“All of the United States’ most important governing institutions are failing at once.
Congress, of course, has long been barely able to function. Every year, it struggles merely to fund the rest of the government, and the risk that it will trigger a debt ceiling breach that would set the global economy on fire is alarmingly high.
The Republican Party has atrophied into a cult of personality, centered on an authoritarian who literally tried to overthrow the duly elected United States government. The Democratic Party, meanwhile, may be unable to dislodge a senescent leader who is no longer capable of making the case against his imperious opponent.
And then there’s the Supreme Court, perhaps the only branch of the United States government that is capable of speaking in complete sentences right now. But the most recent Supreme Court term, which ended last week, makes one thing clear: Don’t confuse the Court’s relative eloquence for competence.
The justices are barely able to manage their own docket, even though it’s been shrinking for decades. They publish incompetently drafted decisions that sow confusion throughout the judiciary, then refuse to accept responsibility when those decisions lead to ridiculous and immoral outcomes. They take liberties with the facts of their cases, and they can’t even be trusted to read the plain text of an unambiguous statute correctly. In just the last few years, they’ve overruled so many seminal precedents that law professors no longer know how to teach their classes.
If the justices did not wield such awesome power, and if lawyers who practice before them did not have to treat them with ritualized obsequiousness, most of the justices would be laughingstocks. Few people this famous are so ostentatiously bad at their jobs.
And yet, despite their incompetence, the justices continue to claim more and more power — even though they simply do not have the personnel or expertise needed to address every policy question they’ve added to their own plates.”
…
“The Court’s inability to create sensible legal rules was on full display in its most closely watched decision of the term: Trump v. United States, the presidential immunity case.
The holding of Trump is truly shocking. One question that loomed over this case is, in the words of a lower court judge who earlier heard the Trump case, whether Trump could be prosecuted if he’d ordered “Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival.” Though the Trump opinion does not answer this question directly, it’s hard to read it as permitting such a murderous president to be prosecuted.
For starters, Trump holds “the courts have ‘no power to control [the president’s] discretion’ when he acts pursuant to the powers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution.” One of those powers is the ability to give orders to the military — the Constitution provides that the president “shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor writes in dissent, “When [the president] uses his official powers in any way, under the majority’s reasoning, he now will be insulated from criminal prosecution. Orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival? Immune. Organizes a military coup to hold onto power? Immune. Takes a bribe in exchange for a pardon? Immune. Immune, immune, immune.”
Elsewhere in the opinion, moreover, the Court concludes that presidents enjoy an extremely strong presumption of immunity to prosecution whenever they perform any of the myriad duties entrusted to the president. Under these circumstances, a president is immune “unless the Government can show that applying a criminal prohibition … would pose no ‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.’”
The Court also established that immunity applies even if the president orders the Department of Justice to round up and prosecute all of his political enemies. As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the Court, “the Executive Branch has ‘exclusive authority and absolute discretion’ to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute,” and thus a decision to use federal prosecutors for political ends falls within the president’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority.
When I first read the Trump opinion, which was joined only by the Court’s Republican appointees, I saw a blueprint for a dictatorship. I feared that the Republican justices responsible for this decision could not possibly have intended to authorize the president to murder his enemies unless creating such a dictatorship was their intent. But another decision handed down the same day as Trump casts doubt on this hypothesis.
The Court’s decision in Moody v. Netchoice, which was handed down just minutes before the Trump opinion, is as normal as the holding in Trump is aberrational. Briefly, Moody concerned two state laws, enacted by Republicans in Texas and Florida, that attempted to seize control over content moderation at major social media platforms. Writing for herself and five of her colleagues, Democratic Justice Elena Kagan makes it clear that these laws are not acceptable.
Moody stands for the unremarkable proposition that the government may not seize editorial control over the media. Kagan’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett, three Republicans who also joined most or all of the Trump majority opinion.
Moody casts serious doubt on the thesis that at least three of the Court’s Republicans intended to pave the road to a MAGA dictatorship. If these justices intended to give Trump the power to kill or arrest his critics, why didn’t they also give Trump’s party the power to control the media — a less disruptive and less violent method of consolidating authoritarian rule?
