“On the campaign trail, Trump pledged to put a tariff of between 10 percent and 20 percent on all imports to the United States, along with a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and a 25 percent import surcharge on Canadian and Mexican wares — at least, until our neighbors choke off the flow of all migrants and drugs across America’s northern and southern borders.
This protectionist agenda is far more radical than anything Trump attempted during his first term. It threatens to hamper American tech companies by increasing the cost of semiconductors, depress stock valuations by reducing economic growth and fueling a global trade war, and disrupt the US auto industry, whose supply chains were built around the presumption of duty-free trade with Mexico.
Thus, American investors, executives, and entrepreneurs watched Trump’s first day in office with bated breath: Would his inaugural address and initial executive orders prioritize corporate America’s financial interest in relatively free global exchange — or his own ideological fixation on trade deficits?
Trump’s Day 1 actions did not fully clarify his priorities on this front. In his inaugural speech, the president reiterated his broad commitment to protectionism. Meanwhile, his administration prepared to launch federal investigations into America’s trade deficit in general, as well as the trade practices of China, Mexico, and Canada in particular.
Nevertheless, Trump did not actually establish any new tariffs on his first day in office, as his administration’s arch-protectionists had hoped that he would.
Investors interpreted Trump’s caution as a sign that he would be heeding his advisers’ push for a more limited and incremental tariff policy; stocks rose Monday while the US dollar fell (stiff tariffs would increase the value of America’s currency).
Wall Street’s relief may be premature. Trump appears as ideologically perturbed by America’s trade deficit as ever.”
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“Imposing even a 10 percent tariff on all imported goods would not only harm various business interests, but would also likely increase costs for consumers. Thus, such a duty would harm both Trump’s donors and voters.
If Trump’s first term is any guide, his universal tariff would not even redound to the benefit of American manufacturers, who would be vulnerable to higher costs and retaliatory tariffs from foreign nations. Generally speaking, presidents seek to avoid enacting policies that harm the bulk of their coalition, to the benefit of a narrow band of ideologues. And this is what implementing Trump’s grandest visions for trade policy would likely entail.
Second, the imposition of a universal tariff would roil stock markets. During Trump’s first term in office, he monitored the markets’ performance obsessively, tweeting about it incessantly and suggesting that stock values were a barometer of sound policy, warning in 2018, “If Democrats take over Congress, the stock market will plummet.”
Finally, Trump has recently shown some sensitivity to the interests of his newfound friends in tech, even when those interests conflict with the tenets of rightwing nationalism. Over the holidays, Elon Musk feuded with their co-partisans over the desirability of high-skill immigration and the H-1B visa, which help American tech companies to hire foreign talent. Trump ultimately expressed support for Musk’s position.”
“The FTC’s stated motivation for challenging the merger was to avoid “higher prices for groceries and other essential household items for millions of Americans.””
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“Kroger and Albertsons would still only account for 9 percent of overall grocery sales, as C. Jarrett Dieterle has noted in Reason, belying the FTC’s concerns that the merger would grant them significant market power. The FTC’s overly narrow definition of the grocery market is the actual cause of concern: The Commission’s definition includes traditional supermarkets and “hypermarkets” like Walmart and Target, but excludes Amazon and Costco, the second and third largest grocery retailers, respectively.
Considering Kroger’s and Albertsons’ single-digit shares of the properly defined market, and competition from other grocers not recognized by the FTC, the merger was more likely to save Albertsons from insolvency, not afford them enough market power to increase prices. Kroger and Albertsons projected the merger would create $500 million in cost savings—at least some of which would be passed onto consumers. The pair also planned to invest $1.3 billion to improve customer service, according to Nate Scherer, a policy analyst with the American Consumer Institute, a nonprofit research institute dedicated to the promotion of consumer welfare.”
“In a newly-released research paper, Evan Cunningham, a Ph.D candidate in Economics at the University of Minnesota, studied the effects of Amazon’s continued spread across the country—growing from just a handful of warehouses, or “fulfillment centers,” in 2010, to more than 1,300 today in the U.S. alone. On balance, it turns out that Amazon warehouses provide a net positive to local economies.
“I find Amazon’s entry in a metro [area] increases the total employment rate by 1.0 percentage points and average wages by 0.7 percent,” Cunningham writes. “The composition of employment shifts from retail and wholesale trade to warehousing and tradeable services, primarily driven by younger workers. Employment gains are concentrated among non-college workers.”
There are also some drawbacks, though it largely depends on your perspective. “Amazon’s entry increases rents by 1.1 percent and the cost of utilities by 6.0 percent,” while “average home values increase by 5.6 percent.” Higher rents and utility rates may not sound particularly appealing, but Cunningham notes that this is a result of higher housing demand: “The average worker is willing to pay $329 per year to live in a large U.S. city after Amazon’s entry, relative to a counterfactual U.S. economy where Amazon did not expand. This increase was primarily driven by rising home values, implying the benefits accrued to home owners.””
“big study gave 1,000 low-income people $1,000 per month for three years—no strings attached. What happened?
Not the great things that were promised. After three years of getting $1,000/month, UBI recipients were actually a little deeper in debt than before.
Why? Because they worked less. Their partners did, too.
Some recipients talked about starting businesses, but few actually tried it. Most who said they did start a business waited until the third year of the study—when their free money was about to end.”
“Capitalists create new wealth. They don’t take a big slice of the pie and leave us a sliver. If they get rich, it’s because they find ways to bake lots of new pies.
That’s what’s happened in America. Its why today, even poor Americans have access to things European kings only dreamed about.
Capitalists can get rich only by making all of us better off.
Actual economist Dan Mitchell explains, “Billionaires only kept 2.2 percent of the additional wealth they generated….The rest of us captured almost 98 percent of the benefits.””
Trump played a key role in destroying the USFL in the 1980s?
“The NFL would later introduce extensive evidence designed to prove that the USFL followed Trump’s merger strategy, and that this strategy ultimately caused the USFL’s downfall. The merger strategy, the NFL argued, involved escalating financial competition for players as a means of putting pressure on NFL expenses, playing in the fall to impair NFL television revenues, shifting USFL franchises out of cities where NFL teams played into cities thought to be logical expansion (through merger) cities for the NFL, and, finally, bringing an upcoming antitrust litigation..”