“Donald Trump will soon become the second president to serve non-consecutive terms. Naturally, this invites comparison between Trump and the first president to serve non-consecutive terms, Grover Cleveland. In one crucial respect that juxtaposition is both instructive and cruelly ironic.”
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“When tariffs are too high, Cleveland argued, it means that corrupt politicians and businessmen are able to exploit consumers, often imposing severe hardships through price increases. Just as bad, it means that the government is failing to treat all citizens as equal before the law, instead picking winners and losers in the aforementioned “communism of pelf.”
This was the situation that existed in America during and after the Civil War, when politicians imposed weighty tariffs under the pretext of supporting the nation’s burgeoning business community. While American consumers initially accepted the additional taxation as a wartime necessity, the high rates persisted even after the nascent military-industrial complex had been wound down.
The problem was both simple and intractable: There were thousands of manufacturing, industrial, agricultural, and other business interests that profited from high tariffs. Each special interest group disregarded the national welfare to protect themselves, and as a result, the government accumulated massive surpluses—$113 million in 1886–1887 alone.
Despite this growing crisis, initially, Cleveland did not prioritize tariff reform. For the first two-and-a-half years after taking office in 1885, Cleveland concentrated on rooting out government corruption, which had reached such a nadir that in 1873 Mark Twain dubbed the post-Civil War era as a “Gilded Age.” To the extent that Cleveland’s anti-corruption agenda involved vetoing legislation he deemed financially wasteful, he indirectly picked off some of the rotten fruits that grew from the protectionist tree. However, it was not until 1887 that he shifted his attention to a need for sweeping tariff reform. When he did, he transformed the presidency and America in the process.”
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“Cleveland’s tariff reform proposals passed the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives but failed in the Republican-controlled Senate. Even worse, despite winning the popular vote, Cleveland lost the 1888 election to Republican nominee Benjamin Harrison amid Electoral College disputes in the key states of New York and Indiana. (Unlike Trump, Cleveland accepted his defeat with grace and peacefully ended his term in 1889.) The Republicans took office and passed a high tariff law (framed by future president William McKinley, then an Ohio congressman). The McKinley tariffs raised the average duty on imports by almost 50 percent, and as Dartmouth University economist Douglas Irwin demonstrated in 1998, these tariffs did little to stimulate the economy even as they imposed considerable suffering on low-income Americans.
This is why, just like Trump, Cleveland was able to comfortably get elected to a non-consecutive term by promising to lower prices. The key difference is that, unlike Trump, Cleveland proposed an intelligent solution to the problem—lowering tariffs, not raising them.
Unfortunately for both Cleveland and the Americans of his time, he would not live to see his vision for tariff reform realized. America plunged into an economic depression shortly after he took office in 1893, compelling Cleveland to confront a number of unrelated crises before he could get to tariff reform. By the time a tariff bill did reach his desk in 1894, special interest groups in both parties had diluted it almost to meaninglessness.”
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“Tariff reform along the lines Cleveland advocated would not become the law of the land until the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913, which was promoted with far more political effectiveness by Woodrow Wilson, the first Democratic president to serve after Cleveland’s administration. By then, Cleveland had been dead for five years.”
“Trump’s position on tariffs begins with his longstanding misconceptions about international trade, which he erroneously views as a zero-sum game with rules that are rigged against the United States. “We’re subsidizing Canada to the tune [of] over $100 billion a year,” he told Kristen Welker on Meet the Press. “We’re subsidizing Mexico for almost $300 billion.”
Trump was referring to U.S. trade deficits with those countries, which are about half as big as he claimed. Those gaps between exports and imports are not subsidies; they reflect goods that Americans voluntarily purchase, which means they get something of value in exchange for their money.
As Trump sees it, however, trade deficits are inherently bad, and he aims to eliminate them by imposing tariffs. Although that is feasible only if tariffs raise the cost of imports, making them less competitive with domestically produced alternatives, Trump contradicts that logic by insisting that tariffs do not raise prices.
“Americans are not paying for the Tariffs” on Chinese goods, Trump averred in 2019. “They are being paid for compliments of China.”
