“The law defined the term “controlled by a foreign adversary” to include not only companies owned wholly by Chinese entities but also one in which a citizen of an adversarial nation “directly or indirectly own[s] at least a 20 percent stake.” In other words, even if the overwhelming majority of a company’s shares were owned by Americans, it could be banned or forced to divest so long as the remaining shares were held by Chinese, Russian, or Iranian citizens.
In order to continue operating within the United States, the only recourse would be to sell TikTok to an American company by January 19, 2025—Joe Biden’s last full day in office.
TikTok and ByteDance sued, asking courts to declare the law unconstitutional. “For the first time in history, Congress has enacted a law that subjects a single, named speech platform to a permanent, nationwide ban,” the lawsuit argued. Lawmakers’ “speculative concerns fall far short of what is required when First Amendment rights are at stake.”
The plaintiffs claimed that the law’s restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny—the highest standard of review that a court can apply to an action, reserved for potential burdens on fundamental constitutional rights. “The Act represents a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on protected speech,” the lawsuit said, and the law’s divest-or-be-banned provision constitutes “an unlawful prior restraint.”
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“a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs, finding “the Government’s justifications are compelling” and that it did not violate the First Amendment for the state to single out one company for disfavored treatment.
“We conclude the portions of the Act the petitioners have standing to challenge, that is the provisions concerning TikTok and its related entities, survive constitutional scrutiny,” Senior Judge Douglas Ginsburg wrote for the majority. “We therefore deny the petitions.”
Ginsburg notes that while the law does require “heightened scrutiny,” it satisfies the requirements of strict scrutiny because of how narrowly tailored it was: “The Act was the culmination of extensive, bipartisan action by the Congress and by successive presidents. It was carefully crafted to deal only with control by a foreign adversary, and it was part of a broader effort to counter a well-substantiated national security threat posed by the PRC.”
In fact, that “national security threat” was not very “well-substantiated” at all—but the court didn’t seem to mind.
“TikTok contends the Government’s content-manipulation rationale is speculative and based upon factual errors,” Ginsburg wrote, referring to lawmakers’ concerns that Beijing could manipulate content on TikTok to promote Chinese propaganda. “TikTok fails, however, to grapple fully with the Government’s submissions. On the one hand, the Government acknowledges that it lacks specific intelligence that shows the PRC has in the past or is now coercing TikTok into manipulating content in the United States.” But “the Government is aware ‘that ByteDance and TikTok Global have taken action in response to PRC demands to censor content outside of China'” and “‘have a demonstrated history of manipulating the content on their platforms, including at the direction of the PRC.'”
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“It may be that the PRC has not yet done so in the United States or, as the Government suggests, the Government’s lack of evidence to that effect may simply reflect limitations on its ability to monitor TikTok,” Ginsburg shrugs. “In any event, the Government reasonably predicts that TikTok ‘would try to comply if the PRC asked for specific actions to be taken to manipulate content for censorship, propaganda, or other malign purposes’ in the United States.”
The court’s decision is yet another instance where vague claims of “national security” trump individuals’ First Amendment rights. Claiming that Congress has the authority to force a company to sell one of its holdings—not through an established power like antitrust, but simply because they don’t like how it could be used in the future—is not only a weak justification; it is a plainly unconstitutional one.”
“Floridians this fall will vote on a constitutional “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.” So authorities decided to interfere with free speech in an attempt to thwart voters from limiting the government’s right to interfere in reproductive decisions. The state threatened TV stations with criminal penalties for running an ad supporting the abortion initiative (known as Amendment 4).
A federal judge isn’t impressed. “To keep it simple for the State of Florida: it’s the First Amendment, stupid,” wrote U.S. District Judge Mark E. Walker in an October 17 opinion.”
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” The ad in question is “political speech—speech at the core of the First Amendment,” notes Judge Walker. “And just this year, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the bedrock principle that the government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly by threatening third parties with legal sanctions to censor speech it disfavors. The government cannot excuse its indirect censorship of political speech simply by declaring the disfavored speech is ‘false.'””
“There’s a slight of hand when people declare the United States is a Christian nation. The nation was clearly founded on enlightenment principles that included freedom of religion and separation of church and state. These principles were put into the Constitution, and we know their meaning because we have the writings of the founders. At the same time, the country was a mostly Christian populace whose culture evolved from a Europe that had been Christian for many hundreds of years. Of course much of the ethos of such a society is going to be infused with Christian ideas, which themselves had been infused with Jewish, Roman, and Greek ideas. The country was and is majority Christian; in this sense it was a Christian nation. The country is and has always been heavily influenced by Christian culture, so also in that sense it is a Christian nation. But, at the nation’s founding, the founders explicitly created a government that was not supposed to implement Christianity upon its people, so in that sense it is not a Christian nation. As the country’s religious diversity grows, it becomes less of a Christian nation unless it can maintain some underlying Christian culture that goes beyond religious belief.”
