“We now know that Virginia Thomas, the wife of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, spent the weeks after the 2020 election cheerleading the Trump White House’s efforts to overturn President Joe Biden’s victory in that election. One detail we do not yet know, however, is what Justice Thomas knew about his wife’s communications, and whether he tried to use his office to protect her.
In January, the Supreme Court permitted the US House committee investigating the January 6 attacks on the Capitol to obtain hundreds of pages of White House records that may shine a light on former President Donald Trump’s efforts to thwart the peaceful transfer of power to Biden. These records may or may not contain additional evidence linking Ginni Thomas to January 6.
If Clarence Thomas had his way, the House committee and the public would never know. Thomas was the only justice to publicly dissent from the Supreme Court’s decision to let the House committee obtain these records — though he offered no explanation for why he dissented.
But here’s the thing: Yes, Thomas’s vote in this case, Trump v. Thompson, may have been an underhanded effort to protect his own wife. But his vote in Trump was entirely consistent with his record in cases where his spouse does not have a personal interest.
In more than three decades on the Supreme Court, Thomas has consistently voted to make it harder for many Americans to have their vote count; to erode institutions, like a free press, that are essential to democracy; and to dismantle nearly a century’s worth of democratically enacted laws on spurious constitutional grounds. Thomas’s opposition to democracy is not rooted in nepotism. It appears to be quite principled.
Among other things, Thomas is the only sitting justice who voted to install a Republican president in Bush v. Gore (2000) — although three other current justices were part of Republican George W. Bush’s legal team in that case. Thomas would allow Republican administrations to deactivate the entire Voting Rights Act so long as they are in power. He would strip journalists of First Amendment rights that allow them to safely provide critical coverage of government officials. And he would invalidate a long list of laws including the federal bans on child labor and on whites-only lunch counters, based on a widely rejected reading of the constitutional provision that grants Congress most of its power over the private sector.
No matter how the scandal with his wife’s texts shakes out, it’s worth remembering how the Court’s longest-serving justice would shape the world. In Clarence Thomas’s America, elections would be skewed so heavily in the Republican Party’s favor that Democrats will struggle to ever gain power. And if Democrats somehow do manage to squeak into office, Thomas would ensure that they cannot govern.”
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“In 1960, civil rights activists aligned with Martin Luther King, Jr. ran an advertisement in the New York Times, which alleged that Alabama police used brutal tactics to suppress student protests. The ad, however, contained some minor factual errors. It misidentified the song that protesters sang at a particular demonstration, for example, and it also claimed that police had arrested King seven times, when he’d in fact only been arrested four times.
Pointing to these small errors, a Jim Crow police official won a $500,000 verdict against the Times in an Alabama court — close to $5 million in 2022 dollars. Had this verdict stood, it would have chilled journalism of all kinds, because it would have meant that any newspaper or other outlet that prints even very small factual mistakes could have been hit with a verdict large enough to bankrupt the outlet.
The New York Times decision, however, prevented this outcome by holding that the First Amendment imposes limits on defamation lawsuits. When someone speaks about a public figure and about a matter of public concern, the Court held, they cannot be held liable for making false statements unless that statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
Thomas argued in McKee v. Cosby (2019) that New York Times should be overruled. Indeed, Thomas’s opinion suggests that states should be free to define their own defamation law free of constitutional constraints. “The States are perfectly capable of striking an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm,” Thomas wrote.
If this approach were to prevail, state officials could once again use malicious defamation lawsuits to target journalists. Suppose, for example, that I mistakenly report that “500 people attended a rally protesting Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis,” when in fact the rally was attended by only 450 people. If states can set their own defamation laws, free of constitutional constraint, then DeSantis could sue me and Vox Media for millions, endangering our ability to continue reporting on DeSantis — and potentially bankrupting Vox in the process.”
“GOP senators who are attacking President Joe Biden’s Supreme Court pick seem weirdly unaware of how our justice system works. By focusing in part on Ketanji Brown Jackson’s former role as a criminal defense attorney, they act as if it’s wrong to provide a defense to people accused of a crime—and that if the government levels a charge, it must be right.
