“Basically, the feds impose damaging new taxes and trade restrictions on farmers for reasons mostly related to ideology and rent-seeking, then undo their effects by making farmers more dependent on government largesse. Often lost in the discussion, but one reason that U.S. farmers are so dependent on selling commodity crops to China and elsewhere is that past policies essentially subsidized them to do so.
Like with all things political, various federal farm policies have created a series of odd bedfellows. Many environmental groups have lauded past farm bills because they provide incentives for farmers to set aside land as open space, but overall the federal meddling has harmed the environment. For instance, federal sugar subsidies have greatly diminished the Florida Everglades by encouraging the conversion of wetlands into sugar fields.”
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“All these policies drive up food prices for non-farmers and reduce our choices in meats and produce.”
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“Instead of creating this convoluted, counterproductive policy that mimics a Rube Goldberg farce, the government should do the basics to help farmers. It should scuttle tariffs, halt subsidies, eliminate costly shipping levies, create a guest-worker program so farmers can have a consistent labor source, lower taxes, bolster water infrastructure and let markets do the rest.”
“President Donald Trump threatened on Friday morning to raise prices on iPhones sold in the United States, as he threatened to slap a 25 percent tariff on Apple smartphones that aren’t built in the United States.
“I have long ago informed Tim Cook of Apple that I expect their iPhone’s (sic) that will be sold in the United States of America will be manufactured and built in the United States, not India, or anyplace else,” Trump posted on Truth Social. “If that is not the case, a Tariff of at least 25% must be paid by Apple to the U.S.”
In either outcome, consumers will have to pay more. A 25 percent tariff on iPhones built in other countries would, of course, artificially inflate prices. On the other hand, an American-made iPhone would likely be even more expensive: one estimate pegs the cost of an American-made iPhone at around $3,500.”
“Yoshida at first glance appeared to be quite helpful to the Trump administration.
The court concluded that the tariff was legally justified under the TWEA to address the trade imbalance and pointed to language in the statute that authorized the president to “regulate” the “importation” of foreign goods in the event of an emergency. That language was carried over into IEEPA as part of a much longer list of actions permitted by the president, though that list does not explicitly mention either tariffs or taxes (a point to which we will return).
In light of the parallel statutory language in TWEA and IEEPA, the Justice Department argued that Yoshida “continues to control today” and requires the Court of International Trade to rule in favor of the Trump administration.
As Wednesday’s decision makes clear, it was not so simple.
In several crucial respects, the Yoshida decision cut sharply against the administration’s position. That put the Justice Department in the awkward — and generally unenviable — position of having to pick and choose which parts of the decision that it likes, and which parts of the decision the courts should ignore.
For starters, the Yoshida decision rejected a key proposition that is at the heart of the government’s defense of Trump’s tariffs — the notion that courts have no power to review a president’s actions under IEEPA.
The court ruled in Yoshida that each presidential action under the statute “must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances.” The court went on to emphasize that its ruling, while favorable to the Nixon administration, was not a blanket approval of “any future surcharge of a different nature, or any surcharge differently applied or any surcharge not reasonably related to the emergency declared;” that the president’s actions under the statute “must also bear a reasonable relation to the particular emergency confronted;” and that “emergencies are expected to be shortlived.”
In other words, the facts matter. But the facts then under Nixon — and the facts now under Trump — are markedly different.
Nixon’s tariff was fixed at 10 percent and in place for less than five months. Trump’s tariff framework is far more ambitious, open-ended and has been all over the place since his inauguration — with the effective dates and applicable countries, rates, exceptions and concessions under seemingly constant revision.
And if Trump and some of his advisors are to be believed, there would be no end in sight. “If President Trump succeeds like he wants to succeed,” Trump’s trade adviser Peter Navarro said earlier this year, “we are going to structurally shift the American economy from one over-reliant on income taxes and the Internal Revenue Service, to one which is also reliant on tariff revenue and the External Revenue Service.” That is a far cry from a five-month, supplemental 10 percent tariff like what Nixon imposed.
Two other, subtler points in the Yoshida decision made things worse for the administration.
First, Nixon’s tariff did not apply to all imports — only those that had been the subject of prior concessions under the government’s tariff schedule — and Nixon made clear in announcing the policy that the rates would nevertheless be capped at levels that Congress had previously set for the relevant goods. As a result, the court concluded in Yoshida that “the congressionally established rates remained untouched” and that Nixon was not claiming the power to simply impose “whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.”
Trump made no such concessions, which made it a relatively straightforward matter for the court on Wednesday to contrast Nixon’s “limited” tariffs with those imposed by Trump. Indeed, given the administration’s position that the courts cannot review Trump’s emergency declarations in support of the tariffs or circumscribe his authority to issue tariffs under IEEPA, he has effectively claimed the power not just to issue “whatever tariff rates he deems desirable” but to impose those tariffs whenever he wants, for any reason that he wants and for however long he wants.