“You can’t yell fire in a crowded theater. I’m sure you’ve heard somebody say that before when discussing free speech and limitations on free speech and the First Amendment. Well, it’s actually one of the most widely misunderstood quotes in American law. It’s routinely parroted as the status of why there can be or are limitations on free speech, but it is a big fat myth. I will explain here in just a moment, so stick around.”
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“the interesting about it is the Schenck case wasn’t about fires, it wasn’t about theaters, it kind of wasn’t even about free speech. It was in a way, but it was really about a guy that was being charged with violations of the Espionage Act because he was a member of the socialist party and he was speaking out against the draft. And the other bizarre thing about why this quote gets attributed to why it’s okay to limit free speech is, the Schenck case, which has now actually been overturned and has been for like 60 years, actually stood for the exact opposite. The Schenck case was applying a pretty large degree of censorship on free speech. That’s why it was overturned is because it was actually found to be completely contrary toward what the First Amendment stood for.
So, the idea that you can’t yell fire in a crowded theater, Justice Holmes was using that as an analogy to simply say that free speech can’t go completely unchecked. And that idea has maintained it’s truth throughout the years. That’s still true. There are limitations on what is considered protected speech and what is not considered protected speech, and that’s a topic for a different video. But it’s just always been interesting to me that this quote, which is just dicta, it’s not the holding of the case, it’s not really the law of the land, and it’s not Justice Holmes saying that’s what the law of the land should be, has somehow withstood the test of time and is still, to this day”
“The Supreme Court handed down a stern rebuke to some of the most right-wing judges in the country.., holding that no, judges do not get to micromanage how the Biden administration speaks to social media companies.
The vote in Murthy v. Missouri was 6-3, with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett joining the Court’s three Democratic appointees in the majority. Justice Samuel Alito dissented, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch.
As Barrett’s majority opinion lays out, this lawsuit never should have been filed in the first place, and no federal court should have entertained it. Her opinion holds that the Murthy plaintiffs, who raised vague allegations that the government tried to censor them, could not even show that the government did anything to harm them in the first place.
Murthy involves a wide range of communications among the White House, various federal agencies, and major social media platforms like Facebook and X (the website formerly known as Twitter). Some of these communications urged platforms to remove content, such as speech seeking to recruit terrorists, to spread election disinformation, or to promote false and potentially harmful medical advice — including false claims about Covid-19 and vaccines.
The plaintiffs in Murthy are two red states plus an array of individuals who had content removed or suppressed by at least one of the social media platforms. They claimed that platforms censored them because of pressure from the government, and that this pressure violates the First Amendment.
That is a highly dubious claim. While the First Amendment forbids the government from coercing media outlets into removing content, nothing prevents the government from asking a platform to do so. Indeed, at oral arguments in Murthy, both Justices Elena Kagan and Kavanaugh recounted times when, during their service as White House officials, they pressured journalists to remove or correct editorials or other content that contained factual errors.
Nevertheless, the far-right US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not simply embrace this claim, it issued a vague and sweeping injunction forbidding the Biden administration from having “consistent and consequential” communications with social media companies — whatever that means. As a practical matter, this difficult-to-parse injunction made it virtually impossible for the administration to have any communications whatsoever with the platforms.
But the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to even consider these plaintiffs’ dubious First Amendment arguments, ruling that federal courts lack jurisdiction over this case.”
“So, on the same day that the Supreme Court appears to have established that a sitting president can commit the most horrible crimes imaginable against someone who dares to speak out against him, the same Court — with three justices joining both decisions — holds that the First Amendment still imposes some limits on the government’s ability to control what content appears online.
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined both decisions in full. Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the Netchoice opinion in full, plus nearly all of the Trump decision.”
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“That’s such a sweeping restriction on content moderation that it would forbid companies like YouTube or Twitter from removing content that is abusive, that promotes violence, or that seeks to overthrow the United States government. Indeed, Kagan’s opinion includes a bullet-pointed list of eight subject matters that the Texas law would not permit the platforms to moderate, including posts that “support Nazi ideology” or that “encourage teenage suicide and self-injury.”
In any event, Kagan makes clear that this sort of government takeover of social media moderation is not allowed, and she repeatedly rebukes the far-right US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the Texas law.
As Kagan writes, the First Amendment does not permit the government to force platforms “to carry and promote user speech that they would rather discard or downplay.” She also cites several previous Supreme Court decisions that support this proposition, including its “seminal” decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974), which held that a newspaper has the right to final control over “the choice of material to go into” it.
