“Most studies define the middle class relative to the national median, which makes the dividing line between haves and have-nots rise automatically as the country gets richer. Rose and Winship instead use a benchmark of fixed purchasing power, so that if real incomes (those adjusted for inflation) rise, more people are shown moving into—or beyond—the middle class in a meaningful sense.
Under this approach, the “core” of the middle class does indeed shrink modestly. But crucially, the middle class shrinks because people are moving up the income ladder, not because they’re falling down. Since 1979, the share of Americans in the upper-middle class has roughly tripled—from about 10 percent to 31 percent—while shares of those considered lower middle class or poor fell substantially.”
Economist Luigi Zingales was on Fox News for something other than the estate tax, but they asked him about it and he said he was for it. He was never invited on Fox News again.
Frank Luntz was hired by the Republican Party and groups funded by super wealthy people to fight the estate tax. He renamed it the death tax so people wouldn’t think of it as a tax that mostly affected the super wealthy.
The problem with the super wealthy and taxes isn’t tax rates, it’s that much of their income is not taxed at all. It isn’t counted as income. Before the fall of Communism, the American super wealthy actually paid taxes, but without the threat of Communism, there wasn’t the pressure to show that capitalism will work for everyone. Many changes, and a lack of reform to catch up with gaming the system, has resulted in the estate tax being a joke and the super wealthy paying very little tax compared to their lifetime income.
High income people pay taxes, but the super wealthy don’t officially have much income. Of course, they do have income, but it doesn’t count and is often never taxed.
“The poorest 10% of households will lose an average of about $1,200 in resources per year, amounting to a 3.1% cut in their income, according to the analysis released Monday of the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” Households in the highest 10% of incomes will see about a $13,600 boost in resources on average, amounting to a 2.7% increase in their incomes.
Earners in the middle of the distribution will see their annual resources grow by about $800 to $1,200 on average, according to the analysis.”
“In 2020, three political scientists studied how location and income affected white voters’ voting decisions. They found that, on a national level, poorer white people were indeed more likely to vote for Trump than richer ones.
But when you factored in local conditions — the fact that your dollar can buy more in Biloxi than Boston — the relationship reverses. “Locally rich” white people, those who had higher incomes than others in their zip codes, were much more likely to support Trump than those who were locally poor. These people might make less money than a wealthy person in a big city, but were doing relatively well when compared to their neighbors.
Put those two results together, and you get a picture that aligns precisely with Hochschild’s observations. Trump’s strongest support comes from people who live in poorer parts of the country, like KY-5, but are still able to live a relatively comfortable life there.
So what does this mean for how we understand the Trump-era right? It cuts through the seemingly interminable debate about Trump’s appeal to “left behind” voters and helps us understand the actual complexity of the right’s appeals to region and class in the United States. America’s divisions are rooted in less income inequality per se than is widely appreciated, and often tied to divisions inside of communities and social groups.
In Stolen Pride, Hochschild locates the heart of Trump’s appeal to rural voters in emotions of pride and shame — including pride in their region’s traditions and shame in what it’s become in an era of declining coal jobs and rising drug addiction.
For Roger Ford, a KY-5 entrepreneur and Republican activist who serves as Hochschild’s exemplar of Trump’s “locally rich” base, Trump helps resolve those emotions by offering someone to blame. Ford may not be suffering personally, but his region is — and Trump’s rage at liberal coastal elites helps him locate a villain outside of his own community.
“He based his deepest sense of pride, it seemed, on his role of defender of his imperiled rural homeland from which so much had been lost — or, as it could feel, ‘stolen,’” she writes.
Ford’s comments to Hochschild shift seamlessly between economic and cultural grievances. In discussing his opposition to transgender rights, he situates it as the latest in a long line of dislocations that people in his region faced.
“With all we’re coping with here, we’re having a hard enough time,” he tells Hochschild. “Then you make it fashionable to choose your gender? Where are we going?”
This comment might make it seem as if economic concerns are somehow prior to cultural ones, and people like Ford are angry at transgender people because of economic deprivation in coal country. But high-quality research tells a different, more complicated story.
In 2022, scholars Kristin Lunz Trujillo and Zack Crowley examined the political consequences of what they call “rural consciousness” for politics. They divide this consciousness into three component parts: “a feeling that ruralites are underrepresented in decision-making (‘Representation’) and that their way of life is disrespected (‘Way of Life’) — both symbolic concerns — and a more materialistic concern that rural areas receive less resources (‘Resources’).”
When they tried to use these different “subdimensions” of rural consciousness to predict Trump support among rural voters, they found something interesting. People who saw the plight of ruralities in cultural and political terms were most likely to support Trump, while those primarily concerned about rural poverty were, if anything, less likely to support him than their neighbors.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the story isn’t simply that economic deprivation breeds cultural resentment. Trump’s strongest supporters in rural areas tend to be angry that their regions don’t set the social terms of American life: that they don’t control the halls of power and that, as a consequence, both political and cultural life is moving away from what they’re comfortable with. Economic decline surely exacerbates this sense of alienation, but it isn’t at the heart of it.”
“if it’s win-win, why just make the minimum $20? Why not $30? Or $100?
Because government requiring higher wages is not a win-win.
Interfering with market prices always creates nasty unintended consequences.”
…
“No. 1: Thousands of Californians have already lost jobs because some restaurants closed. Others lost income because their employer cut worker hours. The chain El Pollo Loco cut employees’ hours by 10 percent.
Pizza Hut announced that they will lay off more than a thousand delivery drivers. One such driver, Michael Ojeda, understandably asked, “What’s the point of a raise if you don’t have a job?”
No. 2: Workers who still have jobs will lose them because now their employers have more incentive to automate. Chipotle just created a robot that makes burrito bowls. Even CNN acknowledged, “Some restaurants are replacing [fast food workers] with kiosks.”
Millennials & Gen-Z are Poorer Than Ever (Here’s Why) Humphrey Yang. 2023 5 17. Have the Boomers Pinched Their Children’s Futures? – with Lord David Willetts The Royal Institution. 2020 1 23. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZuXzvjBYW8A Some numbers at beginning for UK and Europe. The