Hey, if you haven’t done anything wrong, you have nothing to fear—or something like that. “Like any attorney who has been in any kind of practice, they are going to have to answer for the clients they represented and the arguments they made,” Sen. Josh Hawley (R–Mo.) said in reference to Jackson and other Biden nominees. Apparently, defense attorneys should only defend choirboys.
Yet I guarantee if Hawley—known for his fist pump in support of Jan. 6 protestors at the U.S. Capitol—became the target of an overzealous prosecutor who accused him of inciting an insurrection, he’d be happy to have a competent defense attorney to advocate on his behalf. That attorney shouldn’t be forever stained for defending someone as loathsome as Hawley.”
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“Jackson will be the nation’s first Supreme Court justice to have served as a public defender, with Thurgood Marshall being the last justice to have criminal defense experience.”
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“A study last year by the libertarian Cato Institute found the Trump administration’s judicial appointments tilted in favor of prosecutors over those who represented individuals by a 10-to-one margin. Only 14 percent of the liberal Obama administration’s appointees defended individuals. Most judges strive to be fair, but their backgrounds color their worldview.”
“Now the West Virginia plaintiffs raise several different legal arguments against the nonexistent Clean Power Plan, several of which could permanently hobble the federal government’s power to regulate if adopted by the Court.
A brief filed by several senior red-state officials, for example, rests heavily on the “major questions” doctrine, a legal doctrine that is currently fashionable among Republican judges but that was also invented entirely by judges and has no basis in any statute or provision of the Constitution.
The major questions doctrine claims that there are fairly strict limits on federal agencies’ power to hand down particularly impactful regulations. As the Court most recently stated in NFIB v. OSHA (2022), “we expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.” And several of the plaintiffs in West Virginia argue that the Clean Air Act isn’t sufficiently clear to justify a regulation like the Clean Power Plan.
One problem with this major questions doctrine is that it is vague. The Court has never explained what constitutes a matter of “vast economic and political significance,” or just how “clearly” Congress must “speak” to permit an agency to issue significant regulations. So, in practice, the major questions doctrine largely just functions as a veto power, allowing judges to justify blocking nearly any regulation they do not like. If a judge doesn’t like a particular regulation, they can just claim that it is too big.”
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“Other briefs in the West Virginia case suggest that the Clean Power Plan violates the “nondelegation doctrine,” another judge-created doctrine that limits Congress’s power to delegate the power to issue binding regulations to federal agencies. This doctrine is even more vague than the major questions doctrine, and even more capable of being applied selectively to strike down regulations that a particular panel of judges do not like.
As Justice Neil Gorsuch described nondelegation in 2019, a federal law authorizing an agency to regulate must be “‘sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain whether Congress’s guidance has been followed.” How “precise” must the law be? That’s up to judges to decide.
Notably because this doctrine outright forbids Congress from delegating certain powers to an agency, a Supreme Court decision that struck down the Clean Power Plan on nondelegation grounds could permanently strip Congress of its power to authorize the EPA to issue major regulations in the future. Indeed, depending on how broadly the Supreme Court worded such a decision, it could impose drastic new limits on every single federal agency.”
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“the issues at stake in West Virginia can be summarized fairly concisely. It is a case about a regulation that does not exist, that never took effect, and that would have imposed obligations on the energy industry that it would have met anyway. It also involves two legal doctrines that are mentioned nowhere in the Constitution, and that have no basis in any federal statute.
And yet, West Virginia could wind up permanently hobbling the government’s ability to fight climate change.”
“For nearly a decade, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has been trying to lift some of the secrecy cloaking the operations of the federal court that oversees foreign intelligence warrants. But in November, the Supreme Court declined to consider an ACLU petition arguing that the public has a First Amendment right to see the court’s classified decisions.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approves electronic surveillance, physical searches, and demands for business records targeting “a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.” Agencies seeking warrants have to claim that the collection of foreign intelligence is a “significant purpose” of their investigations and follow “minimization” procedures aimed at limiting collection of information about U.S. citizens or legal residents.
Since 2013, the ACLU has been seeking the release of FISC opinions, redacted as necessary, regarding the National Security Agency’s mass collection of Americans’ telephone records and online data. That practice, which was revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden, was based on a controversial interpretation of PATRIOT Act provisions that expired in 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act, which Congress approved that year, renewed those provisions but imposed new restrictions on bulk collection of telecommunication metadata.
Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FISC is supposed to protect Americans from unjustified federal snooping. But it is hard to assess how well the court is doing that without seeing its rulings. Because those opinions are classified, the Justice Department argues, only the executive branch has the authority to release them.
When the Supreme Court declined to hear the ACLU’s petition, Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, dissented, noting that “FISC evaluates extensive surveillance programs that carry profound implications for Americans’ privacy and their rights to speak and associate freely.” Gorsuch took a dim view of the government’s argument that the courts have no authority to approve the release of FISC opinions.
“This case presents questions about the right of public access to Article III judicial proceedings of grave national importance,” he wrote. “Maybe even more fundamentally, this case involves a governmental challenge to the power of this Court to review the work of Article III judges in a subordinate court. If these matters are not worthy of our time, what is?””
“Justice Amy Coney Barrett had been a member of the Supreme Court for less than a month when she cast the key vote in one of the most consequential religion cases of the past century.
Months earlier, when the seat she would fill was still held by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court had handed down a series of 5-4 decisions establishing that churches and other houses of worship must comply with state occupancy limits and other rules imposed upon them to slow the spread of Covid-19.
As Chief Justice John Roberts, the only Republican appointee to join these decisions, explained in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (2020), “our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States.” And these officials’ decisions “should not be subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.”
But this sort of judicial humility no longer enjoyed majority support on the Court once Barrett’s confirmation gave GOP justices a 6-3 supermajority. Twenty-nine days after Barrett became Justice Barrett, she united with her fellow Trump appointees and two other hardline conservative justices in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo (2020), a decision striking down the very sort of occupancy limits that the Court permitted in South Bay. The upshot of this decision is that the public’s interest in controlling a deadly disease must give way to the wishes of certain religious litigants.”
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“Before Roman Catholic Diocese, religious objectors typically had to follow a “neutral law of general applicability” — meaning that these objectors must obey the same laws that everyone else must follow. Roman Catholic Diocese technically did not abolish this rule, but it redefined what constitutes a “neutral law of general applicability” so narrowly that nearly any religious conservative with a clever lawyer can expect to prevail in a lawsuit.
That decision is part of a much bigger pattern. Since the Court’s Republican majority became a supermajority, the Court has treated religion cases as its highest priority.”
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“Several of the justices are openly hostile to the very idea that the Constitution imposes limits on the government’s ability to advance one faith over others. At a recent oral argument, for example, Justice Neil Gorsuch derisively referred to the “so-called separation of . . . church and state.”
Indeed, it appears likely that the Court may even require the government to subsidize religion, at least in certain circumstances.
At December’s oral arguments in Carson v. Makin, for example, the Court considered a Maine program that provides tuition vouchers to some students, which they can use to pay for education at a secular private school when there’s no public school nearby. Though the state says it wishes to remain “neutral and silent” on matters of religion and not allow its vouchers to go to private religious schools, many of the justices appeared to view this kind of neutrality as unlawful. “Discriminating against all religions,” Justice Brett Kavanaugh suggested, is itself a form of anti-religious discrimination that violates his conception of the Constitution.
For many decades, the Court held the opposite view. As the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), “no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”
But Everson’s rule is now dead. And the Court appears likely to require secular taxpayers to pay for religious education, at least under some circumstances.”
“Breyer prizes compromise, and as the court has become more ideologically polarized, he’s tried to find points of common ground with the conservative justices, even on relatively high-profile issues, like religious liberty. That pragmatic streak was on display in 2005, when he served as the pivotal vote in two separate cases about public displays of the Ten Commandments. In one of the cases, he voted with the conservatives to uphold the display; in the other, he voted with the liberals to strike it down. Over the years, he joined the conservatives in a variety of other important religion cases, including a dispute over a 40-foot cross that was displayed on public property in Maryland and a fight over whether Missouri could exclude a church from a public grant program for playground resurfacing.
In those cases, he often stressed the need to avoid religious disagreements — which sometimes led to outcomes that upset liberals. In the 2005 case where he voted to uphold a Ten Commandments display in Texas, for instance, he wrote that although it was a “borderline case,” ruling that it was unconstitutional could lead to the removal of similar displays around the country and “thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”
And his breaks with his liberal colleagues haven’t been on religion alone. According to a recent analysis by political scientists Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn, Breyer cast the lowest percentage of liberal votes of any of the three Democratic appointees who served with him. Epstein, Martin and Quinn found that most of those disagreements were in the area of criminal procedure, particularly in cases related to search and seizure.
