“The problem for Trump is that for all of his talk of prioritizing loyalty in his second term, he has staffed his administration with a number of conservative ideologues who could have very different ideas about what the government should be doing — none more influential than his likely soon-to-be budget director, Russ Vought.
Vought is a well-known quantity on Capitol Hill from his time as a staffer there, to say nothing of his work as a Project 2025 author and all-around warrior for small government. Republicans there saw his fingerprints on the spending freeze — or the “Vought memo,” as some are calling it.
“This has Russ’s name written all fucking over it,” said one GOP aide who works in appropriations, adding, ”I see a disparity between what Trump wants to do and what Russ wants to do.”
In other words, the battle between fiscal hawks and populists is set to rage not only on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in the coming months, but inside the White House itself.
“There’s an undercurrent of the old Republican Party at play where they’re like, ‘We’re going to cut benefits’ and all this,” the lawmaker said. “And like the new Republican Party is like, ‘Yeah, we don’t care about that.’””
“GOP leaders see an opportunity for a new, working-class coalition, which includes more union outreach. It’s a major shift, and fault lines are already forming over President Trump’s pro-labor Cabinet nominee, former Rep. Lori Chavez-DeRemer.”
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“Hawley has been quietly circulating draft legislation that would prevent employers from stalling union contract negotiations — keeping the process to months, not years, according to a copy obtained by Axios.”
It’s not conservatism. What we call the conservative movement today is not what the conservative movement historically has been in the United States. It’s a species of reactionary politics. The distinction rests in the party’s fundamental attitude towards democracy and democratic institutions.
The old Republican Party, for all of its faults, played by the political rules. It had faith in the idea that elections determine the winner, and that when elections happen, you accept the verdict of the people and you adjust based on that regardless of whether or not you like the policy preferences.
Reactionary parties are different from conservatism. They both share an orientation towards believing that certain ways in which society is arranged — certain setups, institutions, even hierarchies — are good and necessary. There’s value in the way that things are. What differs between the two of them is that conservative parties don’t see potential social change as an indictment of democracy. That is to say, even if a democracy or an election produces an outcome that they don’t like, that threatens to transform wholesale certain elements of the social order, a conservative would not throw out the political order as a consequence of that. Reactionaries are willing to do that.
My view is, at the core of the Trump movement, which I want to distinguish from every Trump supporter because they’re not the same, but the people who have given Donald Trump an iron grip on the Republican Party, that base of hardcore support, are animated primarily by reactionary politics, by a sense that things have gone too far in a socially liberal and culturally liberal, and even in some cases economically liberal direction, and they want things to go back to partially a past that never existed, but also a past that did exist where there was a little bit more order and structure in terms of who was in charge and what the rules were.”
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“Coming into office last time, Trump didn’t have a vendetta against large chunks of the government. He didn’t believe an election had been stolen from him and that needed to be rectified. At the very least, he thinks it is a public blemish that needs to be shown to be false to many people, because if many people believe that he won, then that’s good enough. It doesn’t matter if he actually did. What matters, to put it differently, is Donald Trump’s honor, and the honor of Donald Trump must be avenged at all costs, and the insult of 2020 must be erased from the history books. That’s the kind of thing that he cares about.
The degree and scope of the planning that has gone into this and the willingness to take a hammer to different institutions and the specificity of the plans for doing so is not normal. To name just one example from Project 2025, they want to prosecute the former Pennsylvania secretary of state who presided over the 2020 elections using the [Ku Klux] Klan Act, which was passed to fight the first Klan. It’s basically alleging that by trying to help people fix improperly filed mail-in ballots in 2020, this Pennsylvania secretary of state was rigging the election, trying to undermine everyone else’s fair exercise of their votes in a way akin to the Klan intimidating Black voters in the 1860s by threatening to lynch them.
When I speak to legal experts about this, they’re like, “No credible prosecutor I know would bring such a charge.” It’s a real abuse of power and anti-democratic in many ways because it’s trying to wield federal power to prevent local authorities from administering elections properly and helping people vote. So in order to try to even begin an investigation on this front, let alone actually prosecute, what you need to do is fire the people who would do that kind of job, which would typically be in the Justice Department Civil Rights Division role, so the Election Crimes Unit and the Criminal Division, fire those people who work on these cases, bring in attorneys who are willing to do what you say, even though it’s ludicrous on the basis of a traditional read of the law, and then initiate an investigation, try to get charges spun up, and then get them to a judge like Aileen Cannon, who’s presiding over Trump’s documents case and has clearly shown herself to not really care about what’s going on, but rather just to interpret the law in whatever way is most favorable to Trump.
