Omicron’s most crucial warning: A disease can move much faster than we can

“By some estimates, about 40 percent of the population of the United States will have been infected with the omicron variant of Covid-19 by the time the current wave fully subsides. The WHO estimates that half of Europe will have been infected as well. And nearly all of those infections will have occurred between mid-December and the beginning of February.

It’s hard to say for sure, but there’s good reason to think that never before have so many people been infected with an emerging virus in such a short timespan. For most of history, diseases traveled much slower, carried by travelers on boats or horses.”

“We are incredibly lucky that omicron seems to be milder than previous strains of Covid-19 and that both vaccinations and previous exposure have built up immune resistance. The massive spike in cases around the world — while badly taxing health care systems — hasn’t been matched by an equal spike in hospitalizations and deaths.

I think it’s hard to appreciate what a massive bullet we dodged: If omicron had been substantially more deadly, there is very little we could have done to stop the death toll.”

“Earlier strains of the virus were successfully contained in some countries by maintaining strong border controls, aggressively quarantining people, and using traditional epidemiological tools like contact tracing.

China quashed a large initial outbreak with unprecedented measures, including surveillance, sealing off cities, locking people in their homes, and other policies more extreme than those employed even in other countries that successfully suppressed the virus, like New Zealand.

Nothing the world has tried works as effectively against a variant as contagious as omicron.”

“Forty percent of the US in two months. That would have been apocalyptic if the viral variant were a deadly one. If we press the snooze button on this wake-up call, we might not get another one.”

The quest to avert an asteroid apocalypse is going surprisingly well

“Last year, NASA launched the Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART), which is a car-size box outfitted with solar panels. It’s currently on its way to a 160-meter asteroid called Dimorphos. In the fall, DART will crash into Dimorphos at 24,000 kilometers an hour (about 15,000 miles per hour).

Dimorphos is a “moonlet” asteroid, which means it orbits a larger asteroid named Didymos, much like the moon orbits the Earth. If all goes according to plan, the collision will change its orbit, proving that it’s possible to redirect a big hunk of rock in the middle of space. (The larger asteroid’s gravitational pull will help ensure that Dimorphos doesn’t fly off in a new direction, say, toward Earth.)

DART is the definition of a long shot. “This has never been tried before,” Andrews explains on Unexplainable. If it doesn’t work, that doesn’t mean we couldn’t ever deflect an asteroid. But perhaps it will take more force than DART can supply.”

“If DART works, NASA can build a similar strategy into its anti-asteroid game plan. If they spot an asteroid heading toward Earth, “they can send a precursor mission to observe it beforehand,” Andrews says. In those initial observations, scientists can study the asteroid’s composition and make calculations for how much force it will take to deflect the rock. “You could then send a DART-like mission.”
The problem of asteroids potentially crashing into the Earth is not yet solved. Still, a couple hundred years in the future, it’s possible that scientists like Fast will be hailed as forward-thinking heroes who laid the groundwork of a planetary defense system. “There’s no greater gift that America’s space agency can give” than protection for humans of the future, Fast says.

Even though these disasters might not arrive in our lifetimes, we can still feel good about the progress being made. It’s a way to be good ancestors to the generations that follow us. On the long list of problems to solve and disasters to mitigate, maybe we can actually solve one.”

Ukraine crisis prompts Germany to rethink Russian gas addiction

“Behind the rude awakening on energy security lies an even more unsettling realization for many German elites: That a decades-long goal of bringing Berlin and Moscow closer together through mutually beneficial trade seems to have failed.”

“The idea that growing trade links with other nations would help to gradually embed Western democratic standards in those countries has already taken a hit when it comes to China, which has only become more and more repressive despite growing economic links. Still, leading German politicians have long held out hope that “Wandel durch Handel” might still work with Russia, and defended Nord Stream 2 as a tool to also influence Russia for the better.
“Obviously, this policy has totally failed when it comes to Russia,” said Marcel Dirsus, a non-resident fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. He argued that instead of influencing Moscow by making Russia more dependent on Germany, the policy had the opposite effect.

