{"id":7540,"date":"2022-03-31T14:55:52","date_gmt":"2022-03-31T14:55:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lonecandle.com\/?p=7540"},"modified":"2022-03-31T14:55:52","modified_gmt":"2022-03-31T14:55:52","slug":"9-big-questions-about-russias-war-in-ukraine-answered","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/?p=7540","title":{"rendered":"9 big questions about Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine, answered"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\n\n“Beneath this rhetoric, according to experts on Russia, lies a deeper unstated fear: that his regime might fall prey to a similar protest movement<\/a>. Ukraine could not succeed, in his view, because it might create a pro-Western model for Russians to emulate \u2014 one that the United States might eventually try to covertly export to Moscow. This was a central part of his thinking in 2014<\/a>, and it remains sotoday.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cHe sees CIA agents behind every anti-Russian political movement,\u201d says Seva Gunitsky, a political scientist who studies Russia at the University of Toronto. \u201cHe thinks the West wants to subvert his regime””<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“\u201cThe formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us,\u201d as he put it in his 2021 essay<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why Putin decided that merely seizing part of Ukraine was no longer enough remains a matter of significant debate among experts. One theory, advanced by Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar<\/a>, is that pandemic-induced isolation drove him to an extreme ideological place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But while the immediate cause of Putin\u2019s shift on Ukraine is not clear, the nature of that shift is. His longtime belief in the urgency of restoring Russia\u2019s greatness curdled into a neo-imperial desire to bring Ukraine back under direct Russian control. And in Russia, where Putin rules basically unchecked, that meant a full-scale war.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“The initial Russian plan reportedly<\/a> operated under the assumption that a swift march on Kyiv would meet only token resistance. Putin \u201cactually really thought this would be a \u2018special military operation\u2019: They would be done in a few days, and it wouldn\u2019t be a real war,\u201d says Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at the CNA think tank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This plan fell apart within the first 48 hours of the war when early operations like an airborne assault on the Hostomel airport ended in disaster<\/a>, forcing Russian generals to develop a new strategy<\/a> on the fly. What they came up with \u2014 massive artillery bombardments<\/a> and attempts to encircle and besiege Ukraine\u2019s major cities<\/a> \u2014 was more effective (and more brutal). The Russians made some inroads into Ukrainian territory, especially in the south, where they have laid siege to Mariupol and taken Kherson and Melitopol.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Russia\u2019s invasion has gone awry for two basic reasons: Its military wasn\u2019t ready to fight a war like this, and the Ukrainians have put up a much stronger defense than anyone expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s problems begin with Putin\u2019s unrealistic invasion plan. But even after the Russian high command adjusted its strategy, other flaws in the army remained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe\u2019re seeing a country militarily implode,\u201d says Robert Farley, a professor who studies air power at the University of Kentucky.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the biggest and most noticeable issues has been rickety logistics. Some of the most famous images of the war have been of Russian armored vehicles parked on Ukrainian roads, seemingly out of gas and unable to advance. The Russian forces have proven to be underequipped and badly supplied, encountering problems ranging from poor communications to inadequate tires<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part of the reason is a lack of sufficient preparation. Per Kofman, the Russian military simply \u201cwasn\u2019t organized for this kind of war\u201d \u2014 meaning, the conquest of Europe\u2019s second-largest country by area. Another part of it is corruption in the Russian procurement system. Graft in Russia is less a bug in its political system than a feature; one way the Kremlin maintains the loyalty of its elite is by allowing them to profit off of government activity<\/a>. Military procurement is no exception to this pattern of widespread corruption, and it has led to troops having substandard access to vital supplies<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The same lack of preparation has plagued Russia\u2019s air force<\/a>. Despite outnumbering the Ukrainian air force by roughly 10 times, the Russians have failed to establish air superiority: Ukraine\u2019s planes are still flying and its air defenses mostly remain in place<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perhaps most importantly, close observers of the war believe Russians are suffering from poor morale. Because Putin\u2019s plan to invade Ukraine was kept secret from the vast majority of Russians, the government had a limited ability to lay a propaganda groundwork that would get their soldiers motivated to fight. The current Russian force has little sense of what they\u2019re fighting for or why \u2014 and are waging war against a country with which they have religious, ethnic, historical, and potentially even familial ties. In a military that has long had systemic morale problems, that\u2019s a recipe for battlefield disaster.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Vladimir Putin\u2019s government has ramped up its already repressive policies<\/a> during the Ukraine conflict, shuttering independent media outlets and blocking access to Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram<\/a>. It\u2019s now extremely difficult to get a sense of what either ordinary Russians or the country\u2019s elite think about the war, as criticizing it could lead to a lengthy stint in prison.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Putin has done an effective job engaging in what political scientists call \u201ccoup-proofing.\u201d He has put in barriers \u2014 from seeding the military with counterintelligence officers to splitting up the state security services into different groups led by trusted allies \u2014 that make it quite difficult for anyone in his government to successfully move against him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cPutin has prepared for this eventuality for a long time and has taken a lot of concerted actions to make sure he\u2019s not vulnerable,\u201d says Adam Casey, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Michigan who studies the history of coups in Russia and the former communist bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, turning the antiwar protests into a full-blown influential movement is a very tall order.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Most other countries around the world fall somewhere on the spectrum between the West and China. Outside of Europe, only a handful of mostly pro-American states \u2014 like South Korea, Japan, and Australia<\/a> \u2014 have joined the sanctions regime. The majority of countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America do not support the invasion, but won\u2019t do very much to punish Russia for it either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India is perhaps the most interesting country in this category. A rising Asian democracy that has violently clashed with China in the very recent past<\/a>, it has good reasons to present itself as an American partner in the defense of freedom. Yet India also depends heavily on Russian-made weapons for its own defense and hopes to use its relationship with Russia to limit the Moscow-Beijing partnership. It\u2019s also worth noting that India\u2019s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has strong autocratic inclinations<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The result of all of this is a\u00a0balancing act reminiscent of India\u2019s Cold War approach of \u201cnon-alignment\u201d<\/a>: refusing to side with either the Russian or American positions while\u00a0attempting to maintain decent relations with both<\/a>. India\u2019s perceptions of its strategic interests, more than ideological views about democracy, appear to be shaping its response to the war \u2014 as seems to be the case with quite a few countries around the world.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