I don’t know the answer to this question, but I can rule out the possibility that the Republican justices did what they did in Trump because “the law” required them to do so. There is no Presidential Immunity Clause in the Constitution, and what the Constitution does have to say about prosecuting high-ranking officials cuts strongly against the Court’s decision in Trump.
Nor does Roberts’s opinion really even try to make the case that presidential immunity can be found somewhere in the Constitution’s text. Rather, the opinion is grounded in a policy judgment that the president should not be chilled from taking, in Roberts’s words, “bold and unhesitating action” by “the threat of trial, judgment, and imprisonment.”
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Court just gave presidents the power to kill or arrest their rivals and critics. The Moody decision suggests that the immunity decision was not made to usher in a Trump dictatorship. But that simply means that these Republican justices, whether through blundering or reckless disregard for the risks created by their decisions, unintentionally laid the groundwork for murder and oppression.”
…
“Every state’s law permits abortions when necessary to prevent a patient from dying, and even most states with strict abortion bans permit it in at least some cases when a patient’s health is endangered by their pregnancy.
As a practical matter, however, these exceptions to state abortion bans are often worthless. Women have fled to blue states for abortions or been told to wait until they develop truly alarming symptoms because abortion providers are too afraid of being arrested if they perform a medically necessary abortion.
The reason why this is happening is clear. Because Roe v. Wade (1973) deactivated state abortion bans for half a century, state courts did not hear any cases clarifying when it is legal to perform abortions under state law. Indeed, many states enacted new abortion bans during the period when Roe was in effect that suddenly sprung to life when Roe fell, despite no court decisions whatsoever interpreting those laws.
Hospital lawyers, in other words, have no way to advise their clients on when it is legal to perform an abortion and when a doctor who performs one might face years in prison.
This situation is profoundly undemocratic. Every state agrees that abortion should be legal when necessary to save a life, and only about 11 percent of Americans believe abortion should not be legal under these circumstances. And it is rather obviously the Supreme Court’s fault. The Court eliminated Roe, a decision that gave doctors and patients a great deal of clarity about when abortions were legal, without giving any thought to how the law would operate in Roe’s absence.
This term, the Supreme Court was handed a golden opportunity to fix the abortion crisis that it created. Moyle v. United States asked the justices to enforce a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires nearly all hospitals to provide “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition” of “any individual” who arrives at the hospital’s ER with an “emergency medical condition.”
That includes patients who require an abortion to stabilize their condition because EMTALA contains no exception for abortions.
Had the Court ruled that EMTALA means what it says, that would have done a tremendous amount to clarify when abortions are lawful, even in very red states.
But the Supreme Court didn’t simply refuse to read EMTALA according to its plain text. It refused to decide the Moyle case altogether, kicking it back down to a lower court for what could be months of more litigation. The non-decision in Moyle means that at least another year is likely to pass before women can stop waiting to develop sepsis before they can receive emergency medical care — and that’s assuming the justices don’t create an unwritten abortion exception to EMTALA when the issue reaches them again in the future.
A similar drama played out in United States v. Rahimi, a case where a federal appeals court concluded that a remarkably violent man, who allegedly committed six different shooting crimes and threatened to kill two women, has a Second Amendment right to own a gun.
To their credit, eight of the nine justices agreed that allowing this man to be armed is unacceptable. But their decision in Rahimi did little to clarify a 2022 Supreme Court decision which seemed to compel lower courts to rule that even this exceptionally violent individual gets to own a gun.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022) held that all gun laws are unconstitutional unless the government can “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” A modern-day gun law is particularly suspect under Bruen, moreover, if it addresses “a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century.”
The lower court that heard Rahimi struck down a federal law that disarms people who are subject to domestic violence restraining orders. But the worst part about this lower court’s decision is that it was correctly decided, at least if you take Bruen seriously. Violence between romantic partners, after all, existed in the 18th century. But there were hardly any laws addressing it, and no state made it a crime for married partners to beat their spouse until 1871.
And while Bruen compelled the immoral result reached by the lower court in Rahimi, its vague “historical tradition” test has baffled judges across the political spectrum, few of whom are trained as historians. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s concurring opinion in Rahimi cited a dozen lower court opinions, all begging the Supreme Court to tell them how, exactly, Bruen is supposed to work.
