“In 2024, Congress passed the Protecting Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which prohibited operating or hosting “a foreign adversary controlled application (e.g., TikTok)” within the United States. The law required TikTok to find a buyer by January 19, 2025, or else shut down operations within the United States.
Ultimately, neither happened…Trump issued the executive order on his first day, “instructing the Attorney General not to take any action to enforce the Act for a period of 75 days from today.” He has since issued two additional orders further extending the deadline
…
“But no president has the authority to simply postpone the enforcement of a law passed by Congress. The fact that Congress seems content to let Trump decline to enforce it does not obviate the law itself. And for that reason, if Congress will not repeal the law, then it should insist Trump enforce it.”
“the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of a teenage girl and her parents who are attempting to sue the girl’s school district for alleged disability discrimination. The decision, which did not rule on the merits of the case, is similar to another recent unanimous ruling finding that courts cannot require different discrimination cases to meet different standards of proof to receive a favorable judgment.”
…
“two lower courts ruled against the family. The 8th Circuit ruled that simply failing to provide A. J. T. a reasonable accommodation wasn’t enough to prove illegal discrimination. Rather, because the family was suing a school, they would be subject to a higher standard than plaintiffs suing other institutions. The family was told they had to prove that the school’s behavior rose to the level of “bad faith” or “gross misjudgment.”
The Supreme Court disagreed. In the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that disability discrimination “claims based on educational services should be subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts,” adding that “Nothing in the text of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that such claims should be subject to a distinct, more demanding analysis.”
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor reiterated how nonsensical the 8th Circuit’s higher standard for educational disability discrimination claims was, noting that some of the most obvious forms of disability discrimination do not involve bad faith or misjudgment against the disabled.”
The Constitution clearly puts the power of deciding to go to war in the hands of the Congress. The attack on Iran was a clear act of war. It was not authorized by Congress. The attack on Iran was unconstitutional.
“Under the War Powers Act of 1973, the law that governs presidential authority to order military strikes, there are three lawful ways for a commander-in-chief to order the bombing of another country. None of them appears to cover the strikes carried out on Saturday.
Here is the relevant section of the law (emphasis added): “The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”
The first two options provided by the law are clearly not involved here, as Congress did not declare war against Iran and did not pass an authorization for the use of military force (as was done to allow the invasion of Iraq in 2002).
The third circumstance also does not apply to Trump’s attack on Iran, which was not carried out in response to an attack on American troops and did not respond to a crisis threatening American soil.”
…
“The War Powers Act should not be treated as a series of suggestions that can be discarded when they seem inconvenient. Indeed, limits on executive power are most essential at the moments when they are inconvenient—otherwise, they are meaningless. Trump’s attack on Iran was not just an assault on a suspected nuclear weapons program; it was yet another blow against the separation of powers and the fundamental structure of the American constitutional system.”
“Given that Congress wasn’t consulted about Trump’s weekend strikes on Iran either (more on that in a bit), the administration’s “we’re not at war” insistences allow it to pretend it’s not completely ignoring the Constitution.”
…
“Nevertheless, Republican Congressional leaders have cheered on Trump’s unconstitutional attack on Iran. Most rank-and-file Republicans have offered support as well, with a few notable exceptions like Rep. Thomas Massie (R–Ky.), who got roasted by Trump on Truth Social for his trouble.”
“To argue that Riley’s murder, tragic though it was, justifies skirting due process fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of the doctrine. It is not to excuse criminal behavior, but to ensure that accusations—especially when they carry life-altering consequences—are publicly tested by evidence and judged fairly.
Homan’s logic would see due process abolished. It need not apply, he says, in the face of serious allegations or unsympathetic individuals, which is contrary to why the Founders demanded its inclusion in the Constitution. They knew the power of the state was dangerous. The government doesn’t always get it right. “Because we said so” isn’t sufficient reason to abrogate anyone’s liberty.
That the prisoners sent to CECOT were not citizens is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that even those suspected of being in the U.S. unlawfully are entitled to due process of law. And the people in question were not merely deported—they were sent without charge or conviction to a notorious megaprison, where Kristi Noem, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, has said she hopes the men are kept for life.”
…
“A country that claims to value liberty cannot shed the process meant to protect it. If due process is no longer sacred, neither is justice; and if some of us do not have due process, then none of us do. Trump has defined himself as someone who fights for American values: “Make America Great Again.” You cannot do that by discarding one of the core values that made the U.S. exceptional.”
“Yoshida at first glance appeared to be quite helpful to the Trump administration.
The court concluded that the tariff was legally justified under the TWEA to address the trade imbalance and pointed to language in the statute that authorized the president to “regulate” the “importation” of foreign goods in the event of an emergency. That language was carried over into IEEPA as part of a much longer list of actions permitted by the president, though that list does not explicitly mention either tariffs or taxes (a point to which we will return).