https:\/\/www.vox.com\/22989379\/russia-ukraine-war-putin-zelenskyy-us-nato-explainer-questions<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

“Beneath this rhetoric, according to experts on Russia, lies a deeper unstated fear: that his regime might fall prey to a similar protest movement. Ukraine could not succeed, in his view, because it might create a pro-Western model for Russians to emulate \u2014 one that the United States might eventually try to covertly export to Moscow. This was a central part of his thinking in 2014, and it remains so today.<\/p>\n

\u201cHe sees CIA agents behind every anti-Russian political movement,\u201d says Seva Gunitsky, a political scientist who studies Russia at the University of Toronto. \u201cHe thinks the West wants to subvert his regime””<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“\u201cThe formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us,\u201d as he put it in his 2021 essay.<\/p>\n

Why Putin decided that merely seizing part of Ukraine was no longer enough remains a matter of significant debate among experts. One theory, advanced by Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar, is that pandemic-induced isolation drove him to an extreme ideological place.<\/p>\n

But while the immediate cause of Putin\u2019s shift on Ukraine is not clear, the nature of that shift is. His longtime belief in the urgency of restoring Russia\u2019s greatness curdled into a neo-imperial desire to bring Ukraine back under direct Russian control. And in Russia, where Putin rules basically unchecked, that meant a full-scale war.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“The initial Russian plan reportedly operated under the assumption that a swift march on Kyiv would meet only token resistance. Putin \u201cactually really thought this would be a \u2018special military operation\u2019: They would be done in a few days, and it wouldn\u2019t be a real war,\u201d says Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at the CNA think tank.<\/p>\n

This plan fell apart within the first 48 hours of the war when early operations like an airborne assault on the Hostomel airport ended in disaster, forcing Russian generals to develop a new strategy on the fly. What they came up with \u2014 massive artillery bombardments and attempts to encircle and besiege Ukraine\u2019s major cities \u2014 was more effective (and more brutal). The Russians made some inroads into Ukrainian territory, especially in the south, where they have laid siege to Mariupol and taken Kherson and Melitopol.” <\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“Russia\u2019s invasion has gone awry for two basic reasons: Its military wasn\u2019t ready to fight a war like this, and the Ukrainians have put up a much stronger defense than anyone expected.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s problems begin with Putin\u2019s unrealistic invasion plan. But even after the Russian high command adjusted its strategy, other flaws in the army remained.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe\u2019re seeing a country militarily implode,\u201d says Robert Farley, a professor who studies air power at the University of Kentucky.<\/p>\n