But rather than offer clarity, the Court’s decision in Rahimi is pure gobbledygook. The new rule is that “a court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit,” whatever that means.
Rather than abandoning Bruen’s framework, which failed immediately and in spectacular fashion and which led a wide array of judges to take the unusual step of speaking out against the Supreme Court, the Court babbled about the history of gun laws for a few pages of an unusually short opinion, then left the lower courts to decide the fate of every gun law in the United States with no meaningful guidance whatsoever from the justices.”
…
“The Court’s just-completed term also featured one of the biggest power grabs in the Court’s recent history. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo makes the Supreme Court the final word on hundreds or even thousands of policy questions that Congress delegated to federal agencies like the EPA or the Department of Labor.
These questions concern some big policy disputes, such as who is entitled to overtime pay or how to reduce greenhouse emissions by power plants. But they also concern a much broader array of minor and often very technical questions that few people are likely to care about. The Loper Bright case itself, for example, asked whether the government or the vessels themselves must pay for federal observers who sometimes accompany fishing vessels at sea.
One bizarre thing about Loper Bright is that the Supreme Court already gave itself an unchecked veto power over anything involving what the Court calls a “major question” — that is, agency actions that involve a matter of “vast ‘economic and political significance.’” So the justices were already the final word on policy questions that sparked meaningful political disagreement. All that Loper Bright does is force the courts to decide many more less significant questions.
These are questions like how much residents of Kauai, Hawaii, should pay for cable television service, or whether a wastewater treatment plant in Taunton, Massachusetts, emits too much nitrogen — questions, in other words, that are both far beyond the expertise of the justices and so small they aren’t really worth the time of the nine most powerful officials in the most powerful nation that has ever existed.
Taken in aggregate, federal agencies have thousands or even tens of thousands of employees, many of whom have very specialized expertise and perform the very intensive fact-finding and information-gathering process that any responsible government must perform before it regulates.
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has nine justices, each of whom typically hires four law clerks to assist them. That’s nowhere near enough staff to handle the firehose of hypertechnical policy questions the Court just directed at federal courts, and ultimately at the justices themselves.
The unmanageable volume of cases headed the Court’s way will be further magnified by the Republican justices’ recent decision in Corner Post v. Federal Reserve, which effectively eliminates the six-year statute of limitations that used to apply to lawsuits challenging federal regulations.
Corner Post holds that this six-year clock begins to count not when an agency issues a new rule but when a new business is formed that is subject to that rule. Thus, any company under six years old is allowed to challenge any federal regulation that impacts it, even if that regulation has been on the books for decades.
So, thoughts and prayers to the justices, who will now have to deal with the unmanageable workload they’ve created for themselves, even as they are unable to handle the cases that are already on their docket in a competent manner.”
…
“The Supreme Court, in other words, no longer really functions as a court. It spends less and less time deciding bread and butter legal issues that should be the core work of judges, and more and more time resolving political questions that often should be decided by people who hold elected office.”
…
“Most government officials are subject to strict limits on their ability to accept gifts. Members of Congress and their staff, for example, are typically forbidden from accepting any gift valued at more than $50. Thomas, by contrast, has accepted millions of dollars worth of gifts from Republican-aligned billionaires. And Alito accepted a $100,000 private jet ride from Republican billionaire Paul Singer, before staying in a $1,000-a-day fishing lodge and reportedly drinking wine that costs over $1,000 a bottle.
Yet, after months of embarrassing news stories examining Thomas’s and Alito’s corruption, the Court responded with a toothless, largely unenforceable ethics code that does nothing to limit the justices’ ability to take similar gifts in the future.
Indeed, the primary effect of this ethics code appears to be giving the justices something they can cite to justify their ethical lapses. After Alito came under fire for flying flags conveying right-wing political messages outside of his two homes (Alito blames the flags on his wife), he cited the new ethics code — and specifically its statement that a justice is “presumed impartial” — to justify taking no corrective action.
These justices, moreover, continue to sit on corruption cases despite their own corruption. In Snyder v. United States, for example, they joined a majority opinion ruling in favor of an Indiana mayor who accepted a $13,000 gift from a trucking company, after the mayor’s city entered into a $1.1 million contract with that company.