In light of the parallel statutory language in TWEA and IEEPA, the Justice Department argued that Yoshida “continues to control today” and requires the Court of International Trade to rule in favor of the Trump administration.
As Wednesday’s decision makes clear, it was not so simple.
In several crucial respects, the Yoshida decision cut sharply against the administration’s position. That put the Justice Department in the awkward — and generally unenviable — position of having to pick and choose which parts of the decision that it likes, and which parts of the decision the courts should ignore.
For starters, the Yoshida decision rejected a key proposition that is at the heart of the government’s defense of Trump’s tariffs — the notion that courts have no power to review a president’s actions under IEEPA.
The court ruled in Yoshida that each presidential action under the statute “must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances.” The court went on to emphasize that its ruling, while favorable to the Nixon administration, was not a blanket approval of “any future surcharge of a different nature, or any surcharge differently applied or any surcharge not reasonably related to the emergency declared;” that the president’s actions under the statute “must also bear a reasonable relation to the particular emergency confronted;” and that “emergencies are expected to be shortlived.”
In other words, the facts matter. But the facts then under Nixon — and the facts now under Trump — are markedly different.
Nixon’s tariff was fixed at 10 percent and in place for less than five months. Trump’s tariff framework is far more ambitious, open-ended and has been all over the place since his inauguration — with the effective dates and applicable countries, rates, exceptions and concessions under seemingly constant revision.
And if Trump and some of his advisors are to be believed, there would be no end in sight. “If President Trump succeeds like he wants to succeed,” Trump’s trade adviser Peter Navarro said earlier this year, “we are going to structurally shift the American economy from one over-reliant on income taxes and the Internal Revenue Service, to one which is also reliant on tariff revenue and the External Revenue Service.” That is a far cry from a five-month, supplemental 10 percent tariff like what Nixon imposed.
Two other, subtler points in the Yoshida decision made things worse for the administration.
First, Nixon’s tariff did not apply to all imports — only those that had been the subject of prior concessions under the government’s tariff schedule — and Nixon made clear in announcing the policy that the rates would nevertheless be capped at levels that Congress had previously set for the relevant goods. As a result, the court concluded in Yoshida that “the congressionally established rates remained untouched” and that Nixon was not claiming the power to simply impose “whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.”
Trump made no such concessions, which made it a relatively straightforward matter for the court on Wednesday to contrast Nixon’s “limited” tariffs with those imposed by Trump. Indeed, given the administration’s position that the courts cannot review Trump’s emergency declarations in support of the tariffs or circumscribe his authority to issue tariffs under IEEPA, he has effectively claimed the power not just to issue “whatever tariff rates he deems desirable” but to impose those tariffs whenever he wants, for any reason that he wants and for however long he wants.
Second, as a footnote in the Yoshida decision notes, Congress later enacted a specific statutory provision to address the problem that attracted the Nixon administration’s attention. That provision authorizes the president to impose tariffs in response to “large and serious … balance-of-payments deficits,” but it caps those tariffs at 15 percent and limits them to a duration of just 150 days unless Congress authorizes an extension.
Needless to say, the Trump administration did not invoke that statute, and Justice Department lawyers sought to downplay its significance given the fact that Congress kept the statutory language at issue in Yoshida on the books in IEEPA.
This argument also did not move the three judges on the Court of International Trade. They concluded that the existence of the statute demonstrated that “even ‘large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits’ do not necessitate the use of emergency powers” and that they “justify only the President’s imposition of limited remedies subject to enumerated procedural constraints.”
The argument was rooted in the conclusion in Yoshida that if a president wanted to impose a similar tariff in the future, he must “comply with the statute now governing such action.”
Trump, of course, had no interest in doing that.
There is no way to definitively predict how the appellate court — and eventually the Supreme Court”
“After President Donald Trump began penalizing major law firms that had offended him in one way or another last February, nine of them chose to surrender rather than fight. They agreed to humiliating concessions that included pro bono work, totaling nearly $1 billion, for causes favored by the president. But several firms stood their ground, arguing that Trump’s executive orders targeting them violated the First Amendment and undermined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”
“Trump had used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs on nearly all imports to the U.S., even though that law narrowly authorizes presidential actions only in response to “an unusual and extraordinary threat.”
International commerce is plainly neither of those things, as the court concluded in its ruling. “We do not read IEEPA to delegate an unbounded tariff authority to the President,” the judges wrote. “We instead read IEEPA’s provisions to impose meaningful limits on any such authority it confers.”
By reviewing the actions of the executive branch to ensure they comport with the underlying law, the Court of International Trade merely fulfilled the constitutional role of the judiciary. ”
Trump’s Secretary of Homeland Security doesn’t know basic things about rights and abilities granted to Americans in the Constitution. She reaches for any bullshit she can to justify illegally expanding Trump’s power.