Of course, Breyer has been an outspoken liberal voice on other issues, including reproductive rights and the death penalty.”
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“Breyer plainly became concerned about the court’s reputation, particularly after Ginsburg died and was replaced by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, which gave the conservative majority even more power. He’s spent the years since then trying to convince Americans that the court was fundamentally a nonideological institution, even publishing a short book where he argued that the court — despite its clear conservative tilt — was not a political institution.
That commitment to preserving the judiciary’s nonpartisan image — and staying mostly in line with public opinion — put Breyer increasingly out of step with the court’s trajectory. This year’s term isn’t over yet, but at least some of the Supreme Court conservatives seem ready to veer sharply outside the mainstream on abortion, gun rights and other high-profile issues. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, meanwhile, shows no desire to make nice with the conservatives — in a recent dissent, she called the court’s decision to leave a highly restrictive Texas abortion law in place a “disaster” and a “grave disservice to women in Texas.”
In a 2020 interview, Breyer told reporter Dahlia Lithwick, “The best is the enemy of the good. … But if you have a choice between achieving 20 or 30 percent of what you’d like or being the hero of all your friends, choose the first.” That attitude seems unlikely to be especially popular at the Supreme Court going forward — among liberals or conservatives.”
“Underlying that split is the question of whether and when COVID-19 counts as a workplace hazard, justifying regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as opposed to a general risk that Americans face throughout the day, which goes beyond that agency’s statutory mission. All of the justices agreed that OSHA does not have a general license to protect public health, and all of them agreed that the agency does have the power to address COVID-19 in the workplace. But while the dissenters were willing to let OSHA define that problem in general terms, justifying a broad solution covering 84 million employees, the majority thought the agency was obliged to be more specific and discriminating.”
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“OSHA has previously issued regulations that addressed communicable diseases. In 1990, it issued a nonemergency standard dealing with bloodborne pathogens, and last June it published a COVID-19 ETS for the health care industry. But both of those rules aimed to protect employees who faced special hazards because of the nature of their work (handling blood samples and treating COVID-19 patients, respectively), and neither of them encouraged or required employers to make vaccination mandatory. That is something OSHA, which has existed for more than half a century, has never done before—a point that the justices emphasized during oral arguments last week and again in yesterday’s decision.
“OSHA has never before imposed such a mandate,” the Court notes. “Nor has Congress. Indeed, although Congress has enacted significant legislation addressing the COVID–19 pandemic, it has declined to enact any measure similar to what OSHA has promulgated here….The most noteworthy action concerning the vaccine mandate by either House of Congress has been a majority vote of the Senate disapproving the regulation on December 8, 2021.”
In a joint dissent, Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan argue that OSHA’s unprecedented rule is justified by the unprecedented threat that COVID-19 poses”
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“Even as Breyer et al. emphasize the society-wide threat posed by COVID-19, they suggest the risk is especially acute in the workplace, where employees typically gather inside for eight hours a day. That basic fact, the dissenters argue, justifies OSHA’s broad approach, because the coronavirus “spreads mostly without regard to differences in occupation or industry.””
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“More generally, the majority says, OSHA has failed to draw appropriate distinctions between different work situations that pose widely varying risks of virus transmission. “Although COVID-19 is a risk that occurs in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most,” the Court says. “COVID–19 can and does spread at home, in schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather. That kind of universal risk is no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life—simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock—would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.””
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“The majority nevertheless concedes that OSHA has the authority to address COVID-19 in certain contexts:
“Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of
an employee’s job or workplace, targeted regulations are plainly permissible. We do not doubt, for example, that OSHA could regulate researchers who work with the COVID–19 virus. So too could OSHA regulate risks associated with working in particularly crowded or cramped environments. But the danger present in such workplaces differs in both degree and kind from the everyday risk of contracting COVID–19 that all face. OSHA’s indiscriminate approach fails to account for this crucial distinction—between occupational risk and risk more generally—and accordingly the mandate takes on the character of a general public health measure, rather than an “occupational safety or health standard.”””