So, the current Court is unable to write a coherent legal standard. It removes essential safeguards against tyranny and dictatorship. It can barely handle a shrinking caseload, yet appears determined to flood itself with some of the most difficult and low-stakes policy questions that come before the federal government. And it can’t even follow the most basic norms establishing that government officials should not be on the take.
We live in an age of babbling and incoherent leaders. The Supreme Court is no exception.”
“When Trump urged the Justice Department to investigate his baseless allegations of election fraud, Roberts says, he was exercising his “conclusive and preclusive” authority. The executive branch has “‘exclusive authority and absolute discretion’ to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute,” he writes, “including with respect to allegations of election crime.”
The indictment also alleges that Trump “attempted to enlist” Vice President Mike Pence to “use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” Trump wanted Pence to reject electoral votes for Joe Biden from several battleground states and send them back to state legislatures to consider whether he actually won them. When the president and the vice president “discuss their official responsibilities,” Roberts says, “they engage in official conduct.” The government therefore has to overcome a presumption of immunity, which means the district court must consider whether prosecuting Trump based on these conversations would impermissibly intrude on executive authority.
Other allegations involve Trump’s interactions with state officials and private parties. Trump tried to persuade state officials that the election results had been tainted by systematic fraud, and his campaign enlisted “alternate” electors whom he wanted state legislators to recognize instead of the Biden slates.
Those actions, Trump maintained, were “official” because he was trying to ensure the integrity of a federal election. To the contrary, Special Counsel Jack Smith argued, Trump was trying to undermine the integrity of the election, and he did so in service of his interests as a political candidate, not as part of his presidential duties. According to the Supreme Court, the district court therefore must determine, as an initial matter, “whether Trump’s conduct in this area qualifies as official or unofficial.”
Finally, the indictment cites Trump’s behavior on January 6, 2021, the day his supporters, inspired by his phony grievance, invaded the U.S. Capitol, interrupting the congressional tally of electoral votes. Trump’s conduct that day consisted mainly of his speech at the pre-riot “Stop the Steal” rally and various tweets. Roberts notes that the president has “extraordinary power to speak to his fellow citizens and on their behalf.” Generally speaking, his public communications therefore “are likely to fall comfortably within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities.” Whether Trump’s communications counted as official acts, Roberts says, depends on the “content and context of each,” requiring “factbound analysis” by the district court.”
…
“The majority says Trump cannot be prosecuted for urging the Justice Department to embrace his stolen-election fantasy because such conversations fell within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority to enforce federal law. But the president is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which suggests that orders to the military, whether they involve assassination or a coup, likewise trigger absolute immunity. The president has plenary authority to issue pardons, which suggests impeachment might be the only remedy if he takes a bribe in exchange for granting one.
That remedy, as Roberts notes in rejecting Trump’s interpretation of the Impeachment Judgments Clause, could be foreclosed by timing or a lack of political will. If a president abuses his powers toward the end of his term (as happened in this case), resigns immediately afterward, or conceals his crimes well enough that they do not come to light until after he has left office, impeachment will not be a viable option, and his prosecution could be blocked by “absolute” or “presumptive” immunity, leaving no way to hold him accountable.
Roberts glides over such possibilities, focusing instead on the threat to presidential authority that allowing prosecution for “official acts” could pose. One of the charges against Trump, for example, alleges that he defrauded the United States, which is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison under 18 USC 371. Section 371, Roberts notes, “is a broadly worded criminal statute” that can cover “any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.” Since “virtually every President is criticized for insufficiently enforcing some aspect of federal law,” he says, “an enterprising prosecutor in a new administration may assert that a previous President violated that broad statute.”
Without immunity, such prosecutions of former presidents “could quickly become routine,” Roberts worries. “The enfeebling of the Presidency and our Government that would result from such a cycle of factional strife is exactly what the Framers intended to avoid. Ignoring those risks, the dissents are instead content to leave the preservation of our system of separated powers up to the good faith of prosecutors.””
