“The secretary of state, Marco Rubio, has proposed a sweeping reorganisation of the US state department as part of what he called an effort to reform it amid criticism from the Trump White House over the execution of US diplomacy.
If approved, the reorganisation would cut more than 700 positions and eliminate 132 of 734 offices, according to state department officials. But those officials also stressed that the plan, which was suddenly announced on Tuesday, remained a proposal and would not lead to immediate layoffs or cuts.”
“He’s insisting on one-on-one talks with China’s leader, Xi Jinping — and this has stifled other diplomatic efforts to halt the worsening trade war between the two global powers.
The president won’t authorize White House delegates to engage with Chinese officials in Beijing about a detente, according to two former senior State Department officials and an industry official, who were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive ongoing discussions. The Senate has yet to confirm an ambassador to China; Trump has not appointed anyone else to lead talks with Beijing; and the White House isn’t reaching out to the Chinese embassy to begin discussions.
The absence of any substantial outreach has frozen meaningful communications between the two countries and threatened the likelihood of a near-term solution.”
“The bottom line is that Putin doesn’t yet have a good enough reason to agree to end the war.
What will change his mind? The carrots Trump has been offering must be replaced with sticks — effective and consistent policies designed to make the cost of waging war higher than the cost of peace.”
“If an African government wants strong relations with Washington, including future development assistance, it must pay up in other ways — ranging from giving access to minerals to accepting deportees, Trump backers told me.”
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“Trump and his team are fast-tracking efforts to achieve a goal that other U.S. presidents, including his four immediate Democratic and Republican predecessors, articulated to varying degrees — to shift the nature of the U.S. relationship with Africa. Each saw some progress, but none was willing to slash aid so deeply and suddenly.
The overwhelming sense among African officials is that they need to pony up what they can to effectively buy Trump’s love — the transactionalism for which he’s well known.
The Democratic Republic of Congo is offering access to critical minerals in exchange for U.S. help battling rebel forces; Massad Boulos, the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, was named recently to a role looking into such potential deals in the DRC and other African countries. And Somalia has offered the U.S. operational control over certain ports.
Angola will likely keep U.S. backing for the Lobito Corridor, a rail project that can help the U.S. access minerals. Togo, which is touting its track record in quietly mediating some African conflicts, could also see continued U.S. support, according to a former U.S. official familiar with African diplomatic circles. (A Togo official did not respond to questions about the mediation pitch.)
Some African nations will have an easier time staying on the U.S. radar simply because of their political sway on the continent (hey there, Kenya and Ethiopia), importance to energy markets (Nigeria) or other one-off reasons. Some are more financially and politically able to absorb the shock of losing U.S. aid than others. But some will have little to offer for Washington’s benefit, and they may choose to side with U.S. adversaries on the global stage — whether at the United Nations or in a war.
At least one, South Africa, is likely to be in the cold for a long time under Trump. The president’s team is infuriated by South Africa’s foreign policy choices, especially its diplomatic attacks on Israel, and accuses South Africa’s government of persecuting white Afrikaners. Trump has recently kicked out South Africa’s ambassador in Washington and set up a refugee program for white Afrikaners. South African officials insist Trump is misrepresenting them, especially on the Afrikaner issue.”
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“Africans are already dying because of the U.S. aid cuts, and there’s been an outcry, mainly among Democrats, over the scaling down of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief — aka PEPFAR, the George W. Bush-era health initiative that has funded HIV/AIDS treatments on the African continent.
Still, people in Trump’s orbit are not moved by such anecdotes or data, seeing them as parts of tired arguments that have prevented a needed, radical change in U.S. ties with Africa. One person pointed out that the “E” in PEPFAR stands for “emergency.” Yet the program is now more than two decades old.”
Trump removed the advocates general of the military and other military leaders. This is exactly what you would do if you wanted the military to do something illegal.
“sanctions have never made the clerical regime abandon its nuclear ambitions. During Trump’s first term, his “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign did real damage to Iran’s economy. Iran didn’t, however, concede its atomic assets.”
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” Obama’s more friendly outreach only made progress after Washington made a key concession — Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. The Americans also made a second key concession: allowing Iran to retain a substantial nuclear infrastructure, which could ramp back up at any time. Ali Salehi, the MIT-educated nuclear engineer who was probably the mastermind behind Iran’s dual-use import network, loved the Obama agreement because it would guarantee the Islamic Republic a more advanced, better-financed atomic program that it could grow in the open. It was Obama’s permissive terms much more than the promised financial relief that induced the theocracy to sign the 2015 accord.”
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” Along the way, the clerical regime might agree to dilute its stock of 60 percent-enriched uranium, which is near weapons-grade, or even cap enrichment at a lower level. It would be a flashy concession that won’t fundamentally affect the complexion or the trajectory of Tehran’s nuclear program. The mullahs know that what matters most are protecting its new generation of centrifuges. With much greater efficiency and speed, these machines can enrich uranium to bomb-grade and can be housed in small facilities that are harder to detect.”
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“Even a stringent inspection regime, unless supported by a well-placed human-intelligence network, would find locating these centrifuges an excruciatingly difficult task.”