“Right now, when push comes to shove, Berlin is dependent on Moscow when it comes to energy, and that influences the way it positions itself,” he said, referring to Berlin’s initial reluctance to include Nord Stream 2 in potential sanctions against Russia in the case of further aggression against Ukraine.

It took weeks of internal bickering and harsh international criticism before Scholz’s Social Democrats agreed to put the pipeline on the sanctions table.

“Now, they are coming to this realization [that they are too reliant on Russia] and now they are also admitting it in public, but now it’s too late,” Dirsus said.”

The Speech In Which Putin Told Us Who He Was

“It may be easy to forget today that after Russia emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Europe spent years working to integrate it into a new post-Cold War order. Far from triumphalist vengeance (as the Kremlin would have the world believe) the West provided Russia with substantial financial and technical assistance. All European states, including Russia, as well as the United States and Canada signed multiple agreements pledging to uphold key principles, including refraining from the threat or use of force; renouncing any change of borders by force; and affirming the right of all states to choose their own political and economic systems and security alliances.

Notably, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity with the international borders in effect at that time, in exchange for Ukraine giving up the third-largest nuclear stockpile in the world. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the “Founding Act” establishing a Permanent Joint Council and identifying a number of areas where the western alliance and Russia would work together to strengthen security — an “alliance with the Alliance,” as some of its architects in the Clinton administration put it at the time.

Things started to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Russia was not happy with the NATO-led war in Kosovo, nor with President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Putin became president of Russia in 2000 and declared his intention to restore Russian greatness. At the time, many Russians and international observers – including some in the Bush administration – welcomed his words. Coming on the heels of a decade of what many saw as wild-west capitalism, corruption, and breakdowns in law and order, Putin seemed poised to make a necessary correction that would strengthen Russian stability and modernization without doing major damage to its democracy.

In hindsight, however, we can see that what Putin meant by Russian greatness was not strengthening the rule of law and building up Russia’s economy and international stature in the world. Upon taking office, he methodically went about rebuilding the Russian military, modernizing and expanding Russia’s nuclear arsenal, reviving and expanding Russian intelligence services and activities. That in itself was not necessarily a problem, except that Putin also started dismantling the nascent Russian democracy: taking control of media outlets, consolidating state industries and undermining opposition to his United Russia party, including by assassination of political opponents. Putin didn’t just tame the oligarchs of the 1990s; he replaced them with his own. He was creating something resembling a Soviet system of Communist Party control, just without the Soviet ideology and a personal structure of rule in place of the old Party nomenklatura.

A clue to his thinking came in 2005 when he described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. Then, in 2007 at Munich, that shift in rhetoric became unmistakable.

Following the speech, Putin matched his words with actions, dismantling the structures designed to keep peace in post-Cold War Europe. Russia formally announced in July 2007 that it would no longer adhere to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. It continued to reject the principle of host-nation consent for its troop presence in Georgia and Moldova, and began ignoring Vienna Convention limits on troop concentrations, exercises and transparency.

In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, trading its peacekeepers in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for regular military personnel, and driving tanks toward the capital, Tbilisi. Six years later, Russian operatives took over Crimea and rapidly orchestrated its illegal annexation by Russia. Russia followed up with attacks in eastern Ukraine and continues to engage in low-intensity fighting and to occupy parts of Donbas to this day. Later, Russia violated the INF Treaty and began to deny overflights requested under the Open Skies Treaty.”

“we must understand what Putin has been openly telling us. This requires recognizing that the playbook created in the 1990s, fitting and well-intentioned as it was at the time, needs to be replaced with a new approach that treats Putin’s Russia as a threat to peace and an adversary. And we must sustain such a new approach for as long as Putin remains in power.”

What the West doesn’t understand about Russia or Ukraine

““You have to understand, George. Ukraine is not even a country.”

Those were the jarring — and, it would turn out, prescient — words uttered by Russian strongman Vladimir Putin in 2008, during a meeting with then-President George W. Bush. It was an unambiguous assertion of ownership over a sovereign nation, an assertion that has particular resonance 14 years later, as Putin has just recognized the independence of two Ukrainian regions and sent troops to bolster Russian-backed separatists.”