Second, as a footnote in the Yoshida decision notes, Congress later enacted a specific statutory provision to address the problem that attracted the Nixon administration’s attention. That provision authorizes the president to impose tariffs in response to “large and serious … balance-of-payments deficits,” but it caps those tariffs at 15 percent and limits them to a duration of just 150 days unless Congress authorizes an extension.
Needless to say, the Trump administration did not invoke that statute, and Justice Department lawyers sought to downplay its significance given the fact that Congress kept the statutory language at issue in Yoshida on the books in IEEPA.
This argument also did not move the three judges on the Court of International Trade. They concluded that the existence of the statute demonstrated that “even ‘large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits’ do not necessitate the use of emergency powers” and that they “justify only the President’s imposition of limited remedies subject to enumerated procedural constraints.”
The argument was rooted in the conclusion in Yoshida that if a president wanted to impose a similar tariff in the future, he must “comply with the statute now governing such action.”
Trump, of course, had no interest in doing that.
There is no way to definitively predict how the appellate court — and eventually the Supreme Court”
U.S. debt is becoming more expensive because interest rates on U.S. debt are going up. The U.S. has to pay more to maintain the debt. Trump’s trade wars, and his continuation and growing of U.S. deficits, are causing this. Trump’s erratic tariff behavior causes uncertainty and discourages investment.
“President Donald Trump claims that the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 grants him the power to deport certain Venezuelan-born aliens without due process, based on the mere allegation of membership in a criminal street gang.
But the text of the Alien Enemies Act does not allow the president to do anything of the sort. “Whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any foreign nation or government,” the act states, the president may direct the “removal” of “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized.”
The crimes of the alleged members of the street gang Tren de Aragua do not meet this legal standard. There is no “declared war” between the United States and Venezuela, and there is no “invasion or predatory incursion” of the U.S. by “any foreign nation or government.” The gang is not a foreign state, and the gang’s alleged crimes, heinous as they may be, do not qualify as acts of war by a foreign state. Trump’s frequent talk about a rhetorical “invasion” of the U.S. by undocumented immigrants utterly fails to satisfy the law’s requirements.”
“The direct cost of President Donald Trump’s trade war will be borne by American consumers and businesses—of that, there should no longer be much debate.
But trade wars also come with indirect costs and unforeseen consequences. Some of those show up on balance sheets in the form of lower profits, losses in the stock market, or stagnating wages. Some are best counted under the Christmas tree, where higher prices might mean fewer toys (as the president now admits) and other goodies that make life a little more joyful, as tariffs squeeze wallets and reduce discretionary income.
Others are trickier to sum up, but that doesn’t mean they don’t exist.
“The administration’s trade policy sends a message to the world: America is an unreliable ally that sees you only as a source of wealth; and if you don’t have wealth, you’ll pay for it,””
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“”The United States’ role as a linchpin of this system has enhanced its position as the pre-eminent global power,” writes Murray. “Yet the new administration’s curious tariff policy threatens all of this, for no discernible benefit.””
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“American soft power rides on the back of the global trading system. American investment and purchasing power help build factories and lift people out of extreme poverty. For the countries that benefit from all that, American interests are first and foremost. Take away the benefits of trade, and the rest fades too, warns Murray.
Higher tariffs and reduced global trade “kills US soft power with these nations and leaves a geopolitical vacuum into which US rivals like China will expand,” he writes. “High tariff rates on south east Asian countries, for example, will exacerbate the drift of those countries towards the Chinese sphere of influence that has been happening in the wake of trade uncertainty since the first Trump administration.””
“Trump had used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs on nearly all imports to the U.S., even though that law narrowly authorizes presidential actions only in response to “an unusual and extraordinary threat.”
International commerce is plainly neither of those things, as the court concluded in its ruling. “We do not read IEEPA to delegate an unbounded tariff authority to the President,” the judges wrote. “We instead read IEEPA’s provisions to impose meaningful limits on any such authority it confers.”
By reviewing the actions of the executive branch to ensure they comport with the underlying law, the Court of International Trade merely fulfilled the constitutional role of the judiciary. ”
“High-end medical devices, including those made by American manufacturers, may be especially vulnerable as many machines are built of components from a dozen vendors around the world. Some scanners cost millions of dollars and are so cutting-edge that hospitals publish a press release when they arrive.”
“There’s nothing “hostile and political” about informing the public of the negative consequences of poor economic policy. Were Amazon actually to go through with such a plan, they would be doing America a public service, not serving “a Chinese propaganda arm.””