\n\n“it wasn\u2019t as if those running the Texas energy system\u2019s various fiefdoms\u2014the grid, the power plants, the natural gas\u2013production facilities\u2014hadn\u2019t been warned about the dangers of severe weather. Hell may not freeze over, but history suggests that Texas\u2019s energy system does\u2014and with some frequency. In 1989, in 2003, and in 2011, the state experienced, to varying degrees, simultaneous shutdowns of power plants and parts of its natural gas\u2013producing infrastructure, as significant swaths of both of those critical systems were incapacitated by arctic temperatures, triggering blackouts.
The frigid weather during the first four days of February 2011 knocked off enough power generation throughout ERCOT\u2014about 29,000 megawatts of capacity\u2014that ERCOT initiated blackouts affecting about 3.2 million customers, according to a voluminous postmortem of the failure produced in August 2011 by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corp. That report suggested the state add teeth to its effort to gird its energy infrastructure for wintry weather. Among its policy recommendations was that in states in the Southwest, including Texas, legislatures require power companies to submit winterization plans and give their public-utility commissions the authority to require senior executives of power companies to sign off on those plans and the authority \u201cto impose penalties for non-compliance.\u201d Magness, the ERCOT chief, said that in the wake of the 2011 report he and others met with Texas power generators to suggest that they better winterize their facilities. He was asking, not telling. \u201cIt wasn\u2019t a conversation like, `I\u2019m your regulator and you have to do this,\u2019\u201d he recalled. \u201cIt was sharing those best practices.\u201d”
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“Under the deregulation scheme passed by the Legislature more than two decades ago, Texas has a market design that allows generators to make money only by selling juice\u2014not for investing in equipment that could help produce extra power in the event of an emergency. Critics contend that this approach, part and parcel of Texas\u2019s aversion to regulation, makes the state\u2019s energy system less reliable, even as it boosts profits for some market participants. Based on their biographies on the ERCOT website, at least eleven of the fifteen ERCOT board members have current or prior ties to the energy industry.”
…
“Texas lawmakers, as they investigate what went wrong this past week, ought to explore weatherization mandates.”
…
“better weatherizing power infrastructure, like inducing electricity producers to invest in extra generating capacity, likely would raise Texans\u2019s electricity rates. \u201cIs it worth the cost to consumers?\u201d he asked. I asked him if ERCOT had any answer to that question. \u201cI am not aware,\u201d he said, \u201cthat we have ever conducted a real cost-benefit analysis on that topic.\u201d”
…
“the electricity blackout and frozen pipes in Texas had significantly curtailed the state\u2019s production of oil and natural gas. IHS estimated that nearly 20 percent of natural-gas production, and perhaps an equal or greater percentage of oil production, in the continental U.S. in the first half of February had been shut in\u2014and that the Permian Basin, the big oil-producing region that sits largely in West Texas, accounted for the biggest share of that production drop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A couple of hours later, the governor, who earlier in the week had called for top ERCOT leaders to resign, issued an announcement. Years after Texas officials had been advised to do so, Abbott said he would ask the Legislature to mandate the winterization of power plants across the state\u2014and to \u201censure the necessary funding\u201d for it.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n