“Justice Amy Coney Barrett had been a member of the Supreme Court for less than a month when she cast the key vote in one of the most consequential religion cases of the past century.
Months earlier, when the seat she would fill was still held by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court had handed down a series of 5-4 decisions establishing that churches and other houses of worship must comply with state occupancy limits and other rules imposed upon them to slow the spread of Covid-19.
As Chief Justice John Roberts, the only Republican appointee to join these decisions, explained in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (2020), “our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States.” And these officials’ decisions “should not be subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.”
But this sort of judicial humility no longer enjoyed majority support on the Court once Barrett’s confirmation gave GOP justices a 6-3 supermajority. Twenty-nine days after Barrett became Justice Barrett, she united with her fellow Trump appointees and two other hardline conservative justices in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo (2020), a decision striking down the very sort of occupancy limits that the Court permitted in South Bay. The upshot of this decision is that the public’s interest in controlling a deadly disease must give way to the wishes of certain religious litigants.”
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“Before Roman Catholic Diocese, religious objectors typically had to follow a “neutral law of general applicability” — meaning that these objectors must obey the same laws that everyone else must follow. Roman Catholic Diocese technically did not abolish this rule, but it redefined what constitutes a “neutral law of general applicability” so narrowly that nearly any religious conservative with a clever lawyer can expect to prevail in a lawsuit.
That decision is part of a much bigger pattern. Since the Court’s Republican majority became a supermajority, the Court has treated religion cases as its highest priority.”
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“Several of the justices are openly hostile to the very idea that the Constitution imposes limits on the government’s ability to advance one faith over others. At a recent oral argument, for example, Justice Neil Gorsuch derisively referred to the “so-called separation of . . . church and state.”
Indeed, it appears likely that the Court may even require the government to subsidize religion, at least in certain circumstances.
At December’s oral arguments in Carson v. Makin, for example, the Court considered a Maine program that provides tuition vouchers to some students, which they can use to pay for education at a secular private school when there’s no public school nearby. Though the state says it wishes to remain “neutral and silent” on matters of religion and not allow its vouchers to go to private religious schools, many of the justices appeared to view this kind of neutrality as unlawful. “Discriminating against all religions,” Justice Brett Kavanaugh suggested, is itself a form of anti-religious discrimination that violates his conception of the Constitution.
For many decades, the Court held the opposite view. As the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), “no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”
But Everson’s rule is now dead. And the Court appears likely to require secular taxpayers to pay for religious education, at least under some circumstances.”
“Breyer prizes compromise, and as the court has become more ideologically polarized, he’s tried to find points of common ground with the conservative justices, even on relatively high-profile issues, like religious liberty. That pragmatic streak was on display in 2005, when he served as the pivotal vote in two separate cases about public displays of the Ten Commandments. In one of the cases, he voted with the conservatives to uphold the display; in the other, he voted with the liberals to strike it down. Over the years, he joined the conservatives in a variety of other important religion cases, including a dispute over a 40-foot cross that was displayed on public property in Maryland and a fight over whether Missouri could exclude a church from a public grant program for playground resurfacing.
In those cases, he often stressed the need to avoid religious disagreements — which sometimes led to outcomes that upset liberals. In the 2005 case where he voted to uphold a Ten Commandments display in Texas, for instance, he wrote that although it was a “borderline case,” ruling that it was unconstitutional could lead to the removal of similar displays around the country and “thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”
And his breaks with his liberal colleagues haven’t been on religion alone. According to a recent analysis by political scientists Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn, Breyer cast the lowest percentage of liberal votes of any of the three Democratic appointees who served with him. Epstein, Martin and Quinn found that most of those disagreements were in the area of criminal procedure, particularly in cases related to search and seizure.
Of course, Breyer has been an outspoken liberal voice on other issues, including reproductive rights and the death penalty.”
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“Breyer plainly became concerned about the court’s reputation, particularly after Ginsburg died and was replaced by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, which gave the conservative majority even more power. He’s spent the years since then trying to convince Americans that the court was fundamentally a nonideological institution, even publishing a short book where he argued that the court — despite its clear conservative tilt — was not a political institution.