Trump, the self-described “Tariff Man,” clearly does not understand how tariffs work. They are taxes collected from importers, not from the exporting country.
In theory, exporters could respond by cutting prices, or importers could swallow the additional cost. But study after study has found that the cost of tariffs is paid mainly by American buyers of intermediate goods and finished products.”
“Extending the individual income tax portions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) is supposed to be a good thing, right? After all, who doesn’t love lower taxes? However, data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that, without accompanying spending cuts, these tax cuts are going to cost the government.
If the cuts continue, it’s possible that “the positive effects of lower taxes would be counteracted by the negative effects of higher debt,” according to a Tuesday report from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB).
“Despite claims that tax cuts pay for themselves,” the CRFB adds, “analyses from across the political spectrum have found that the economic effects of extending the expiring parts of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) would offset 1 to 14 percent of the revenue loss – falling well short of the 100 percent needed to pay for itself.”
While the tax cuts would create an economic boost in the short term, increasing gross domestic product (GDP) by around 0.3 percent in 2027 and 2028, the CRFB predicts that the cuts will actually lower projected GDP by 0.08 percent by 2034. Further, the CBO’s data shows that continuing TCJA tax cuts are likely to lead to increasing interest rates over the next decade.
While continuing the cuts “would produce about $90 billion of positive revenue feedback,” according to the CRFB, “those higher interest rates would add $150 billion to the debt, more than counteracting the revenue gains.””
“In an ideal world, everyone who qualifies for an aid program ought to receive its benefits. But the reality is that this is often not the case. Before the pandemic, for example, nearly one-fifth of Americans who qualified for food stamps didn’t receive them. In fact, millions of Americans who are eligible for existing social welfare programs don’t receive all of the benefits they are entitled to.”
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“Means testing a given social program can have good intentions: Target spending toward the people who need it most. After all, if middle- or high-income people who can afford their groceries or rent get federal assistance in paying for those things, then wouldn’t there be less money to go around for the people who actually need it?
The answer isn’t so straightforward.”
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“Implementing strict eligibility requirements can be extremely tedious and have unintended consequences.
For starters, let’s look at one of the main reasons lawmakers advocate for means testing: saving taxpayers’ money. But that’s not always what happens. “Though they’re usually framed as ways of curbing government spending, means-tested benefits are often more expensive to provide, on average, than universal benefits, simply because of the administrative support needed to vet and process applicants,” my colleague Li Zhou wrote in 2021.
More than that, means testing reduces how effective antipoverty programs can be because a lot of people miss out on benefits. As Zhou points out, figuring out who qualifies for welfare takes a lot of work, both from the government and potential recipients who have to fill out onerous applications. The paperwork can be daunting and can discourage people from applying. It can also result in errors or delays that would easily be avoided if a program is universal.
There’s also the fact that creating an income threshold creates incentives for people to avoid advancing in their careers or take a higher-paying job. One woman I interviewed a few years ago, for example, told me that after she started a job as a medical assistant and lost access to benefits like food stamps, it became harder to make ends meet for her and her daughter. When lawmakers aggressively means test programs, people like her are often left behind, making it harder to transition out of poverty.
As a result, means testing can seriously limit a welfare program’s potential. According to a report by the Urban Institute, for example, the United States can reduce poverty by more than 30 percent just by ensuring that everyone who is eligible for an existing program receives its benefits. One way to do that is for lawmakers to make more welfare programs universal instead of means-tested.”
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“There sometimes is an aversion to universal programs because they’re viewed as unnecessarily expensive. But universal programs are often the better choice because of one very simple fact: They are generally much easier and less expensive to administer. Two examples of this are some of the most popular social programs in the country: Social Security and Medicare.
Universal programs might also create less division among taxpayers as to how their money ought to be spent. A lot of opposition to welfare programs comes from the fact that some people simply don’t want to pay for programs they don’t directly benefit from, so eliminating that as a factor can create more support for a given program.
In 2023, following a handful of other states, Minnesota implemented a universal school meal program where all students get free meals. This was in response to the problems that arise when means testing goes too far. Across the country, students in public school pay for their meals depending on their family’s income. But this system has stigmatized students who get a free meal. According to one study, 42 percent of eligible families reported that their kids are less likely to eat their school meal because of the stigma around it.