“in his second term he appears to be in the business of exerting American power abroad, from Greenland to Gaza. But no modern empire has ever successfully projected power globally without a competent and motivated bureaucracy. The late Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington wrote that the more complex a society becomes, the more it needs institutions to run it. And this is especially true of an empire, which the United States has been in functional terms since 1945. Americans may, like the elder Bush, be uncomfortable with the word empire, but our successes, challenges and even disasters have been akin to those of all the great empires of history. The Trump administration’s war on its own imagined “deep state” is essentially a war against the very institutions needed to organize society at home and especially, defend it from its enemies abroad.
American power abroad is expressed not only through presidential decisions, but through the power of institutions, notably the State Department and the Defense Department. American diplomats deal with crises in dozens upon dozens of countries in the world on a daily basis that you never read about: they include small countries and large, troubled, and complex states like Pakistan, Nigeria and Colombia. The finest linguists and political secretaries are needed in overseas embassies to manage such challenges. Weaken the bureaucracy at this crucial level — at the same time you are discouraging new generations of young people from going into public service — and you weaken American power itself. This might take time to be noticed, but its effect will be real and insidious.”
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“Trump wants to exert control worldwide, but his actions against the bureaucracy undermine that goal.”
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“The Arabists and the China experts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been some of the finest bureaucrats I have encountered. They are the ultimate early warning system: the Arabists warned against the 2003 Iraq War and the China experts about the political and economic dangers of a conflict over Taiwan. You want the very best people in these jobs. Empires at their best encourage cosmopolitanism, that is, a knowledge of other languages and cultures required for the maintenance of good diplomatic and security relations. Yet the Trump administration is essentially telling brilliant, linguistically adroit young people not to want a career in government. It is fine to trim bloated bureaucracies in order to save money and to improve efficiency. But it is another thing entirely to make life miserable for those who remain by requiring them to fill out weekly forms about their activities and so forth. In such a circumstance, the very people you need to be motivated won’t be, and will look elsewhere for careers.”
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“USAID, through its projects often run by non-governmental organizations, has been for decades doing much more than running humanitarian programs throughout the developing world. In fact, these programs don’t operate in the abstract: Because they are on-the-ground operations often in far-flung areas of a given country, they build vital human connections that are money in the bank for diplomats and military people to utilize, especially during crisis situations where local contacts are essential. An empire is about more than guns and money, it is also about the maintenance of relationships built up on official and non-official levels throughout the world by way of, among other things, humanitarian projects. Trump has been rightly concerned about the rise of Chinese power around the world, but has seemingly not realized that China is itself spreading its influence in large part through development projects. Dismantling our humanitarian projects in places like Africa and South America leaves a vast opening for the Chinese to fill with projects of their own. It will also hurt our intelligence gathering, as USAID staffers have had their own networks in the hinterlands of difficult countries.
The postwar American-led order has been administered through three non-economic pillars: NATO, USAID, and various treaty alliances in the Pacific. The Trump administration disdains the first, is trying to gut the second, and is making the third very nervous.”
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“The British Empire lasted as long as it did through the brilliance of its diplomats and intelligence agents. As I can attest through reporting in Africa and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s, British influence continued for decades afterwards, partly because the British embassy or high commission in each country was manned by equally brilliant people who could always be counted on to deliver a great briefing to a reporter. Nothing projects power like the quality of people in your vital institutions at home and at your embassies and other missions around the world.
The most long-lasting world powers and empires succeeded not by raw power but by various methods of persuasion: the more subtle the approach, the more longevity for the great power involved. And such persuasion involves a talented and well-functioning bureaucracy, exactly what Trump is seeking to destroy. Our bureaucratic elite is not like others around the world: its sense of seeing little differentiation between American self-interest and promoting human rights and democracy might be somewhat naïve and self-serving, but it is real and deeply felt. These bureaucrats know that without that sense of idealism, America’s foreign policy descends into a sterile, ruthless realpolitik: like China’s. And no empire or great power has lasted very long without a sense of mission. That’s why Trump’s policies toward the bureaucracy are in direct conflict with his goals abroad, even if he doesn’t know it.”
“At the end of the day, protectionism is rooted in fear and pessimism: fear that we’ll be outcompeted, and pessimism about the idea that a growing, dynamic economy can make us all better off. Libertarians are fond of making just such claims—so fond that Cass coined a term to mock us for it. Instead of tussling over the size of different constituencies’ relative shares of the fixed economic pie, the libertarian view is that our goal should be to grow the pie so everyone’s share is bigger. Cass calls this “economic piety,” and he rejects it. For him, the goal is not to grow the economy; it’s to direct the economy for the benefit of deserving constituencies such as blue-collar workers.
This is pure zero-sum thinking. It cements in place a mindset where one group’s gains necessarily come at some other group’s expense. To libertarians, technological innovation is a boon because it makes the whole economy more productive and everyone richer in the long run. But some people usually are hurt in the short run—think of the proverbial buggy-whip salesmen when automobiles come along. Protectionists are inclined to be suspicious of the tech sector and sympathetic toward policies that would tamp down economic dynamism in the name of protecting the would-be losers. The result, inevitably, is stagnation.”
“The New York Federal Reserve Bank’s monthly survey of manufacturers, published earlier this week, reported sharp drops in what it calls “forward-looking indicators”—that is, what businesses expect the next six months to look like. The manufacturers in the survey expect to see fewer orders, longer delivery times, declining inventories, and lower levels of employment. About the only lines in the survey that are pointed upward are the expectations about prices.”