That commitment to preserving the judiciary’s nonpartisan image — and staying mostly in line with public opinion — put Breyer increasingly out of step with the court’s trajectory. This year’s term isn’t over yet, but at least some of the Supreme Court conservatives seem ready to veer sharply outside the mainstream on abortion, gun rights and other high-profile issues. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, meanwhile, shows no desire to make nice with the conservatives — in a recent dissent, she called the court’s decision to leave a highly restrictive Texas abortion law in place a “disaster” and a “grave disservice to women in Texas.”
In a 2020 interview, Breyer told reporter Dahlia Lithwick, “The best is the enemy of the good. … But if you have a choice between achieving 20 or 30 percent of what you’d like or being the hero of all your friends, choose the first.” That attitude seems unlikely to be especially popular at the Supreme Court going forward — among liberals or conservatives.”
“Underlying that split is the question of whether and when COVID-19 counts as a workplace hazard, justifying regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as opposed to a general risk that Americans face throughout the day, which goes beyond that agency’s statutory mission. All of the justices agreed that OSHA does not have a general license to protect public health, and all of them agreed that the agency does have the power to address COVID-19 in the workplace. But while the dissenters were willing to let OSHA define that problem in general terms, justifying a broad solution covering 84 million employees, the majority thought the agency was obliged to be more specific and discriminating.”
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“OSHA has previously issued regulations that addressed communicable diseases. In 1990, it issued a nonemergency standard dealing with bloodborne pathogens, and last June it published a COVID-19 ETS for the health care industry. But both of those rules aimed to protect employees who faced special hazards because of the nature of their work (handling blood samples and treating COVID-19 patients, respectively), and neither of them encouraged or required employers to make vaccination mandatory. That is something OSHA, which has existed for more than half a century, has never done before—a point that the justices emphasized during oral arguments last week and again in yesterday’s decision.
“OSHA has never before imposed such a mandate,” the Court notes. “Nor has Congress. Indeed, although Congress has enacted significant legislation addressing the COVID–19 pandemic, it has declined to enact any measure similar to what OSHA has promulgated here….The most noteworthy action concerning the vaccine mandate by either House of Congress has been a majority vote of the Senate disapproving the regulation on December 8, 2021.”
In a joint dissent, Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan argue that OSHA’s unprecedented rule is justified by the unprecedented threat that COVID-19 poses”
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“Even as Breyer et al. emphasize the society-wide threat posed by COVID-19, they suggest the risk is especially acute in the workplace, where employees typically gather inside for eight hours a day. That basic fact, the dissenters argue, justifies OSHA’s broad approach, because the coronavirus “spreads mostly without regard to differences in occupation or industry.””
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“More generally, the majority says, OSHA has failed to draw appropriate distinctions between different work situations that pose widely varying risks of virus transmission. “Although COVID-19 is a risk that occurs in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most,” the Court says. “COVID–19 can and does spread at home, in schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather. That kind of universal risk is no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life—simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock—would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.””
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“The majority nevertheless concedes that OSHA has the authority to address COVID-19 in certain contexts:
“Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of
an employee’s job or workplace, targeted regulations are plainly permissible. We do not doubt, for example, that OSHA could regulate researchers who work with the COVID–19 virus. So too could OSHA regulate risks associated with working in particularly crowded or cramped environments. But the danger present in such workplaces differs in both degree and kind from the everyday risk of contracting COVID–19 that all face. OSHA’s indiscriminate approach fails to account for this crucial distinction—between occupational risk and risk more generally—and accordingly the mandate takes on the character of a general public health measure, rather than an “occupational safety or health standard.”””
“Today’s liberal critics of judicial review make two principal claims, both of which Learned Hand made too. First, they say that judicial review is repugnant to democracy. To allow unelected judges to void the actions of democratically elected legislators, presidents, or governors, the argument goes, is to allow the judiciary to subvert the will of the majority. Second, these critics say, judicial review “wasn’t enumerated in the Constitution and isn’t inherent in the court as an institution,” as Bouie put it. Thus, the act of abolishing judicial review does not raise any constitutional concerns.
