“In fact, most federal criminal prosecutions are immigration, drug and gun cases. The largest numbers of federal inmates are in custody because they were convicted of drug, weapon and sex offenses. The story is similar in state prison systems, where roughly 90 percent of the inmates are in custody because they were convicted of a violent offense, property crime or a drug offense.
The legal system is far from flawless — and plenty of Americans sincerely believe that there are too many laws and regulations in the country — but Gorsuch’s selective and misleadingly presented case studies do not tell us anything particularly useful about it.
To be sure, there are some redeeming features of the book. Gorsuch criticizes occupational licensing requirements, the exorbitant cost of legal services in this country and the ways in which they burden working- and middle-class Americans.
But what’s left out of the book is often just as instructive — if not more so — than what’s in it. His interest in government overreach stops short when it comes to liberal causes.
In an anecdotal book about overzealous prosecutors, there are no stories about people being sent to prison because they mistakenly tried to vote when they weren’t eligible or about laws that make it illegal to give voters water while they wait in line. There are no stories about women being arrested because they had miscarriages, part of the ongoing fallout from the decision by Gorsuch and his fellow Republican appointees to overturn Roe v. Wade.”
“It’s astonishing how little thought many past presidents put into their Supreme Court appointments. In the past, justices were often chosen for idiosyncratic personal reasons, or to please a particular interest group or voting bloc, and without much, if any, inquiry into how the nominee was likely to decide cases.
President Woodrow Wilson, for example, appointed Justice James Clark McReynolds — an awful judge and an even worse human being who Time magazine once described as a “savagely sarcastic, incredibly reactionary Puritan anti-Semite” — in large part because Wilson found McReynolds, who was US attorney general before he joined the Court, to be so obnoxious that the president promoted him to get him out of the Cabinet.
Similarly, President Dwight Eisenhower complained late in his presidency that appointing Justice William Brennan, one of the most consequential left-liberal jurists in American history, to the Supreme Court was among the biggest mistakes he made in office. But Ike’s White House never vetted Brennan for his ideological views, and Brennan was selected largely because Eisenhower was running for reelection when he made the nomination, and he thought that appointing a Catholic like Brennan would appeal to Catholic voters.
Even in 1990, after top Republican officials had published lengthy documents laying out their party’s vision for the Constitution, they still hadn’t developed a reliable system for vetting Supreme Court nominees to ensure that they were on board with the party’s agenda. Bush chose the center-left Justice Souter over other, more right-wing candidates largely due to misguided advice from his top legal advisers.
As journalist Jan Crawford Greenburg reported in a 2007 book, Souter beat out early frontrunner Ken Starr — the same Ken Starr who would go on to hound President Bill Clinton in the Monica Lewinsky investigation — in large part because Bush’s right-wing advisers feared that Starr was too liberal. According to Crawford Greenburg, then-Deputy Attorney General Bill Barr opposed Starr because of a low-stakes dispute over “a federal law that permitted private citizens to sue for fraud against the federal government.”
Much has changed since 1990. On the Republican side, the Federalist Society — a kind of bar association for right-wing lawyers with chapters on most law school campuses and in most major cities — now starts vetting law students for elite legal jobs almost as soon as they begin their studies. And Republican presidents can rely on the Federalist Society to identify ideologically reliable candidates for the bench. As Trump said in 2016 while campaigning for president, “We’re going to have great judges, conservative, all picked by the Federalist Society.”
Nor is the Federalist Society the only way Republicans vet potential Supreme Court nominees. Every single one of the Court’s current Republican members except for Barrett previously served as a political appointee in a GOP administration, roles that allowed high-level Republicans to observe their work and probe their views.
Democrats’ vetting process, meanwhile, is more informal. But it’s been no less successful in identifying Supreme Court nominees who reliably embrace their party’s stance on the most contentious issues. The last Democrat appointed to the Supreme Court who broke with the party’s pro-abortion rights stance, for example, was Justice Byron White — a dissenter in Roe v. Wade appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962.
The result is a modern-day Supreme Court where every single member was carefully selected by their party to ensure that they will not stray on any of the issues where the two parties have settled views. Every Republican justice voted to abolish affirmative action on nearly all university campuses, with every Democratic justice in dissent. Every Republican voted to give the leader of the Republican Party broad immunity from criminal prosecution, with every Democrat in dissent. Every Republican except for Roberts voted to overrule Roe (and Roberts merely argued that the Court should have waited a little longer), while every Democrat dissented.”
“All three of the Court’s Democrats, meanwhile, appeared sympathetic to Glossip’s arguments, and spent much of the case batting down Alito’s proposals to dismiss the case on procedural grounds — though Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson showed some openness to forming an alliance with Thomas to send the case back down to the state courts in order to gather additional evidence.