All of that stuff, and this is just one specific example, illustrates the ways in which doing what Trump and his allies have outlined as part of their revenge campaign requires attacking very fundamental components of American democracy: the building blocks, like the rule of law, like a nonpartisan civil service that treats all citizens equally, like a judiciary that’s designed with interpreting the law as best as it can, rather than delivering policy outlines, you need all of those things in order to act on already offered promises in what is widely understood to be the planning document for the Trump administration.”
“The House Foreign Affairs Committee has long been seen as one of the few corners of relative bipartisanship in Congress. Democrats on the panel are warning incoming Chair Brian Mast is about to blow that up.
Three Democratic staffers said Mast is expected to focus on divisive culture war issues and that his previous incendiary statements on the Middle East and Ukraine will make it difficult to get any across-the-aisle work done.
“The days of bipartisanship and collegiality on the committee could be over,” said one staffer, a sentiment echoed by the two others, who were granted anonymity to speak freely about internal conversations. “There are moments when Mast is a level-headed guy, but those are rare. It doesn’t happen very often.”
The House Foreign Affairs Committee holds considerable sway over U.S. foreign policy. Its top Democrat and Republican can block or slow-walk weapons transfers to foreign countries. The committee’s mandate also allows it to scrutinize initiatives by the State Department and other agencies, chart major foreign policy priorities, design sanctions and shape the country’s national security strategy.
Those are the type of issues and crises that Democrats and Republicans have traditionally tried to put aside some of their partisan rancor to solve. Outgoing Foreign Affairs Chair Michael McCaul of Texas took pains to work with Democrats on legislation to support Israel and Ukraine, address the rise of China and publicly show that the committee’s members were working across party lines to advance U.S. national security interests around the world.
Mast’s imminent selection came as a very unwelcome shock to committee Democrats. The assumption had been that either committee Vice Chair Ann Wagner (R-Mo.) or Helsinki Commission Chair Joe Wilson (R-S.C.), both more moderate Republicans, would prevail.
Mast has alienated some staunch Democratic supporters of Israel with incendiary comments about Palestinians. And his hardline views on Ukraine could upend the bipartisan consensus under McCaul that U.S. support for Ukraine should continue and that restrictions on Kyiv’s use of donated weapons should be lifted.
In an interview, Mast reiterated his commitment to giving the State Department “a colonoscopy” to examine how money is spent and to pursuing an “America first” foreign policy on the committee.”
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“Mast separates him from some more moderate critics of the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy, including Trump’s pick to be secretary of State, Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida. Rubio opposed supplemental funding as well, but the Florida Republican argued that his vote was in protest over a lack of funding for tighter security measures at the U.S. southern border. That said, Mast did previously back Ukraine receiving NATO membership and a no-fly zone in Ukraine, a stance that puts him in line with the staunchest allies of Kyiv in both parties.
And the committee could still accomplish bipartisan work on China. Mast, like McCaul and many committee Democrats, supports a tougher line on Beijing. He could also find some common ground with Democrats on policy towards Israel and the Middle East, including the need to provide Israel with defensive weaponry and counter Iranian aggression.
Democrats are expressing hope that the pressures of leadership will change the way he approaches committee work and his relationships with Democrats.”
“According to exit polls, 55 percent of men voted for Trump in 2024, compared to 45 percent of women, for a 10-point gender gap — 1 point less than the 11-point gap in support for Trump in both 2020 and 2016.*
Compared to other exit polling results that point to how Trump’s victory may have boiled down to a referendum on President Joe Biden and the economy, this relatively static gender gap may not point to gender as a major factor in the election. But differences in the gender gap across groups of voters — such as growing gaps among Black and Latino voters — can tell us more about the country’s changing partisan landscape. And there’s a reason gender has also been widely discussed in the aftermath of Election Day: The role that gender played in each party’s 2024 presidential campaigns highlights a potential shift in the parties’ approaches to male and female voters, and how voters think about gender and politics.”
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“Trump’s 11-point gap in support between men and women in 2016 and 2020 was a record, but men have been consistently more likely than women to back Republicans since 1980. From then until 2016, the gender gap in support for Republicans ranged from 0 points (in 1992) to 10 points (in 2000), according to exit polls. (The phenomenon of men consistently showing stronger support for the more ideologically conservative party than women is not limited to the U.S., either.)”
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“the gender gap isn’t uniform across all groups. For example, white men and women voted more similarly to each other in 2024 than Black or Latino men and women.”