These liberal critics are right on the first count and wrong on the second. The judiciary is undoubtedly the least democratic branch of government. But that is by design. The role of the federal courts, as James Madison once put it, is to stand as “an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.” Lawmakers and presidents sometimes assume powers that they should not, and popular majorities sometimes support those power grabs. The judiciary is meant to stand in the way even if judicial review thwarts the will of such majorities. Indeed, the judiciary is meant to act as a check against the tyranny of such majorities.
What is more, contra Bouie, this authority is firmly located in the Constitution and fully inherent in the judicial branch. According to Article III, Section 1, “the judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution understood the phrase “the judicial power” to include the power of federal judges to nullify legislative and executive acts that violate the Constitution, which is the power that we call judicial review.”
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“An examination of American legal history reveals the solid constitutional foundations of judicial review. Take the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, where the document was drafted. Speaking on July 21, Luther Martin gave voice to the consensus view. “As to the constitutionality of laws,” Martin observed to his fellow delegates, “that point will come before the judges in their proper official character. In this character they will have a negative on the laws.” George Mason made the same point on the same day. Under the Constitution, he said, judges “could declare an unconstitutional law void.” Nobody at the convention disagreed with any of that.
This same understanding of “the judicial power” is also evident in the Framers’ debates about a proposal that did not make it into the final document. James Madison was foremost among those at the convention who thought that Congress should have the constitutional power to veto state laws. Madison had watched as various states, under the Articles of Confederation, erected tariffs and other costly impediments to interstate commerce (among other barriers to the economic and political harmony of the new nation). Madison wanted to see a congressional check put in place against such state actions.
The states “can pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be…set aside by the national tribunals,” Madison told the convention on July 17. In other words, Madison worried that judicial review by the federal courts might take too long in such cases and therefore wanted Congress to be able to move even more quickly against especially dangerous state laws.
Gouverneur Morris spoke for the opposition to that proposal. “A law that ought to be negatived,” Morris replied, “will be set aside in the judiciary department.” Morris did not favor a congressional veto over state legislation because he thought the veto power of the federal courts—judicial review—would do the trick.
Morris beat Madison in that particular debate. The Constitution would not contain a congressional “negative” over state laws. But both sides in the debate did think—indeed, both sides simply took it for granted—that the federal courts would have the constitutional power to “set aside” unconstitutional laws. They all agreed that the federal courts would have the power of judicial review.”
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“That same understanding of “the judicial power” is evident when you examine the records of the state ratifying conventions.”
“The FBI has arrested more than 700 Donald Trump supporters who unlawfully entered the Capitol grounds or the Capitol itself that day, many of whom incriminated themselves by recording and/or livestreaming their activities. On the anniversary of the riot, The New York Times reported that “a little over 300” had been charged with petty crimes such as trespassing and disorderly conduct, while “more than 225 people” were “accused of attacking or interfering with the police” and “about 275” were charged with obstructing the congressional certification of President Joe Biden’s election.
Against this backdrop, last week’s indictment of 11 Oath Keepers stands out. It was the first time that any of the rioters had been charged with sedition—specifically, using force to “prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.” The conspiracy described in the indictment is notably different from the spontaneous, heat-of-the-moment crimes committed by most of the people who stormed the Capitol. Unlike the riot as a whole, which looked more like a temper tantrum than an incipient coup, the “operation” mounted by the Oath Keepers was planned well in advance. Although it is the closest thing we have seen so far to an “insurrection” (the label that Democrats routinely apply to the riot), it was still half-baked and pitifully ineffectual.”
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” The preparations for January 6 allegedly included gathering Oath Keepers from around the country; paramilitary training; “reconnaissance” of the Capitol area; multiple purchases of guns, ammunition, and firearm accessories; a stash of weapons at a hotel in Arlington; and a “quick reaction force” (QRF) that waited at the hotel, ready to act “if SHTF.” The indictment says “the QRF teams were prepared to rapidly transport firearms and other weapons into Washington, D.C., in support of operations aimed at using force to stop the lawful transfer of presidential power.””
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“The Oath Keepers who went to the Capitol on January 6 evidently did not bring any firearms, although they did have “hard-knuckle tactical gloves, tactical vests, ballistic goggles, radios, chemical sprays, a paracord attachment, fatigues, goggles, scissors, a large stick,” and a German Shepherd named Warrior.”