“Today’s liberal critics of judicial review make two principal claims, both of which Learned Hand made too. First, they say that judicial review is repugnant to democracy. To allow unelected judges to void the actions of democratically elected legislators, presidents, or governors, the argument goes, is to allow the judiciary to subvert the will of the majority. Second, these critics say, judicial review “wasn’t enumerated in the Constitution and isn’t inherent in the court as an institution,” as Bouie put it. Thus, the act of abolishing judicial review does not raise any constitutional concerns.
These liberal critics are right on the first count and wrong on the second. The judiciary is undoubtedly the least democratic branch of government. But that is by design. The role of the federal courts, as James Madison once put it, is to stand as “an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” Lawmakers and presidents sometimes assume powers that they should not, and popular majorities sometimes support those power grabs. The judiciary is meant to stand in the way even if judicial review thwarts the will of such majorities. Indeed, the judiciary is meant to act as a check against the tyranny of such majorities.
What is more, contra Bouie, this authority is firmly located in the Constitution and fully inherent in the judicial branch. According to Article III, Section 1, “the judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution understood the phrase “the judicial power” to include the power of federal judges to nullify legislative and executive acts that violate the Constitution, which is the power that we call judicial review.”
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“An examination of American legal history reveals the solid constitutional foundations of judicial review. Take the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, where the document was drafted. Speaking on July 21, Luther Martin gave voice to the consensus view. “As to the constitutionality of laws,” Martin observed to his fellow delegates, “that point will come before the judges in their proper official character. In this character they will have a negative on the laws.” George Mason made the same point on the same day. Under the Constitution, he said, judges “could declare an unconstitutional law void.” Nobody at the convention disagreed with any of that.
This same understanding of “the judicial power” is also evident in the Framers’ debates about a proposal that did not make it into the final document. James Madison was foremost among those at the convention who thought that Congress should have the constitutional power to veto state laws. Madison had watched as various states, under the Articles of Confederation, erected tariffs and other costly impediments to interstate commerce (among other barriers to the economic and political harmony of the new nation). Madison wanted to see a congressional check put in place against such state actions.
The states “can pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be…set aside by the national tribunals,” Madison told the convention on July 17. In other words, Madison worried that judicial review by the federal courts might take too long in such cases and therefore wanted Congress to be able to move even more quickly against especially dangerous state laws.
Gouverneur Morris spoke for the opposition to that proposal. “A law that ought to be negatived,” Morris replied, “will be set aside in the judiciary department.” Morris did not favor a congressional veto over state legislation because he thought the veto power of the federal courts—judicial review—would do the trick.
Morris beat Madison in that particular debate. The Constitution would not contain a congressional “negative” over state laws. But both sides in the debate did think—indeed, both sides simply took it for granted—that the federal courts would have the constitutional power to “set aside” unconstitutional laws. They all agreed that the federal courts would have the power of judicial review.”
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“That same understanding of “the judicial power” is evident when you examine the records of the state ratifying conventions.”
“The FBI has arrested more than 700 Donald Trump supporters who unlawfully entered the Capitol grounds or the Capitol itself that day, many of whom incriminated themselves by recording and/or livestreaming their activities. On the anniversary of the riot, The New York Times reported that “a little over 300” had been charged with petty crimes such as trespassing and disorderly conduct, while “more than 225 people” were “accused of attacking or interfering with the police” and “about 275” were charged with obstructing the congressional certification of President Joe Biden’s election.
Against this backdrop, last week’s indictment of 11 Oath Keepers stands out. It was the first time that any of the rioters had been charged with sedition—specifically, using force to “prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.” The conspiracy described in the indictment is notably different from the spontaneous, heat-of-the-moment crimes committed by most of the people who stormed the Capitol. Unlike the riot as a whole, which looked more like a temper tantrum than an incipient coup, the “operation” mounted by the Oath Keepers was planned well in advance. Although it is the closest thing we have seen so far to an “insurrection” (the label that Democrats routinely apply to the riot), it was still half-baked and pitifully ineffectual.”
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” The preparations for January 6 allegedly included gathering Oath Keepers from around the country; paramilitary training; “reconnaissance” of the Capitol area; multiple purchases of guns, ammunition, and firearm accessories; a stash of weapons at a hotel in Arlington; and a “quick reaction force” (QRF) that waited at the hotel, ready to act “if SHTF.” The indictment says “the QRF teams were prepared to rapidly transport firearms and other weapons into Washington, D.C., in support of operations aimed at using force to stop the lawful transfer of presidential power.””