…
“Barrett disagrees with the majority’s holding that “the Constitution limits the introduction of protected conduct as evidence in a criminal prosecution of a President, beyond the limits afforded by executive privilege.” In a bribery case, for example, the official act that a president allegedly performed in exchange for money would be clearly relevant in establishing his guilt. “Excluding from trial any mention of the official act connected to the bribe would hamstring the prosecution,” Barrett writes. “To make sense of charges alleging a quid pro quo, the jury must be allowed to hear about both the quid and the quo, even if the quo, standing alone, could not be a basis for the President’s criminal liability.”
In response, Roberts says “the prosecutor may point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act” and may submit “evidence of what the President allegedly demanded, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept in return for being influenced in the performance of the act.” But the prosecutor may not offer “testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself.””
“Both sides in the case agreed that a former president can be prosecuted for “unofficial acts,” a point that Chief Justice John Roberts affirmed in his majority opinion. But Roberts added that a former president is “absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.”
It is not clear exactly which conduct falls into that “exclusive sphere,” although Roberts said conversations in which Trump urged the Justice Department to investigate his bogus claims of systematic election fraud clearly did. Adding to the uncertainty, the majority said even “official acts” outside “the core” of a president’s duties merit “at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution,” which the government can overcome only if it “can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no ‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.'”
The strictness of that test, combined with the lack of clarity about which acts are “official,” suggests that the distinction between “absolute” and “presumptive” immunity is apt to dissolve in practice. And even if it proves meaningful, the Court said absolute immunity might ultimately be required for all conduct “within the outer perimeter” of a president’s “official responsibility.”
Under the majority’s reasoning, Justice Sonia Sotomayor warned in a dissent joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, a president “will be insulated from criminal prosecution” when he “uses his official powers in any way.” That shield, Sotomayor said, would extend to a president who “orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival,” who “organizes a military coup to hold onto power,” who “takes a bribe in exchange for a pardon,” or who insists that the Justice Department use fabricated evidence in a criminal case.
Instead of explaining why immunity would not apply in such situations, Roberts faulted Sotomayor for “fear mongering on the basis of extreme hypotheticals.” He dismissed the threat posed by lawless presidents because he was focused on the supposed need to protect “an energetic executive” from the threat of criminal liability.
As Sotomayor noted, however, presidents have been operating under that threat for a long time. “Every sitting President,” she wrote, “has so far believed himself under the threat of criminal liability after his term in office and nevertheless boldly fulfilled the duties of his office.”
Former President Richard Nixon, who did not suffer from a notable lack of executive energy, evidently shared that long-standing assumption. After he resigned amid the Watergate scandal, Nixon accepted a pardon from his successor, Gerald Ford, that covered any federal offenses he may have committed as president.
According to the proposed articles of impeachment, those offenses included many acts that would count as “official” in Roberts’ book, such as “false or misleading public statements,” misuse of the CIA and the IRS, and interference with an FBI investigation. If Nixon was immune from prosecution for those acts, his pardon is a bit of a puzzle.
As that episode illustrates, we need not conjure “extreme hypotheticals” to understand the danger of a president who feels unbound by the law. In the real world, the risk of presidential paralysis pales beside the risk of presidential impunity.”
“The Supreme Court handed down a stern rebuke to some of the most right-wing judges in the country.., holding that no, judges do not get to micromanage how the Biden administration speaks to social media companies.
The vote in Murthy v. Missouri was 6-3, with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett joining the Court’s three Democratic appointees in the majority. Justice Samuel Alito dissented, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch.
As Barrett’s majority opinion lays out, this lawsuit never should have been filed in the first place, and no federal court should have entertained it. Her opinion holds that the Murthy plaintiffs, who raised vague allegations that the government tried to censor them, could not even show that the government did anything to harm them in the first place.
Murthy involves a wide range of communications among the White House, various federal agencies, and major social media platforms like Facebook and X (the website formerly known as Twitter). Some of these communications urged platforms to remove content, such as speech seeking to recruit terrorists, to spread election disinformation, or to promote false and potentially harmful medical advice — including false claims about Covid-19 and vaccines.
The plaintiffs in Murthy are two red states plus an array of individuals who had content removed or suppressed by at least one of the social media platforms. They claimed that platforms censored them because of pressure from the government, and that this pressure violates the First Amendment.
