{"id":7542,"date":"2022-03-31T16:30:43","date_gmt":"2022-03-31T16:30:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lonecandle.com\/?p=7542"},"modified":"2022-03-31T16:30:43","modified_gmt":"2022-03-31T16:30:43","slug":"why-india-isnt-denouncing-russias-ukraine-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/?p=7542","title":{"rendered":"Why India isn\u2019t denouncing Russia\u2019s Ukraine war"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\n\n“India forged a relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That has carried over into the present day because of mutual interest and nostalgia, but the biggest reason might be defense. India\u2019s arsenal is largely Soviet- or Russian-made; various analysts put the amount anywhere between 60<\/a> and 85 percent<\/a>. And India needs its military to counter what it sees as the biggest threat in its neighborhood: China\u2019s rise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s rise is also the reason India and the United States have deepened their partnership in recent years; India is a member of the \u201cQuad\u201d<\/a> (along with the US, Australia, and Japan), an informal alliance that came about years ago but which both the Trump and Biden administrations have sought to strengthen. The Quad doesn\u2019t explicitly say it exists as a counterweight to Beijing; it\u2019s a grouping of democracies focused on regional cooperation and other issues. But everyone \u2014 including China<\/a> \u2014 gets it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The antagonism between Washington and Moscow, made worse by Ukraine, puts India in an uncomfortable bind. Except India is used to this. In the Cold War, India practiced nonalignment, where it sought to avoid becoming entangled in the superpower conflicts and maintain its sovereignty. Although that policy has evolved in the decades since, the idea of autonomy still undergirds how India sees its foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India \u201ccan really silo off relationships,\u201d said Derek Grossman, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, focusing on national security and the Indo-Pacific region. \u201cThe relationship they have with Russia should have no bearing whatsoever on their relationships with China, the US, or anybody else.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is why India has walked a careful tightrope since Russia launched its war. Prime Minister Modi spoke to both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy<\/a> shortly after the invasion, reportedly saying in these calls that he wished for an end to hostilities and a return to dialogue. Modi has had to work with both governments over efforts to evacuate thousands of Indian citizens<\/a> stranded in Ukraine. (At least one Indian student was killed<\/a> in the siege on Kharkiv.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While India hasn\u2019t denounced Russia, it has made some pointed comments. India\u2019s Ambassador to the United Nations said in a statement after an abstention on a February 27 UN Security Council vote that the global order is anchored in \u201crespect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states.<\/a>\u201d (That element \u2014 Russia\u2019s unprovoked incursion into a sovereign Ukraine \u2014 is the one that India might be most sensitive<\/a> to because of its own border dispute with China<\/a>.)”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“The Soviet Union and India saw a benefit in relying on each other to counter China and a possible US-China partnership. But India got another perk: Soviet weaponry at what Ganguly called \u201cbargain basement\u201d prices. From the 1970s onward, India built up its military with Soviet, and later Russian, arms and equipment. Even today, the majority of India\u2019s weaponry is of Soviet or Russian origin. Since 2010, Russia makes up two-thirds of India\u2019s arms imports. New Delhi remains Moscow\u2019s biggest arms importer<\/a>, according to data compiled from the Congressional Research Service<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India has tried to diversify, going to the United Kingdom<\/a> and France<\/a> and Israel<\/a>, and especially, the United States<\/a>. As the relationship between the US and India grew in the past few decades, so, too, did defense cooperation \u2014 to the tune ofbillions in arms sales<\/a>. But it\u2019s still nowhere near the amount Russia provides. It\u2019s also not as simple as just swapping out Russian stuff with new, US-made stuff. \u201cOver the last 10 years, Indians have been steadily trying to reduce their dependence on Russia,\u201d Ganguly said. \u201cBut it\u2019s damn difficult.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India needs spare parts to maintain the equipment it already has; arms imports from the US or elsewhere may be inoperable with Russian equipment. India also doesn\u2019t have unlimited funds for defense, and US arms may not come as cheap as Russia\u2019s<\/a>. \u201cIt\u2019s not [as though] you can just turn it off and stop the purchases now,\u201d said Deepa Ollapally, a political scientist specializing in Indian foreign policy at George Washington University. \u201cYou\u2019ve got to take care of your entire arsenal, which it won\u2019t be that easy to do.\u201d”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Experts also cautioned against completely pigeonholing India\u2019s connection to Russia as solely transactional. India\u2019s history of being brutally colonized by the British<\/a> still makes it somewhat wary of being told what to do by the West.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“India\u2019s biggest concern remains Beijing, especially in the Himalayas, where a decades-old border dispute with China<\/a> remains a serious source of tension, including a 2020 flare-up, which reportedly left 20 Indian soldiers dead<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 But Moscow has grown closer with Beijing, too. In the lead-up to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Putin visited Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, during the Olympics. The two said there were \u201cno limits\u201d<\/a> to their partnership, and Putin may have planned his war around the Beijing Games at the request of Chinese officials, according to Western intelligence sources.<\/a>“
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“India still sees Russia as a possible partner in the region, but the more leverage China has over Russia, the less likely that will play out in India\u2019s favor.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

https:\/\/www.vox.com\/22982698\/india-russia-ukraine-war-putin-modi<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