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“According to the indictment, however, Rhodes and other Oath Keepers celebrated the riot and talked about following it up with further acts of resistance. “Thousands of ticked off patriots spontaneously marched on the Capitol,” Rhodes said that night in a Signal group chat. “You ain’t seen nothing yet.” Between January 10 and January 14, the indictment says, Rhodes spent about $18,000 on firearm parts, accessories, and ammunition. But apparently nothing came of whatever Rhodes might have been planning. He was not arrested until.. a year after the spending spree described in the indictment.”
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“On Election Day, Rhodes publicly advised Oath Keepers to “stock up on ammo” and prepare for a “full-on war in the streets” if Biden were declared the winner. A week later, Rhodes posted a “call to action” under the headline “WHAT WE THE PEOPLE MUST DO.” It described elements of the revolt against Milosevic, which included not only “peaceful protests” and “complete civil disobedience” but also “swarm[ing] the streets,” “confronting the opponents,” “storm[ing] the Parliament,” and “burn[ing] down fake state Television.”
In a December 23, 2020, message on the Oath Keepers website, Rhodes said “tens of thousands of patriot Americans, both veterans and non-veterans, will already be in Washington D.C., and many of us will have our mission-critical gear stowed nearby just outside D.C.” He warned that he and likeminded patriots might have to “take to arms in defense of our God given liberty.”
So much for staying below the radar. Rhodes’ lack of discretion was not his only problem. It remains unclear exactly how he hoped to keep Trump in power.”
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“The plan, evidently, was to “scare the shit” out of Congress with a show of force that would persuade legislators to reject electoral votes for Biden. But in the end, the Oath Keepers merely joined a riot that was already in progress, and the riot itself accomplished nothing but an interruption that delayed ratification of Biden’s victory until that night.”
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“The sedition charges do not require that the defendants had any realistic hope of success. Assuming the allegations are true, Rhodes et al. did indeed conspire to use force to “prevent, hinder, or delay” the execution of Congress’ constitutional and statutory obligations to certify the election results. And in addition to the sedition counts, which are punishable by up to 20 years in prison, the defendants face various other charges, including conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, assault, destruction of government property, interference with law enforcement, and tampering with evidence (mainly by erasing incriminating data on their cellphones).
The Justice Department estimates that as many as 2,500 people may ultimately face charges in connection with the Capitol riot. Most of them will be more like Gonzalez, the “Capitol Doobie Smoker,” than Rhodes and his followers, who had ambitious but inept plans that ultimately amounted to little more than a sideshow in a much broader spasm of vandalism and violence that was itself utterly futile.”
“what about the onslaught of frivolous suits that would come down against the police? That also misses the mark, particularly when considering that it is not possible to simply enter a federal courthouse and file a lawsuit because you’re mad at the cops. Before suing a government actor, a plaintiff must satisfy two conditions: that the public servant affirmatively violated someone’s constitutional rights, and that the violation of the rights is clearly established in prior case law. Without qualified immunity, a would-be litigant would still need to prove to a federal judge that his constitutional rights were infringed on. Qualified immunity is only the second part—the part that sends a victim searching for a perfect court precedent where another victim experienced a near-identical sort of misconduct.
It’s for that reason that the doctrine gives license to some disturbing behavior—the sort that should concern anyone who positions himself as a defender of responsible governance. An example: “The City Officers ought to have recognized that the alleged theft was morally wrong,” but the police “did not have clear notice that it violated the Fourth Amendment.” This is a real quote from a real decision from a real federal court—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit—awarding qualified immunity to two government actors who we apparently cannot trust to know that stealing during a search warrant is unconstitutional unless there is some obscure court precedent saying so. I’d posit that most of the public has more faith in police to do their jobs with integrity. I certainly do.”
“No one has ever elected Matthew Kacsmaryk to anything.
Kacsmaryk, whom former President Donald Trump appointed to the federal bench in 2019, was previously a lawyer for a Christian right law firm. He once claimed being transgender is a “mental disorder” and that gay people are “disordered.” He’s also one of the most powerful immigration officials in the country, having successfully wrested control of much of America’s border policy away from the man Americans elected president in 2020.
