{"id":12955,"date":"2024-02-20T18:35:40","date_gmt":"2024-02-20T18:35:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lonecandle.com\/?p=12955"},"modified":"2024-02-20T18:35:40","modified_gmt":"2024-02-20T18:35:40","slug":"how-israels-war-went-wrong","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/?p=12955","title":{"rendered":"How Israel\u2019s war went wrong"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\n\n“At least 28,000 Palestinians<\/a> are already confirmed dead, with more likely lying in the rubble. Around 70 percent of Gaza\u2019s homes<\/a> have been damaged or destroyed; at least 85 percent of Gaza\u2019s population has been displaced<\/a>. The indirect death toll from starvation and disease will likely be higher. One academic estimate suggested that nearly 500,000 Palestinians will die within a year<\/a> unless the war is brought to a halt, reflecting both the physical damage to Gaza\u2019s infrastructure and the consequences of Israel\u2019s decision to besiege Gaza on day three of the war. (While the siege has been relaxed somewhat, limitations on aid flow remain strict<\/a>.)…
“There\u2019s no doubt that the IDF has done significant damage to Hamas’s infrastructure. Israel has killed or captured somewhere around one-third of Hamas\u2019s fighting force<\/a>, destroyed at least half of its rocket stockpile<\/a>, and demolished somewhere between 20 and 40 percent of its tunnel network under Gaza<\/a>. The more the war goes on, the higher those numbers will become.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But as significant as these achievements are, \u201cnone of them come close to eliminating Hamas\u201d”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“When I surveyed over a dozen experts about the war back in October<\/a>, they warned that Israel had a dangerously loose understanding of what the war was about. The stated aim of \u201cdestroying Hamas\u201d was at once maximalist and open-ended: It wasn\u2019t clear how it could be accomplished or what limit there might be on the means used in its pursuit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Israel\u2019s conduct in the war so far has vindicated these fears. The embrace of an objective at once so massive and vague has dragged Israel down the moral nadir documented in Abraham\u2019s reporting, with unclear and perhaps even self-defeating ends. It is a situation that Matt Duss<\/a>, the executive vice president at the Center for International Policy, terms \u201can era-defining catastrophe.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Things did not have to be this way. After the horrific events of October 7, Israel had an obviously just claim to wage a defensive war against Hamas \u2014 and the tactical and strategic capabilities to execute a smarter, more limited, and more humane war plan<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The blame for this failure lies with Israel\u2019s terrible wartime leadership: an extremist government headed by Benjamin \u201cBibi\u201d Netanyahu<\/a>, a venal prime minister currently on trial for corruption<\/a> who has placed his personal interests over his country\u2019s even during wartime.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“For Walzer, Israel cannot wage war justly when Gazan civilians truly cannot escape.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“In previous wars with Hamas, Israel\u2019s primary objective had been degrading Hamas\u2019s military capabilities and deterring it from attacking Israel in the near future. These are relatively limited aims that can be accomplished through more discriminate military means. Israel didn\u2019t need to destroy every Hamas rocket launcher or kill every commander \u2014 but rather do just enough damage to buy itself some safety.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“A significant level of civilian death is inevitable in urban warfare, and especially in Gaza given Hamas\u2019s despicable tactic of stationing military assets in and around schools<\/a> and hospitals<\/a>. The IDF is facing a profoundly challenging operating environment with few true historical parallels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet this does not absolve Israel of its decision to adopt a maximalist war aim or the unusually brutal tactics that followed from it. These were choices Israeli leaders made”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“In the outlines offered by Israeli leadership early in the war, \u201cdestroying Hamas\u201d could only be accomplished by replacing its regime in Gaza with something new and durable. In October, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said this explicitly<\/a> \u2014 that the war must end with the \u201ccreation of a new security regime in the Gaza Strip [and] the removal of Israel\u2019s responsibility for day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regime change is the only<\/em> conceivable way Israel could deliver on its long-shot objective of destroying Hamas. Yet, shockingly, Israel has no clear plan for what comes next. Every source I spoke to with knowledge of Israeli planning confirmed this; so does<\/a> a volume<\/a> of publicly<\/a> available reporting<\/a> and some recent comments from Netanyahu spokesperson Avi Hyman<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAll discussions about the day after Hamas will be had the day after Hamas,\u201d Hyman said during a press briefing.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“In the long run, making Israel look like the depraved side serves two strategic goals for Hamas. First, it puts the Palestinian issue back at the top of the Arab and international political agenda. Second, it convinces Palestinians that Israel must be fought with arms \u2014 and that Hamas, rather than the more peace-oriented Fatah, should be leading their struggle. Polling data both in Palestine<\/a> and elsewhere<\/a> suggest that they have made inroads on both fronts since October 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By inflicting mass suffering on Palestinians without a long-term plan for addressing the political consequences of their misery, Israel is playing right into Hamas\u2019s hands. The current Israeli approach is less likely to destroy the militant group than to strengthen it.”https:\/\/www.vox.com\/24055522\/israel-hamas-gaza-war-strategy-netanyahu-strategy-morality<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