Nothing in Kagan’s opinion breaks new legal ground — it is very well-established that the government cannot seize editorial control over the media, for reasons that should be obvious to anyone who cares the least bit about freedom of speech and of the press. But the Court’s reaffirmation of this ordinary and once uncontested legal principle is still jarring on the same day that the Court handed down a blueprint for a Trump dictatorship in its presidential immunity case.
It’s also worth noting that Kagan’s decision is technically a victory for Texas and Florida, although on such narrow grounds that this victory is unlikely to matter.”
“Texas and Florida’s Republican legislatures both passed similar, but not identical, laws that would effectively seize control of content moderation at the “big three” social media platforms: Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter (the platform that Elon Musk insists on calling “X”).
These laws’ advocates are quite proud of the fact that they were enacted to prevent moderation of conservative speech online, even if the big three platforms deem some of that content (such as insurrectionist or anti-vax content) offensive or harmful. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) said his state’s law exists to fight supposedly “biased silencing” of “our freedom of speech as conservatives … by the ‘big tech’ oligarchs in Silicon Valley.” Texas Gov. Greg Abbott (R) said his state’s law targets a “dangerous movement by social media companies to silence conservative viewpoints and ideas.”
At least five justices — Chief Justice John Roberts, plus Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett — all seemed to agree that the First Amendment does not permit this kind of government takeover of social media moderation. There is a long line of Supreme Court cases, stretching back at least as far as Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974), holding that the government may not force newspapers and the like to publish content they do not wish to publish. And these five justices appeared to believe that cases like Tornillo should also apply to social media companies.”
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“the Supreme Court appears likely to reinstate the Texas and Florida laws. This is not because the Court thinks they are constitutional, and not because the Court thinks that they are constitutional with respect to the three companies that Texas and Florida actually wanted to regulate. But the ham-handedly drafted laws at issue in the NetChoice cases sweep so broadly that they may have some ancillary effects that are permitted by the First Amendment.
That’s probably the right outcome under existing law, but good Lord, it’s an unsatisfying one. This litigation has been ongoing for a very long time, and the Texas law already reached the Supreme Court once in 2022, when a majority of the Court voted to temporarily block it. A decision reinstating the laws because they are not vulnerable to a facial challenge would start that process all over again. And it would create at least some risk that, should the personnel of the Court change while this case is being relitigated, that these clearly unconstitutional laws could actually be upheld.”
“freedom of expression is crucial and central to the American project. It’s also not a force field by which people are shielded from other rules. If I want to get people’s attention by, say, driving 120 miles an hour while sporting a Palestinian flag, I cannot tell the officer who pulls me over for reckless driving that I’m simply exercising my free speech rights. The First Amendment does not give carte blanche to violate the law.”
“Publicly, President Joe Biden accused the platforms of “killing people” by failing to suppress speech that discouraged vaccination against COVID-19. Murthy likewise said that failure was “costing people their lives.” White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki declared that social media companies “have a responsibility related to the health and safety of all Americans to stop amplifying untrustworthy content, disinformation, and misinformation, especially related to COVID-19, vaccinations, and elections.” If they failed to meet that responsibility, Murthy said, “legal and regulatory measures” might be necessary. Psaki floated the possibility of new privacy regulations and threatened social media companies with “a robust anti-trust program.” White House Communications Director Kate Bedingfield said the platforms “should be held accountable,” which she suggested could include reducing their legal protection against civil claims based on users’ posts.
Privately, administration officials pressed Facebook et al. to delete or downgrade specific posts and banish specific speakers, to take action against content even when it did not violate the platforms’ rules, and to expand those rules so that any speech federal officials viewed as dangerous to public health could be deemed a violation. Their “requests” were sometimes phrased as demands.”
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“Flaherty emphasized that he was acting on the president’s behalf, that his concerns were “shared at the highest (and I mean highest) levels of the [White House].” White House officials invoked previous perceived failures at content moderation, which they said had been disastrous. “When Facebook did not take a prominent pundit’s ‘popular post[]’ down,” the 5th Circuit notes, senior White House COVID-19 adviser Andrew Slavitt “asked ‘what good is’ the reporting system, and signed off with ‘last time we did this dance, it ended in an insurrection.'” In another exchange, Flaherty “demand[ed] ‘assurances’ that [Facebook] was taking action” and “likened the platform’s alleged inaction to the 2020 election, which it ‘helped increase skepticism in,'” adding that “an insurrection…was plotted, in large part, on your platform.'”
When social media companies failed to do what the administration wanted, White House officials reacted angrily. Flaherty noted that a flagged Facebook post was “still up,” asking, “How does something like that happen?” Facebook was “hiding the ball,” Flaherty complained. “Are you guys fucking serious?” he said in another email to Facebook. “I want an answer on what happened here and I want it today.” Because Facebook was “not trying to solve the problem,” Slavitt said, the White House was “considering our options on what to do about it.””