With the Supreme Court’s blessing, Kacsmaryk ordered President Joe Biden’s administration to reinstate Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, which requires many asylum seekers who arrive at the United States’ southern border to stay in Mexico while they await a hearing.
Even if you ignore the moral implications of reinstating such a policy, there are good reasons to doubt that the policy is a good use of America’s limited border security resources. And Kacsmaryk’s decision is also unlawful for numerous reasons.
One of the most important reasons is that it upends the balance of power between the president and unelected judges. Reinstating the Remain in Mexico program requires the Mexican government’s cooperation — which means that Kacsmaryk ordered the United States to change its diplomatic stance toward Mexico. And that’s despite decades of warnings from the Supreme Court that judges should be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”
Kacsmaryk’s decision, and the Supreme Court’s decision to stand with Kacsmaryk against President Joe Biden, is one of the most dramatic examples of the Republican-controlled federal judiciary’s many conflicts with America’s Democratic president. But it’s hardly an isolated incident.
In just four years as president, Trump remade the federal judiciary — all with a big assist from a Senate Republican leader willing to break any norm in order to ensure GOP control of the courts. Trump appointed a third of the Supreme Court and nearly a third of all active appeals court judges. He also peppered federal trial courts with conservative activists like Kacsmaryk, who are eager to overturn some of the most fundamental assumptions of US law.
Nearly one year into Biden’s time in office, the result hasn’t exactly been a bloodbath for his policies — in contrast to the seemingly never-ending array of lawsuits seeking to repeal Obamacare, no federal judge has yet tried to repeal Biden’s major legislative accomplishments such as the American Rescue Plan or the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. But in two areas in particular, immigration and public health, the courts have been unusually aggressive.”
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“if the Supreme Court wanted lower-court judges to stop ignoring precedents that permit President Biden to govern, it could intervene to stop them from doing so. Instead, it has rewarded many of the most aggressive conservative innovators within the judiciary.”
“OSHA’s ETS, which it published on November 5, demands that companies with 100 or more employees require them to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or wear face masks and undergo weekly virus testing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit stayed the ETS on November 6, citing “grave statutory and constitutional issues.” The 5th Circuit extended that stay a week later, when it said the mandate is “fatally flawed” because it “grossly exceeds OSHA’s statutory authority.”
After that ruling, the many lawsuits challenging the mandate were consolidated and assigned by lottery to the 6th Circuit, which the Biden administration asked to lift the 5th Circuit’s stay. In doing so, the 6th Circuit majority criticized the other appeals court for reaching hasty conclusions unsupported by precedent and for failing to properly consider the evidence that OSHA presented in favor of its mandate.
An emergency standard allows OSHA to circumvent the usual rule making process by publishing regulations that take effect immediately. But to avoid the public notice, comment, and hearing requirements that ordinarily apply to OSHA rules, the agency has to identify a “grave danger” to employees “from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards.” It also has to show the emergency standard is “necessary to protect employees from such danger.”
In her 6th Circuit majority opinion, Stranch has little trouble concluding that COVID-19 qualifies as an “agent” that is “physically harmful.” Citing the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, she says “an ‘agent’ is ‘a chemically, physically, or biologically active principle,'” while “a virus is defined, in part, as ‘any [of a] large group of submicroscopic infectious agents.'””
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“Larsen opens her dissent by chiding Stranch for misrepresenting reality. “The majority opinion describes the emergency rule at issue here as permitting employers ‘to determine for themselves how best to minimize the risk of contracting COVID-19 in their workplaces,'” she writes. “With respect, that was the state of federal law before the rule, not after.”
Larsen also suggests that Stranch has pulled a bait and switch. “The majority opinion initially agrees…that an emergency standard must be more than ‘reasonably necessary’; it must be ‘essential,'” she writes. “But then that word, and the concept, disappear from the analysis. What starts as a demand for an ‘essential’ solution quickly turns into acceptance of any ‘effective’ or ‘meaningful’ remedy; and later, acquiescence to a solution with a mere ‘reasonable’ ‘relationship’ to the problem. The majority opinion never explains why ‘necessary’ undergoes such a metamorphosis.”