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“Nonwhite and younger voters had the largest gender gaps”
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“in 2020 Trump won 61 percent of white men and 55 percent of white women, for a 6-point gender gap among white voters. That gap was just 1 point bigger this year according to exit polls — 60 percent to 53 percent, for a 7-point gender gap among white voters. But the gender gap among nonwhite voters increased by significantly more.
Among Black voters, even as the vast majority of both men and women voted Democratic in both elections, Trump gained 2 points of support among men and lost 2 among women, moving the gender gap from 10 points in 2020 to 14 points in 2024. The gap is even more striking among Latino voters, one of the groups among whom Trump gained the most support overall compared to 2020. Four years ago, 36 percent of Latino men and 30 percent of Latino women supported Trump, a gender gap of just 6 points. That gap nearly tripled in 2024, as Trump’s support among Latino men went up by almost 20 percentage points: He won 55 percent of Latino men and 38 percent of Latino women, for a gender gap of 17 points.”
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“49 percent of men and 37 percent of women aged 18 to 29 supported Trump, for a 12-point gender gap, 3 points larger than in 2020. The gap among men and women aged 30 to 39 was also 12 points, while it actually shrank among voters over 50.”
“It’s astonishing how little thought many past presidents put into their Supreme Court appointments. In the past, justices were often chosen for idiosyncratic personal reasons, or to please a particular interest group or voting bloc, and without much, if any, inquiry into how the nominee was likely to decide cases.
President Woodrow Wilson, for example, appointed Justice James Clark McReynolds — an awful judge and an even worse human being who Time magazine once described as a “savagely sarcastic, incredibly reactionary Puritan anti-Semite” — in large part because Wilson found McReynolds, who was US attorney general before he joined the Court, to be so obnoxious that the president promoted him to get him out of the Cabinet.
Similarly, President Dwight Eisenhower complained late in his presidency that appointing Justice William Brennan, one of the most consequential left-liberal jurists in American history, to the Supreme Court was among the biggest mistakes he made in office. But Ike’s White House never vetted Brennan for his ideological views, and Brennan was selected largely because Eisenhower was running for reelection when he made the nomination, and he thought that appointing a Catholic like Brennan would appeal to Catholic voters.
Even in 1990, after top Republican officials had published lengthy documents laying out their party’s vision for the Constitution, they still hadn’t developed a reliable system for vetting Supreme Court nominees to ensure that they were on board with the party’s agenda. Bush chose the center-left Justice Souter over other, more right-wing candidates largely due to misguided advice from his top legal advisers.
As journalist Jan Crawford Greenburg reported in a 2007 book, Souter beat out early frontrunner Ken Starr — the same Ken Starr who would go on to hound President Bill Clinton in the Monica Lewinsky investigation — in large part because Bush’s right-wing advisers feared that Starr was too liberal. According to Crawford Greenburg, then-Deputy Attorney General Bill Barr opposed Starr because of a low-stakes dispute over “a federal law that permitted private citizens to sue for fraud against the federal government.”
Much has changed since 1990. On the Republican side, the Federalist Society — a kind of bar association for right-wing lawyers with chapters on most law school campuses and in most major cities — now starts vetting law students for elite legal jobs almost as soon as they begin their studies. And Republican presidents can rely on the Federalist Society to identify ideologically reliable candidates for the bench. As Trump said in 2016 while campaigning for president, “We’re going to have great judges, conservative, all picked by the Federalist Society.”
Nor is the Federalist Society the only way Republicans vet potential Supreme Court nominees. Every single one of the Court’s current Republican members except for Barrett previously served as a political appointee in a GOP administration, roles that allowed high-level Republicans to observe their work and probe their views.
Democrats’ vetting process, meanwhile, is more informal. But it’s been no less successful in identifying Supreme Court nominees who reliably embrace their party’s stance on the most contentious issues. The last Democrat appointed to the Supreme Court who broke with the party’s pro-abortion rights stance, for example, was Justice Byron White — a dissenter in Roe v. Wade appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962.
The result is a modern-day Supreme Court where every single member was carefully selected by their party to ensure that they will not stray on any of the issues where the two parties have settled views. Every Republican justice voted to abolish affirmative action on nearly all university campuses, with every Democratic justice in dissent. Every Republican voted to give the leader of the Republican Party broad immunity from criminal prosecution, with every Democrat in dissent. Every Republican except for Roberts voted to overrule Roe (and Roberts merely argued that the Court should have waited a little longer), while every Democrat dissented.”