“India forged a relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That has carried over into the present day because of mutual interest and nostalgia, but the biggest reason might be defense. India\u2019s arsenal is largely Soviet- or Russian-made; various analysts put the amount anywhere between 60 and 85 percent. And India needs its military to counter what it sees as the biggest threat in its neighborhood: China\u2019s rise.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s rise is also the reason India and the United States have deepened their partnership in recent years; India is a member of the \u201cQuad\u201d (along with the US, Australia, and Japan), an informal alliance that came about years ago but which both the Trump and Biden administrations have sought to strengthen. The Quad doesn\u2019t explicitly say it exists as a counterweight to Beijing; it\u2019s a grouping of democracies focused on regional cooperation and other issues. But everyone \u2014 including China \u2014 gets it.<\/p>\n

The antagonism between Washington and Moscow, made worse by Ukraine, puts India in an uncomfortable bind. Except India is used to this. In the Cold War, India practiced nonalignment, where it sought to avoid becoming entangled in the superpower conflicts and maintain its sovereignty. Although that policy has evolved in the decades since, the idea of autonomy still undergirds how India sees its foreign policy.<\/p>\n

India \u201ccan really silo off relationships,\u201d said Derek Grossman, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, focusing on national security and the Indo-Pacific region. \u201cThe relationship they have with Russia should have no bearing whatsoever on their relationships with China, the US, or anybody else.\u201d<\/p>\n

It is why India has walked a careful tightrope since Russia launched its war. Prime Minister Modi spoke to both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy shortly after the invasion, reportedly saying in these calls that he wished for an end to hostilities and a return to dialogue. Modi has had to work with both governments over efforts to evacuate thousands of Indian citizens stranded in Ukraine. (At least one Indian student was killed in the siege on Kharkiv.)<\/p>\n

While India hasn\u2019t denounced Russia, it has made some pointed comments. India\u2019s Ambassador to the United Nations said in a statement after an abstention on a February 27 UN Security Council vote that the global order is anchored in \u201crespect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states.\u201d (That element \u2014 Russia\u2019s unprovoked incursion into a sovereign Ukraine \u2014 is the one that India might be most sensitive to because of its own border dispute with China.)”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“The Soviet Union and India saw a benefit in relying on each other to counter China and a possible US-China partnership. But India got another perk: Soviet weaponry at what Ganguly called \u201cbargain basement\u201d prices. From the 1970s onward, India built up its military with Soviet, and later Russian, arms and equipment. Even today, the majority of India\u2019s weaponry is of Soviet or Russian origin. Since 2010, Russia makes up two-thirds of India\u2019s arms imports. New Delhi remains Moscow\u2019s biggest arms importer, according to data compiled from the Congressional Research Service.<\/p>\n

India has tried to diversify, going to the United Kingdom and France and Israel, and especially, the United States. As the relationship between the US and India grew in the past few decades, so, too, did defense cooperation \u2014 to the tune of billions in arms sales. But it\u2019s still nowhere near the amount Russia provides. It\u2019s also not as simple as just swapping out Russian stuff with new, US-made stuff. \u201cOver the last 10 years, Indians have been steadily trying to reduce their dependence on Russia,\u201d Ganguly said. \u201cBut it\u2019s damn difficult.\u201d<\/p>\n

India needs spare parts to maintain the equipment it already has; arms imports from the US or elsewhere may be inoperable with Russian equipment. India also doesn\u2019t have unlimited funds for defense, and US arms may not come as cheap as Russia\u2019s. \u201cIt\u2019s not [as though] you can just turn it off and stop the purchases now,\u201d said Deepa Ollapally, a political scientist specializing in Indian foreign policy at George Washington University. \u201cYou\u2019ve got to take care of your entire arsenal, which it won\u2019t be that easy to do.\u201d”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“Experts also cautioned against completely pigeonholing India\u2019s connection to Russia as solely transactional. India\u2019s history of being brutally colonized by the British still makes it somewhat wary of being told what to do by the West.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“India\u2019s biggest concern remains Beijing, especially in the Himalayas, where a decades-old border dispute with China remains a serious source of tension, including a 2020 flare-up, which reportedly left 20 Indian soldiers dead.<\/p>\n

But Moscow has grown closer with Beijing, too. In the lead-up to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Putin visited Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, during the Olympics. The two said there were \u201cno limits\u201d to their partnership, and Putin may have planned his war around the Beijing Games at the request of Chinese officials, according to Western intelligence sources.”<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

“India still sees Russia as a possible partner in the region, but the more leverage China has over Russia, the less likely that will play out in India\u2019s favor.”<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[552,390,272,355,83,314,1545,315,311,158],"class_list":["post-7542","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article-share","tag-conflict","tag-diplomacy","tag-foreign-affairs","tag-foreign-policy","tag-india","tag-international-relations","tag-invasion","tag-russia","tag-ukraine","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7542","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7542"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7542\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7543,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7542\/revisions\/7543"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7542"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7542"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lonecandle.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7542"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}