As Larsen sees it, OSHA “has not made the appropriate finding of necessity.” She notes that “OSHA’s mandate applies, in undifferentiated fashion, to a vast swath of Americans: 84 million workers, 26 million unvaccinated, with varying levels of exposure and risk.” OSHA has the burden of explaining “why the rule should apply to a large and diverse class,” she says, but the agency “does not do so.””
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“In some respects, Larsen thinks, OSHA’s judgments are inconsistent with the numbers it cites. “OSHA has determined that no vaccinated worker is in ‘grave danger,’ whereas all unvaccinated workers are,” Larsen writes. “But the government’s own data reveal that the death rate for unvaccinated people between the ages of 18 and 29 is roughly equivalent to that of vaccinated persons between 50 and 64. So an unvaccinated 18-year-old bears the same risk as a vaccinated 50-year-old. And yet, the 18-year-old is in grave danger, while the 50-year-old is not. One of these conclusions must be wrong; either way is a problem for OSHA’s rule.””
“In a market society, economists Milton and Rose Friedman wrote in 1979, “the consumer is protected from being exploited by one seller by the existence of another seller from whom he can buy and who is eager to sell to him.” In theory, if one company adopts “woke” branding that offends its customers, then the market will deliver those customers into the waiting arms of a competitor.
Yet, rather than waiting for the hand of the market to deliver an invisible spanking to “woke” corporations, speaker after speaker at the Federalist Society’s convention called for a central planner to intervene. ”
“Almost immediately after President Joe Biden took office, his administration started to roll back his predecessor Donald Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, which required many asylum seekers who arrive at the United States’ southern border to stay in Mexico while they await a hearing on their asylum claim.”
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” however, a Trump-appointed judge to a federal court in Texas effectively ordered the federal government to reinstate this Trump-era policy — which is officially known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) — permanently. Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk’s opinion in Texas v. Biden makes the implausible argument that a federal immigration law enacted by Congress in 1996 makes the Remain in Mexico policy mandatory, unless the federal government detains every asylum seeker who is not sent back to Mexico.
Trump’s Remain in Mexico policy was not implemented until early 2019. So the upshot of Kacsmaryk’s opinion is that the federal government was in violation of this 1996 statute for half of the Clinton administration, the entire George W. Bush administration, the entire Obama administration, and most of the Trump administration.
In reality, that 1996 federal law is part of a web of statutes and constitutional doctrines giving immigration officials multiple options when an asylum seeker arrives at the US-Mexico border. One provision of federal immigration law provides that most of these asylum seekers “shall be detained” while they await a hearing.”
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“Kacsmaryk’s decision, moreover, is expected to be appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the most conservative courts in the country — and then potentially to a Supreme Court where Republican appointees have a 6-3 supermajority.
So, while Kacsmaryk’s opinion is wrong on the law, there is no guarantee that it will be reversed by a higher court.”
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“Kacsmaryk is one of many Trump appointees to the federal bench who appears to have been chosen largely due to his unusually conservative political views. Prior to becoming a judge, Kacsmaryk was deputy general counsel for the First Liberty Institute, a firm that largely litigates on behalf of causes of the religious right. In his past writings, he labeled being transgender a “mental disorder” and claimed that gay people are “disordered.”
As recently as 2015, Kacsmaryk published an article denouncing a “Sexual Revolution” that “sought public affirmation of the lie that the human person is an autonomous blob of Silly Putty unconstrained by nature or biology, and that marriage, sexuality, gender identity, and even the unborn child must yield to the erotic desires of liberated adults.”
He’s also the third conservative federal judge in Texas to strike down an immigration policy supported by the Biden administration.”
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“The Supreme Court’s decisions are supposed to give federal officials a great deal of discretion to shape immigration policy — and to afford mercy to individual immigrants. As the Court explained in Arizona v. United States (2012) “a principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.”
But judges like Kacsmaryk, Tipton, and Hanen appear eager to strip the Biden administration of that discretion. With a 6-3 conservative Supreme Court overseeing the judiciary, these judges may very well get away with it.”