That is a highly dubious claim. While the First Amendment forbids the government from coercing media outlets into removing content, nothing prevents the government from asking a platform to do so. Indeed, at oral arguments in Murthy, both Justices Elena Kagan and Kavanaugh recounted times when, during their service as White House officials, they pressured journalists to remove or correct editorials or other content that contained factual errors.
Nevertheless, the far-right US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not simply embrace this claim, it issued a vague and sweeping injunction forbidding the Biden administration from having “consistent and consequential” communications with social media companies — whatever that means. As a practical matter, this difficult-to-parse injunction made it virtually impossible for the administration to have any communications whatsoever with the platforms.
But the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to even consider these plaintiffs’ dubious First Amendment arguments, ruling that federal courts lack jurisdiction over this case.”
“On a 6-3 party-line vote, the Supreme Court ruled..that state officials may accept “gratuities” from people who wish to reward them for their official actions, despite a federal anti-corruption statute that appears to ban such rewards.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote the opinion in Snyder v. United States for the Court’s Republican-appointed majority. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote the dissent on behalf of the Court’s three Democratic appointees.
Snyder turns on a distinction between “bribes” and “gratuities.” As Kavanaugh writes, “bribes are payments made or agreed to before an official act in order to influence the official with respect to that future official act.” Gratuities, by contrast, “are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation.” (Emphasis added.)”
…
” As Jackson writes in her dissent, the most natural reading of this statute is that it targets both bribes (payments that “influenced” a future decision) and gratuities (payments that “rewarded” a past decision). As Jackson writes,
” veryone knows what a reward is. It is a $20 bill pulled from a lost wallet at the time of its return to its grateful owner. A surprise ice cream outing after a report card with straight As. The bar tab picked up by a supervisor celebrating a job well done by her team. A reward often says “thank you” or “good job,” rather than “please.””
Jackson argues that the statute should be read to prohibit “rewards corruptly accepted by government officials in ways that are functionally indistinguishable from taking a bribe,” much like the payment at issue in this case appears to be.”
…
“Kavanaugh’s strongest argument is that the law makes it a very serious crime, punishable by up to 15 years in prison, for a federal official to accept a bribe, but federal officials who accept gratuities only risk two years in prison. Meanwhile, the statute at issue in Snyder, which only applies to state officials, applies a 10-year sentence across the board. So Kavanaugh argues that it would be odd to read the law to draw a sharp distinction between bribes and gratuities given to federal officials but to make no distinction when state officials accept a gift.
In any event, the decision in Snyder is narrow. It does not rule that Congress could not ban gratuities. It simply rules that this particular statute only reaches bribes. That said, the Court’s Republican majority also has a long history of imposing constitutional limits on the government’s ability to fight corruption and restrict money in politics.”
“Was OxyContin in fact “central” to the upward trend in opioid-related deaths? Estimates from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (now the National Survey on Drug Use and Health) indicate that nonmedical use of prescription pain relievers rose for 11 consecutive years before OxyContin was introduced, and then continued to rise. Even during the period highlighted by Gorsuch, OxyContin never accounted for a very large share of the prescription analgesic market.
Defending itself against all of those lawsuits, Purdue presented Drug Enforcement Administration data indicating that OxyContin accounted for just 3.3 percent of pain pills sold in the United States from 2006 through 2012. After adjusting for potency, ProPublica calculated that the product’s “real” share of the market was more like 16 percent.
ProPublica’s analysis is questionable, assuming the concern is how many opportunities nonmedical users have to get their hands on prescription opioids. But either way, the vast majority of pain reliever prescriptions involved products other than OxyContin, most commonly hydrocodone pills such as Vicodin and oxycodone pills such as Percocet. Those latter two types of products also figured prominently in the pain relievers consumed by nonmedical users, accounting for 75 percent of the total in 2018, according to the federal government’s survey data. OxyContin, by comparison, accounted for 11 percent of nonmedical use that year.”
…
“According to a 2007 American Journal of Psychiatry study of OxyContin users admitted to drug treatment programs, 78 percent “reported that the drug had not been prescribed to them for any medical reason.”