One of the biggest and most noticeable issues has been rickety logistics. Some of the most famous images of the war have been of Russian armored vehicles parked on Ukrainian roads, seemingly out of gas and unable to advance. The Russian forces have proven to be underequipped and badly supplied, encountering problems ranging from poor communications to inadequate tires.<\/p>\n

Part of the reason is a lack of sufficient preparation. Per Kofman, the Russian military simply \u201cwasn\u2019t organized for this kind of war\u201d \u2014 meaning, the conquest of Europe\u2019s second-largest country by area. Another part of it is corruption in the Russian procurement system. Graft in Russia is less a bug in its political system than a feature; one way the Kremlin maintains the loyalty of its elite is by allowing them to profit off of government activity. Military procurement is no exception to this pattern of widespread corruption, and it has led to troops having substandard access to vital supplies.<\/p>\n

The same lack of preparation has plagued Russia\u2019s air force. Despite outnumbering the Ukrainian air force by roughly 10 times, the Russians have failed to establish air superiority: Ukraine\u2019s planes are still flying and its air defenses mostly remain in place.<\/p>\n

Perhaps most importantly, close observers of the war believe Russians are suffering from poor morale. Because Putin\u2019s plan to invade Ukraine was kept secret from the vast majority of Russians, the government had a limited ability to lay a propaganda groundwork that would get their soldiers motivated to fight. The current Russian force has little sense of what they\u2019re fighting for or why \u2014 and are waging war against a country with which they have religious, ethnic, historical, and potentially even familial ties. In a military that has long had systemic morale problems, that\u2019s a recipe for battlefield disaster.” <\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“Vladimir Putin\u2019s government has ramped up its already repressive policies during the Ukraine conflict, shuttering independent media outlets and blocking access to Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. It\u2019s now extremely difficult to get a sense of what either ordinary Russians or the country\u2019s elite think about the war, as criticizing it could lead to a lengthy stint in prison.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“Putin has done an effective job engaging in what political scientists call \u201ccoup-proofing.\u201d He has put in barriers \u2014 from seeding the military with counterintelligence officers to splitting up the state security services into different groups led by trusted allies \u2014 that make it quite difficult for anyone in his government to successfully move against him.<\/p>\n

\u201cPutin has prepared for this eventuality for a long time and has taken a lot of concerted actions to make sure he\u2019s not vulnerable,\u201d says Adam Casey, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Michigan who studies the history of coups in Russia and the former communist bloc.<\/p>\n

Similarly, turning the antiwar protests into a full-blown influential movement is a very tall order.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“Most other countries around the world fall somewhere on the spectrum between the West and China. Outside of Europe, only a handful of mostly pro-American states \u2014 like South Korea, Japan, and Australia \u2014 have joined the sanctions regime. The majority of countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America do not support the invasion, but won\u2019t do very much to punish Russia for it either.<\/p>\n

India is perhaps the most interesting country in this category. A rising Asian democracy that has violently clashed with China in the very recent past, it has good reasons to present itself as an American partner in the defense of freedom. Yet India also depends heavily on Russian-made weapons for its own defense and hopes to use its relationship with Russia to limit the Moscow-Beijing partnership. It\u2019s also worth noting that India\u2019s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has strong autocratic inclinations.<\/p>\n

The result of all of this is a balancing act reminiscent of India\u2019s Cold War approach of \u201cnon-alignment\u201d: refusing to side with either the Russian or American positions while attempting to maintain decent relations with both. India\u2019s perceptions of its strategic interests, more than ideological views about democracy, appear to be shaping its response to the war \u2014 as seems to be the case with quite a few countries around the world.”<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[552,390,924,272,355,314,1545,259,315,311,158],"class_list":["post-7540","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article-share","tag-conflict","tag-diplomacy","tag-eastern-europe","tag-foreign-affairs","tag-foreign-policy","tag-international-relations","tag-invasion","tag-military","tag-russia","tag-ukraine","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7540","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7540"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7540\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7541,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7540\/revisions\/7541"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7540"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7540"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7540"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}