“At least 28,000 Palestinians are already confirmed dead, with more likely lying in the rubble. Around 70 percent of Gaza\u2019s homes have been damaged or destroyed; at least 85 percent of Gaza\u2019s population has been displaced. The indirect death toll from starvation and disease will likely be higher. One academic estimate suggested that nearly 500,000 Palestinians will die within a year unless the war is brought to a halt, reflecting both the physical damage to Gaza\u2019s infrastructure and the consequences of Israel\u2019s decision to besiege Gaza on day three of the war. (While the siege has been relaxed somewhat, limitations on aid flow remain strict.)
\n…<\/p>\n

“There\u2019s no doubt that the IDF has done significant damage to Hamas’s infrastructure. Israel has killed or captured somewhere around one-third of Hamas\u2019s fighting force, destroyed at least half of its rocket stockpile, and demolished somewhere between 20 and 40 percent of its tunnel network under Gaza. The more the war goes on, the higher those numbers will become.
\nBut as significant as these achievements are, \u201cnone of them come close to eliminating Hamas\u201d”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“When I surveyed over a dozen experts about the war back in October, they warned that Israel had a dangerously loose understanding of what the war was about. The stated aim of \u201cdestroying Hamas\u201d was at once maximalist and open-ended: It wasn\u2019t clear how it could be accomplished or what limit there might be on the means used in its pursuit.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s conduct in the war so far has vindicated these fears. The embrace of an objective at once so massive and vague has dragged Israel down the moral nadir documented in Abraham\u2019s reporting, with unclear and perhaps even self-defeating ends. It is a situation that Matt Duss, the executive vice president at the Center for International Policy, terms \u201can era-defining catastrophe.\u201d<\/p>\n

Things did not have to be this way. After the horrific events of October 7, Israel had an obviously just claim to wage a defensive war against Hamas \u2014 and the tactical and strategic capabilities to execute a smarter, more limited, and more humane war plan.<\/p>\n

The blame for this failure lies with Israel\u2019s terrible wartime leadership: an extremist government headed by Benjamin \u201cBibi\u201d Netanyahu, a venal prime minister currently on trial for corruption who has placed his personal interests over his country\u2019s even during wartime.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“For Walzer, Israel cannot wage war justly when Gazan civilians truly cannot escape.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“In previous wars with Hamas, Israel\u2019s primary objective had been degrading Hamas\u2019s military capabilities and deterring it from attacking Israel in the near future. These are relatively limited aims that can be accomplished through more discriminate military means. Israel didn\u2019t need to destroy every Hamas rocket launcher or kill every commander \u2014 but rather do just enough damage to buy itself some safety.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“A significant level of civilian death is inevitable in urban warfare, and especially in Gaza given Hamas\u2019s despicable tactic of stationing military assets in and around schools and hospitals. The IDF is facing a profoundly challenging operating environment with few true historical parallels.<\/p>\n

Yet this does not absolve Israel of its decision to adopt a maximalist war aim or the unusually brutal tactics that followed from it. These were choices Israeli leaders made”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“In the outlines offered by Israeli leadership early in the war, \u201cdestroying Hamas\u201d could only be accomplished by replacing its regime in Gaza with something new and durable. In October, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said this explicitly \u2014 that the war must end with the \u201ccreation of a new security regime in the Gaza Strip [and] the removal of Israel\u2019s responsibility for day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip.\u201d<\/p>\n

Regime change is the only conceivable way Israel could deliver on its long-shot objective of destroying Hamas. Yet, shockingly, Israel has no clear plan for what comes next. Every source I spoke to with knowledge of Israeli planning confirmed this; so does a volume of publicly available reporting and some recent comments from Netanyahu spokesperson Avi Hyman.<\/p>\n

\u201cAll discussions about the day after Hamas will be had the day after Hamas,\u201d Hyman said during a press briefing.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“In the long run, making Israel look like the depraved side serves two strategic goals for Hamas. First, it puts the Palestinian issue back at the top of the Arab and international political agenda. Second, it convinces Palestinians that Israel must be fought with arms \u2014 and that Hamas, rather than the more peace-oriented Fatah, should be leading their struggle. Polling data both in Palestine and elsewhere suggest that they have made inroads on both fronts since October 7.<\/p>\n

By inflicting mass suffering on Palestinians without a long-term plan for addressing the political consequences of their misery, Israel is playing right into Hamas\u2019s hands. The current Israeli approach is less likely to destroy the militant group than to strengthen it.”<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.vox.com\/24055522\/israel-hamas-gaza-war-strategy-netanyahu-strategy-morality<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[552,1301,194,391,196,389,108,115,158],"class_list":["post-12955","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article-share","tag-conflict","tag-hamas","tag-israel","tag-middle-east","tag-netanyahu","tag-palestine","tag-terrorism","tag-terrorists","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12955","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=12955"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12955\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12956,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12955\/revisions\/12956"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=12955"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=12955"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=12955"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}