That leaves Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett, conservative Republicans who asked some questions that appeared sympathetic to Glossip, as the wild cards in this case. It is possible that they could provide the fourth and fifth vote to save Glossip’s life, but far from certain.
The alleged constitutional violation that is before the Court — that prosecutors withheld evidence that a key witness has a serious mental illness, and failed to correct this witness when he lied on the stand — is fairly marginal. It turns on four words in handwritten notes by prosecutor Connie Smothermon that were not turned over to Glossip’s lawyers until January 2023. The state agrees with Glossip’s legal team that these four words reveal a sufficiently serious constitutional violation to justify giving him a new trial.
But while this narrow legal issue, which is the only issue before the Supreme Court, is the kind of legal question that reasonable judges could disagree upon, Smothermon’s notes are only one piece of a wide range of evidence suggesting that Glossip’s criminal conviction is unconstitutional: Oklahoma conducted two independent investigations, both of which concluded that Glossip’s trial was fundamentally flawed.
Among other things, those investigations found that Justin Sneed — the man who actually committed the murder at issue here — was pressured by police to implicate Glossip in the crime. They also show that police and the prosecution lost or destroyed evidence that could potentially exonerate Glossip. And they show that police inexplicably did not question potentially important witnesses or search obvious places for evidence.
Now, however, Glossip’s life likely turns upon whether Kavanaugh and Barrett are moved by the procedural arguments pressed by the Court’s right flank, or by the arguments pressed by both Glossip and the state: That four words in Smothermon’s notes reveal a serious constitutional violation.”
“a judge struck down Arlington, Virginia’s missing middle reforms that had briefly allowed smaller, four- to six-unit multifamily developments in the D.C. suburb’s single-family neighborhoods.
In a Friday ruling, Judge David Schell said that the county had violated a number of procedural requirements when it unanimously passed its Enhanced Housing Option (EHO) last year and had failed to adequately study the impact of increased residential density.”
“You can’t yell fire in a crowded theater. I’m sure you’ve heard somebody say that before when discussing free speech and limitations on free speech and the First Amendment. Well, it’s actually one of the most widely misunderstood quotes in American law. It’s routinely parroted as the status of why there can be or are limitations on free speech, but it is a big fat myth. I will explain here in just a moment, so stick around.”
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“the interesting about it is the Schenck case wasn’t about fires, it wasn’t about theaters, it kind of wasn’t even about free speech. It was in a way, but it was really about a guy that was being charged with violations of the Espionage Act because he was a member of the socialist party and he was speaking out against the draft. And the other bizarre thing about why this quote gets attributed to why it’s okay to limit free speech is, the Schenck case, which has now actually been overturned and has been for like 60 years, actually stood for the exact opposite. The Schenck case was applying a pretty large degree of censorship on free speech. That’s why it was overturned is because it was actually found to be completely contrary toward what the First Amendment stood for.
So, the idea that you can’t yell fire in a crowded theater, Justice Holmes was using that as an analogy to simply say that free speech can’t go completely unchecked. And that idea has maintained it’s truth throughout the years. That’s still true. There are limitations on what is considered protected speech and what is not considered protected speech, and that’s a topic for a different video. But it’s just always been interesting to me that this quote, which is just dicta, it’s not the holding of the case, it’s not really the law of the land, and it’s not Justice Holmes saying that’s what the law of the land should be, has somehow withstood the test of time and is still, to this day”
“The “historical tradition” test announced in Bruen has no real substance, cannot be applied consistently by lower court judges, and has led to absurd and immoral results. Just last June, for example, the Supreme Court had to intervene after an appeals court, in a perfectly honest application of the Bruen decision, ruled that people subject to domestic violence restraining orders have a constitutional right to own a gun.
But, while the Court’s decision in that case, United States v. Rahimi, reversed one of the federal judiciary’s most astonishing post-Bruen decisions, it left Bruen’s confounding historical test in place. Under Rahimi, “a court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit” — whatever the hell that means.
In a separate concurring opinion in Rahimi, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson quoted a dozen lower court opinions complaining that judges can’t figure out how Bruen is supposed to work. As one of those opinions stated, “courts, operating in good faith, are struggling at every stage of the Bruen inquiry. Those struggles encompass numerous, often dispositive, difficult questions.”
This chaos is likely to continue until Bruen is overruled. The history and tradition test announced in the case provides lower court judges with no meaningful guidance on which gun laws are constitutional. And Bruen allows judges who are determined to reach pro-gun conclusions no matter what the consequences to strike down virtually any gun law — which may explain Broomes’s decision in the Morgan case.”
“Immigrants, including those living in the U.S. illegally, can get a green card if they marry an American citizen. But U.S. law generally requires those who entered the U.S. illegally to leave the country and re-enter legally to be eligible for a green card. Doing so, however, can trigger a 3- or 10-year ban from the U.S., prompting many mixed-status families not to pursue that option.