“1) Trump has successfully associated himself with a message of economic nostalgia, heightening nonwhite Americans’ memories of the pre-Covid economy in contrast to the period of inflation we’re now exiting.
2) Trump and his campaign have also zeroed in specifically on outreach and messaging to nonwhite men as part of their larger focus on appealing to male voters.
3) Trump and his party have taken advantage of a confluence of social factors, including messaging on immigration and cultural issues, to shore up support from conservative voters of color who have traditionally voted for Democrats or not voted at all.”
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“These three theories try to describe how Trump specifically has been able to improve his and the GOP’s standing among a growing segment of the American electorate. They place Trump as the central cause for the majority of this racial political shift. But would these dynamics still be happening if he weren’t involved?
There are signs that some of this shift may be happening independently of Trump. It could be a product of the growing diversification of America, upward mobility and changing understandings of class, and growing educational divides.
For example, as rates of immigration change and the share of US-born Latino and Asian Americans grows, their partisan loyalties may continue to change. Those born closer to the immigrant experience may have had more of a willingness to back the party seen as more welcoming of immigrants, but as generations get further away from that experience, racial and ethnic identity may become less of a factor in the development of political thinking.
Concepts of racial identity and memory are also changing — younger Black Americans, for example, have less of a tie to the Civil Rights era — potentially contributing to less strong political polarization among Black and Latino people in the US independently of any given candidate — and creating more persuadable voters in future elections.
At the same time, younger generations are increasingly identifying as independents or outside of the two-party paradigm — a change in loyalty that stands to hurt Democrats first, since Democrats tend to do better with younger voters.
Regardless of whether Trump just happens to be the right kind of populist at the right time of racial and ethnic change in America or if he’s a unique accelerator and contributor to the changes America is experiencing, November may offer more evidence that something has fundamentally changed in US politics. As America diversifies, it makes sense for its political parties to diversify too — and that poses a reckoning for Democrats in elections to come.”
“It’s that time again. The last act of Congress funding the federal government expires on September 30. So, unless Congress passes new funding legislation by then, much of the government will shut down.
House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA), egged on by the House Freedom Caucus and by former President Donald Trump, reportedly wants to use this deadline to force through legislation that would make it harder to register to vote in all 50 states.
Johnson plans to pair a bill funding the government for six months with a Republican bill called the “Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act” or “SAVE Act,” that would require new voters to submit “documentary proof of United States citizenship,” such as a passport or a birth certificate, in order to register to vote.
As recently as Monday night, Johnson’s plan to tie government funding to passage of the SAVE Act seemed dead. At least five House Republicans oppose the spending bill, enough that Johnson would need to secure Democratic votes in order to pass it. But Trump, the GOP’s presidential nominee, demanded on Tuesday that congressional Republicans “SHOULD, IN NO WAY, SHAPE, OR FORM, GO FORWARD” with legislation funding the government unless it also includes something like the SAVE Act.
There is no evidence that noncitizens vote in US federal elections in any meaningful numbers, and states typically have safeguards in place to prevent them from doing so. Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, a Republican, for example, claims to have identified 1,634 “potential noncitizens” who attempted to register during a 15-year period. But these possible noncitizens were caught by election officials and were never registered. In 2020, nearly 5 million Georgians voted in the presidential election.
More broadly, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center, “illegal registration and voting attempts by noncitizens are routinely investigated and prosecuted by the appropriate state authorities, and there is no evidence that attempts at voting by noncitizens have been significant enough to impact any election’s outcome.”
While noncitizen voting — which is, of course, illegal — has never been proven to have affected an election, there is evidence that the SAVE Act could have an impact on elections. That much is clear from Arizona, which already has a SAVE Act-like regime. Data from Arizona suggests the state’s law has made it slightly harder for people of color, a group that skews Democratic, to vote. And at least one analysis of Arizona voter data suggests that the SAVE Act could suppress voter registration among another group that tends to vote for Democrats: college students. So the bill could make it slightly more difficult for Democrats to win elections.
That said, the SAVE Act law does have a vague provision allowing voters who “cannot provide” the required documentation to submit other evidence that they are a citizen, and it provides that state or local officials “shall make a determination as to whether the applicant has sufficiently established United States citizenship.”
It’s unclear what, exactly, that means.
Notably, the SAVE Act would take effect immediately if enacted by Congress, and it imposes significant new administrative burdens on state and local election offices. So, if the law did take effect in the two months before a presidential election, it could potentially throw that election into chaos.”