“The FTC’s stated motivation for challenging the merger was to avoid “higher prices for groceries and other essential household items for millions of Americans.””
…
“Kroger and Albertsons would still only account for 9 percent of overall grocery sales, as C. Jarrett Dieterle has noted in Reason, belying the FTC’s concerns that the merger would grant them significant market power. The FTC’s overly narrow definition of the grocery market is the actual cause of concern: The Commission’s definition includes traditional supermarkets and “hypermarkets” like Walmart and Target, but excludes Amazon and Costco, the second and third largest grocery retailers, respectively.
Considering Kroger’s and Albertsons’ single-digit shares of the properly defined market, and competition from other grocers not recognized by the FTC, the merger was more likely to save Albertsons from insolvency, not afford them enough market power to increase prices. Kroger and Albertsons projected the merger would create $500 million in cost savings—at least some of which would be passed onto consumers. The pair also planned to invest $1.3 billion to improve customer service, according to Nate Scherer, a policy analyst with the American Consumer Institute, a nonprofit research institute dedicated to the promotion of consumer welfare.”
“In a newly-released research paper, Evan Cunningham, a Ph.D candidate in Economics at the University of Minnesota, studied the effects of Amazon’s continued spread across the country—growing from just a handful of warehouses, or “fulfillment centers,” in 2010, to more than 1,300 today in the U.S. alone. On balance, it turns out that Amazon warehouses provide a net positive to local economies.
“I find Amazon’s entry in a metro [area] increases the total employment rate by 1.0 percentage points and average wages by 0.7 percent,” Cunningham writes. “The composition of employment shifts from retail and wholesale trade to warehousing and tradeable services, primarily driven by younger workers. Employment gains are concentrated among non-college workers.”
There are also some drawbacks, though it largely depends on your perspective. “Amazon’s entry increases rents by 1.1 percent and the cost of utilities by 6.0 percent,” while “average home values increase by 5.6 percent.” Higher rents and utility rates may not sound particularly appealing, but Cunningham notes that this is a result of higher housing demand: “The average worker is willing to pay $329 per year to live in a large U.S. city after Amazon’s entry, relative to a counterfactual U.S. economy where Amazon did not expand. This increase was primarily driven by rising home values, implying the benefits accrued to home owners.””
“big study gave 1,000 low-income people $1,000 per month for three years—no strings attached. What happened?
Not the great things that were promised. After three years of getting $1,000/month, UBI recipients were actually a little deeper in debt than before.
Why? Because they worked less. Their partners did, too.
Some recipients talked about starting businesses, but few actually tried it. Most who said they did start a business waited until the third year of the study—when their free money was about to end.”
“Capitalists create new wealth. They don’t take a big slice of the pie and leave us a sliver. If they get rich, it’s because they find ways to bake lots of new pies.
That’s what’s happened in America. Its why today, even poor Americans have access to things European kings only dreamed about.
Capitalists can get rich only by making all of us better off.
Actual economist Dan Mitchell explains, “Billionaires only kept 2.2 percent of the additional wealth they generated….The rest of us captured almost 98 percent of the benefits.””
Trump played a key role in destroying the USFL in the 1980s?
“The NFL would later introduce extensive evidence designed to prove that the USFL followed Trump’s merger strategy, and that this strategy ultimately caused the USFL’s downfall. The merger strategy, the NFL argued, involved escalating financial competition for players as a means of putting pressure on NFL expenses, playing in the fall to impair NFL television revenues, shifting USFL franchises out of cities where NFL teams played into cities thought to be logical expansion (through merger) cities for the NFL, and, finally, bringing an upcoming antitrust litigation..”
“As far as consumer complaints go, of course, there’s nothing wrong with some of the DOJ’s concerns. We might wish that every product we owned was compatible with every other product we owned and that they worked in perfect tandem. We might wish we never had to consider tradeoffs between price, function, design, compatibility, etc.
Where this gets crazy is the federal government saying: Consumers being able to choose whether to use a product is not good enough. We’re going to step in and say that this business has to make a competitor’s products more accessible. It has a legal duty to undermine its own business interests to help outside—and many would argue inferior—products compete.
In the vein of other recent antitrust actions against tech companies, particularly under the Biden administration, the Apple suit relies on an absurd conception of how the law should work. And it’s a conception that could seriously harm innovation, weaken the position of U.S. tech companies, and mess with products many people like.
And many people really, really love Apple products, including iPhones.
The bottom line: Nobody has to use an iPhone, and no developer has to distribute its app through the App Store. There are other ways to communicate, other smartphone options, and other ways to distribute apps (including other ways to distribute apps to iPhone users). That many people still carry iPhones and distribute their apps through the App Store speaks to the fact that many people find the phone’s upsides and the App Store’s upsides stronger than any downsides.”