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“The Oath Keepers who went to the Capitol on January 6 evidently did not bring any firearms, although they did have “hard-knuckle tactical gloves, tactical vests, ballistic goggles, radios, chemical sprays, a paracord attachment, fatigues, goggles, scissors, a large stick,” and a German Shepherd named Warrior.”
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“According to the indictment, however, Rhodes and other Oath Keepers celebrated the riot and talked about following it up with further acts of resistance. “Thousands of ticked off patriots spontaneously marched on the Capitol,” Rhodes said that night in a Signal group chat. “You ain’t seen nothing yet.” Between January 10 and January 14, the indictment says, Rhodes spent about $18,000 on firearm parts, accessories, and ammunition. But apparently nothing came of whatever Rhodes might have been planning. He was not arrested until.. a year after the spending spree described in the indictment.”
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“On Election Day, Rhodes publicly advised Oath Keepers to “stock up on ammo” and prepare for a “full-on war in the streets” if Biden were declared the winner. A week later, Rhodes posted a “call to action” under the headline “WHAT WE THE PEOPLE MUST DO.” It described elements of the revolt against Milosevic, which included not only “peaceful protests” and “complete civil disobedience” but also “swarm[ing] the streets,” “confronting the opponents,” “storm[ing] the Parliament,” and “burn[ing] down fake state Television.”
In a December 23, 2020, message on the Oath Keepers website, Rhodes said “tens of thousands of patriot Americans, both veterans and non-veterans, will already be in Washington D.C., and many of us will have our mission-critical gear stowed nearby just outside D.C.” He warned that he and likeminded patriots might have to “take to arms in defense of our God given liberty.”
So much for staying below the radar. Rhodes’ lack of discretion was not his only problem. It remains unclear exactly how he hoped to keep Trump in power.”
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“The plan, evidently, was to “scare the shit” out of Congress with a show of force that would persuade legislators to reject electoral votes for Biden. But in the end, the Oath Keepers merely joined a riot that was already in progress, and the riot itself accomplished nothing but an interruption that delayed ratification of Biden’s victory until that night.”
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“The sedition charges do not require that the defendants had any realistic hope of success. Assuming the allegations are true, Rhodes et al. did indeed conspire to use force to “prevent, hinder, or delay” the execution of Congress’ constitutional and statutory obligations to certify the election results. And in addition to the sedition counts, which are punishable by up to 20 years in prison, the defendants face various other charges, including conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, assault, destruction of government property, interference with law enforcement, and tampering with evidence (mainly by erasing incriminating data on their cellphones).
The Justice Department estimates that as many as 2,500 people may ultimately face charges in connection with the Capitol riot. Most of them will be more like Gonzalez, the “Capitol Doobie Smoker,” than Rhodes and his followers, who had ambitious but inept plans that ultimately amounted to little more than a sideshow in a much broader spasm of vandalism and violence that was itself utterly futile.”
“what about the onslaught of frivolous suits that would come down against the police? That also misses the mark, particularly when considering that it is not possible to simply enter a federal courthouse and file a lawsuit because you’re mad at the cops. Before suing a government actor, a plaintiff must satisfy two conditions: that the public servant affirmatively violated someone’s constitutional rights, and that the violation of the rights is clearly established in prior case law. Without qualified immunity, a would-be litigant would still need to prove to a federal judge that his constitutional rights were infringed on. Qualified immunity is only the second part—the part that sends a victim searching for a perfect court precedent where another victim experienced a near-identical sort of misconduct.
It’s for that reason that the doctrine gives license to some disturbing behavior—the sort that should concern anyone who positions himself as a defender of responsible governance. An example: “The City Officers ought to have recognized that the alleged theft was morally wrong,” but the police “did not have clear notice that it violated the Fourth Amendment.” This is a real quote from a real decision from a real federal court—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit—awarding qualified immunity to two government actors who we apparently cannot trust to know that stealing during a search warrant is unconstitutional unless there is some obscure court precedent saying so. I’d posit that most of the public has more faith in police to do their jobs with integrity. I certainly do.”