Since Gorsuch and Kavanaugh both fault Purdue for contributing to opioid-related deaths by misrepresenting OxyContin as abuse-resistant, it is instructive to consider what happened after the company tried to make good on that promise by reformulating the drug. The new version, introduced in 2010, was much harder to crush for snorting or injection. The idea was to deter nonmedical use, and the hope was that the reformulation would reduce addiction and opioid-related deaths. That is not how things worked out.
The reformulation of OxyContin was instead associated with an increase in deaths involving illicit opioids and, ultimately, an overall increase in fatal drug overdoses. Researchers identified that pattern by looking at the relationship between pre-2010 rates of OxyContin misuse, as measured by surveys, and subsequent overdose trends. They found that death rates rose fastest in states where reformulation would have had the biggest impact.
The root cause of that perverse effect was the substitution that occurred after the old version of OxyContin was retired. Nonmedical users turned to black-market alternatives that were more dangerous because their potency was highly variable and unpredictable—a hazard that was compounded by the emergence of illicit fentanyl as a heroin booster and substitute. Nowadays illicit fentanyl accounts for around 90 percent of opioid-related deaths, which have reached record levels in recent years.
Interventions like the reformulation of OxyContin and the broader crackdown on opioid prescriptions not only failed to turn the tide. They contributed to the upward trend that Gorsuch blames on OxyContin. The story that he and Kavanaugh credulously echo turned out to be deadly as well as misleading.”
“In her ruling, Cannon argued that because Smith had not been appointed a special counsel by the president and confirmed by the Senate, his appointment violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.
Smith, a longtime government prosecutor, was made a Special Counsel by US Attorney General Merrick Garland in November 2022 to oversee the classified documents case. Trump pleaded not guilty to all 37 counts in the indictment Smith and his team eventually filed, including willful retention of national defense information under the Espionage Act and one count of false statements and representations.
Smith was also appointed as special counsel in the investigation into the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol. Smith later charged Trump with four counts, including conspiracy to defraud the United States. That case is ongoing, but after the US Supreme Court ruled earlier this month that the president has broad immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts performed in office, it’s an open question whether he can be prosecuted for his actions related to the insurrection.
Cannon’s ruling, which relies on a stringent reading of the Constitution and represents a brazen break with precedent, has come under heavy criticism from legal scholars. Under her ruling, the appointment of prior special counsels would have also come into question, from Archibald Cox, who investigated the Watergate scandal that led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation, to Robert Mueller, who investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election.
“It’s breathtaking audacity for a trial judge who has clearly shown that she wants to delay and, if possible, get rid of this case,” said Jed Shugerman, a Fordham Law professor and the author of The People’s Courts.”
“the Supreme Court’s decision centered around Joseph Fischer, a former Pennsylvania police officer who was charged with several offenses related to his conduct at the Capitol riot. According to the government, that lawlessness included, among other things, that he “forcibly assaulted a federal officer, entered and remained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly and disruptive conduct in the Capitol.”
But prosecutors tacked on another charge using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which criminalizes “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a record, document, or other object, or attempt[ing] to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding,” or, per the following provision, “otherwise obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding.” Those convicted face up to 20 years in prison.
Fischer challenged that charge, arguing that the statute as written requires the alleged obstruction in question be tied to the impairment of records, documents, or objects, which would not apply to him. The federal judge who initially evaluated Fischer’s petition sided with him; a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed that; and the Supreme Court reversed the reversal.”
…
“”Our commitment to equal justice and the rule of law requires the courts to faithfully apply criminal laws as written, even in periods of national crisis,” she writes. “We recognize this intuitive fact—that there is a certain category of conduct the rule is designed to prohibit—because we recognize, albeit implicitly, that the drafters of this rule have included these particular examples for a reason. We understand that, given the preceding list of examples, this rule was adopted with a clear intent concerning its scope.”
To buttress her case, Jackson looks to the history of the statute, which was enacted in response to the revelation that Arthur Andersen LLP, auditor for the disgraced energy corporation Enron, had torched potentially incriminating documents. “There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction statute,” Jackson concludes.
In response, Attorney General Merrick Garland said in a statement that he is “disappointed by today’s decision, which limits an important federal statute that the Department has sought to use to ensure that those most responsible for that attack face appropriate consequences.” Fortunately for him, he is still free to prosecute people for violating the laws that Congress enacted, which isn’t an unfair limitation.”