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“By and large, especially after Biden and Murthy accused social media companies of killing people, the platforms did what the White House wanted. They were eager to appease the president, repeatedly asking how they could work together to address his concerns. In this context, the 5th Circuit says, it is likely that the pressure campaign amounted to “coercion” and that the White House unconstitutionally shaped moderation decisions.”
“The establishment clause provides simply that there can be no law “respecting an establishment of religion.” It does not explain what an “establishment of religion” is. Nor does it lay out in any detail when the government can and cannot provide benefits to a religious institution.
Armed only with this vague text, the Supreme Court has offered several competing explanations for why the establishment clause exists and what it was intended to prevent. At times, the Court has said that it exists to prevent the government from coercing nonbelievers into acts of devotion they find objectionable. At other times, the Court has described the establishment clause as a nod to pluralism — something that allows many religious traditions to thrive in the United States by forbidding the government from taking sides in religious debates.
Everson was rooted in the first of these two rationales, the belief that the government may not coerce others into religious exercise. As Justice Hugo Black wrote in that case, the clause is intended to universalize a Virginia statute, authored by Thomas Jefferson, which provided that “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.”
Everson read this prohibition on coerced religious activity expansively to include not just direct use of force against nonbelievers, but also the use of taxes collected from the general public to fund religion. As Black wrote, “individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.””
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“Fifteen years later, in Engel v. Vitale (1962), Black laid out a different theory of why the establishment clause exists.
In Engel, the Court struck down a school district’s policy of requiring teachers to begin each school day by reciting a prayer authored by the school board. “One of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way,” Black warned, “lay in the Government’s placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services.”
The central idea animating Engel was that, if the government is allowed to write prayers or otherwise put its seal of approval on particular religious practices, then US politics will inevitably be consumed by religious believers from competing faiths, all lobbying elected officials to make sure that their religion receives the government’s blessing.
The Court reached this conclusion after considering 16th-century English history, when Parliament approved a Book of Common Prayer that “set out in minute detail the accepted form and content of prayer and other religious ceremonies to be used in the established, tax-supported Church of England.” This led to perpetual lobbying, and frequent strife, over just what prayers the government should endorse and which ones it should reject. Powerful religious groups “struggled among themselves to impress their particular views upon the Government,” while less powerful religious believers literally fled the country — many of them becoming early American colonists.
According to Engel, the First Amendment was drafted in large part to prevent this kind of strife among religious factions from occurring in the United States. The founding generation, Black wrote, was not willing “to let the content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot box.”
Thus, while Everson read the establishment clause as a shield against the government coercing nonbelievers into participating in religion, Engel saw it more as a safeguard for pluralism. The idea behind the later decision was that, for multiple faith traditions to coexist peacefully in the United States, the government had to be hyper-cautious about picking favorites among them.
Of course, these two theories of the establishment clause are not mutually exclusive”
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” before the Roberts Court started dismantling the establishment clause’s safeguards, the Court recognized two values implicit in this clause: 1) the right to be free from coerced religious activity, and 2) the right to live in a pluralistic society where the government does not favor one person’s religion over the other. The right against coercion extended not just to direct pressure by the state, but also to more subtle forms of pressure such as a public school ceremony that effectively forces a student to choose between participating in a prayer or risking ostracizing themselves from their classmates. Meanwhile, the pluralistic right prevented the government from endorsing a particular religious viewpoint above others.
All of that went by the wayside, however, in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022).”
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“Bremerton is a mystifying decision, in part because the six Republican-appointed justices in the majority took great liberties with the case’s facts. It involved a high school football coach who would pray at the 50-yard line following games — in full view of students, players, and spectators, and sometimes surrounded by many of them as he was praying. There are photographs of crowds surrounding this coach as he prayed, some of which were included in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent.
Yet Justice Neil Gorsuch, who wrote the Court’s opinion, falsely claimed that this coach only wanted to offer a “short, private, personal prayer.””
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“while the Bremerton opinion is not a model of clarity, two lessons can be extracted from it. One is that the ban on government endorsements of religion — the mechanism the Court used to ensure that a plurality of faiths would thrive in the United States — is now dead. The other is that, while the Court still recognizes that some forms of government coercion into religious behavior are not allowed, its Republican majority appears eager to narrow the definition of “coercion.” There may even be five votes for Scalia’s position — that the government may actively promote religion so long as it does not use force or the threat of penalty to do so.”
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“One form of coercion that the current Court permits is the government may now take taxes from a nonbeliever — taxes that the nonbeliever must pay to avoid criminal sanctions — and use them to fund religious education.”
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“Read together, the Roberts Court’s establishment clause cases suggest that the Court probably will not neutralize this clause altogether. But they have already neutralized many of its modern applications, and they appear likely to endorse government behavior that would not have been tolerated even in the recent past.”