While the Biden administration has argued its initiative promotes family unity in households that include U.S. citizens, Texas and the other Republican-controlled states said in a lawsuit filed Friday that the policy rewards illegal immigration. The red states, which have challenged nearly every major Biden administration immigration move, said the policy misused the immigration parole authority.
On Monday, Barker, the federal judge in Texas appointed by former President Donald Trump, issued an administrative order prohibiting the Department of Homeland Security from granting parole to those applying for the Keeping Families Together policy.”
“In her ruling, Cannon argued that because Smith had not been appointed a special counsel by the president and confirmed by the Senate, his appointment violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.
Smith, a longtime government prosecutor, was made a Special Counsel by US Attorney General Merrick Garland in November 2022 to oversee the classified documents case. Trump pleaded not guilty to all 37 counts in the indictment Smith and his team eventually filed, including willful retention of national defense information under the Espionage Act and one count of false statements and representations.
Smith was also appointed as special counsel in the investigation into the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol. Smith later charged Trump with four counts, including conspiracy to defraud the United States. That case is ongoing, but after the US Supreme Court ruled earlier this month that the president has broad immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts performed in office, it’s an open question whether he can be prosecuted for his actions related to the insurrection.
Cannon’s ruling, which relies on a stringent reading of the Constitution and represents a brazen break with precedent, has come under heavy criticism from legal scholars. Under her ruling, the appointment of prior special counsels would have also come into question, from Archibald Cox, who investigated the Watergate scandal that led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation, to Robert Mueller, who investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election.
“It’s breathtaking audacity for a trial judge who has clearly shown that she wants to delay and, if possible, get rid of this case,” said Jed Shugerman, a Fordham Law professor and the author of The People’s Courts.”
“Amid mounting pressure for Supreme Court reform, Congress has before it one relatively straightforward option: enshrine Scalia’s “standing test” and legislate the basic requirements for who can sue over major issues of national importance.
Currently, the law concerning standing is governed by a series of Supreme Court cases that sort out which plaintiffs can bring cases in federal court in the first place. If it’s the wrong plaintiff, the case is thrown out. It also keeps federal judges out of the business of legislating under the pretense of legitimate litigation.
But so far, there is no general “standing” statute. The court has set its own standards for which cases it and lower courts can hear, pursuant to its reading of the Constitution. Congress should change that and set down its own marker. Although the current right-wing justices could decide to strike down standing legislation as impinging on their constitutional prerogatives, codification of standing law would send an important message that Congress is willing to impose reasonable checks and balances on the justices.
Standing comes from Article III of the Constitution, which gives federal judges the job description of deciding “cases.” The case law around standing amounts to the court’s working definition of the word “case”: At its core, it requires that plaintiffs have an injury that’s unique to them and not shared by the general population. Standing is central to the separation of powers because judges are supposed to only consider disputes between discrete parties that occurred in the past.
To grasp the distinction, imagine a case in which a city miscalculates the property tax liability owed by a homeowner for a single residence. She sues the government to get that particular financial injury redressed. Resolving that dispute is a job for the courts because it’s between two discrete parties and involves retroactive relief.
Legislatures, by contrast, make rules that are future-oriented and apply to the general population. If the homeowner wants the general property tax rate lowered, she must push legislators for action, not the courts. Standing holds judges within their constitutional lane by keeping sweeping policy disputes impacting the broader public out of courtrooms.
The Constitution does not define the word “case,” however, so the Supreme Court has had to fill in the blanks over the years by requiring, first and foremost, a concrete “injury” to make something a case. In cases between private parties, the injury is usually obvious — the defendant broke a contract or committed a tort that left the plaintiff worse off than they were before. In cases against the government, if the plaintiff is a corporation, it’s easy to show that a regulation or legislation causes harm to their business. But if a regular citizen wants the government to take action that affects the public — such as enforcing clean air standards or making mifepristone unavailable across the country — it’s harder to show an injury that’s particularized, or special, to the actual plaintiff bringing the suit.
For those cases, the court has long made clear that taxpayers cannot sue merely to vindicate their alleged “injury” in having their tax dollars misused by the government. That would allow angry taxpayers to turn the judiciary into the ultimate boss of the other two branches of government. Beyond that, what suffices as an injury can be hard to pin down, with the court adding a slew of adjectives to the test, requiring that an injury be imminent and not speculative or hypothetical, for example.
The governing standard, created by the Supreme Court over decades and refined at Scalia’s hand, requires three things: 1) that the plaintiff has an injury that is unique to them, 2) that the defendant caused it and 3) that if the court rules in their favor, that injury will be fixed. The aim is to find the equivalent of a “broken arm” — versus a generic policy gripe — that courts can remedy with an order.”
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“The fact that the court can pick and choose which cases in which to recognize standing law, and which they prefer to overlook it, cries out for congressional intervention.”