Minnesota’s program has proven popular so far: In September 2023, shortly after the program took off, the amount of school breakfasts and lunches served increased by 30 percent and 11 percent compared to the previous year, respectively.
While it might not be politically feasible — or, in some cases, necessary — to get rid of means testing for all public subsidies, free school meals also offer an example of what a compromise might look like at the national level. Though Congress hasn’t made school meals free to all, it passed a provision in 2010 that allows schools to provide free meals to all students in districts where at least 25 percent (originally 40 percent) are eligible. The program showed that providing free meals to all lowered food insecurity, even among poor students who already qualified for free meals, by removing stigma. (The community eligibility provision now serves nearly 20 million students.)
As for how universal programs can be paid for, the answer is, yes, imposing higher taxes. It might seem inefficient to give people a benefit if you’re going to essentially take it back from them in taxes, but what you actually end up with is a much more efficient program that is more easily administered and doesn’t leave anyone out.”
“The rationale behind capping the SALT deduction was that it would disproportionally benefit high-income earners in high-tax states—and it did. In effect, the federal government was subsidizing the tax-and-spend policies of these states by shielding residents from the full impact of local tax increases. If California raised its taxes, the SALT deduction softened the blow for taxpayers.”
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“raising the cap on SALT deductions would ease pressure on blue states to simplify or lower their tax rates. Consider that California’s top marginal rate is a whopping 13.3 percent. When combined with a top federal rate of 37 percent, Golden State residents are approaching a Sweden-level tax rate. Meanwhile, seven states impose no state income tax at all. This dynamic highlights the beauty of the American political system—the states compete for talent and resources. Over time, high-tax states will lose capital, and low-tax states will benefit.
It’s difficult to oppose any proposal that lowers taxes, but an exception applies here. Raising the SALT cap would only reward high-tax states for their fiscal irresponsibility while undermining the competitive pressures that drive reform. Cities like Nashville, Austin, and Miami are thriving as new hubs of innovation precisely because they’ve embraced freedom and pro-growth policies. They’ve earned their success—and that’s the lesson high-tax states need to learn.”
“When the TCJA passed, analysts projected that it would add to the budget deficit and national debt—and it did. But those problems were more easily waved away when the country was running significantly smaller annual deficits and the debt-to-GDP ratio wasn’t reaching levels unseen since the height of World War II.
A full extension of the TCJA would add another $4.6 trillion to the deficit over the next 10 years, the Congressional Budget Office projects.”
“American consumers and businesses bore roughly 93 percent of the cost of Trump’s tariffs, according to one analysis by Moody’s. The U.S. Trade Commission concluded in 2023 that American companies and consumers “bore nearly the full cost” of the tariffs Trump levied on steel, aluminum, and many goods imported from China.”
“It wasn’t even until 1977 that women in Western Germany became free to legally seek jobs without their husband’s permission. The country still has a tax structure that penalizes married couples if both individuals work full time.”
“In 2021, on April Fools’ Day, Manistee County, Michigan, took the title on Chelsea Koetter’s home because of a small debt she owed on her 2018 property taxes. Unfortunately, this wasn’t a prank.
Four months after seizing her home, which she shared with her two sons, the government auctioned it off for $106,500. It kept the profit.
All told, Koetter owed the government $3,863.40, which included her initial tax debt as well as penalties, interest, and fees. She does not contest she was obligated to pay that. At issue is whether the county acted lawfully when it pocketed the remaining $102,636 after selling her house, a practice known as home equity theft.
The issue may sound familiar. In 2020, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled the practice unconstitutional after the government seized Uri Rafaeli’s home, then sold it and kept all the proceeds in excess of what he owed. His initial tax debt was $8.41.
The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue last year in Tyler v. Hennepin County, ruling unanimously that Hennepin County, Minnesota, violated the Constitution when it seized an elderly woman’s home over a debt, sold it, and kept the profit. “A taxpayer who loses her $40,000 house to the State to fulfill a $15,000 tax debt has made a far greater contribution to the public fisc than she owed,” wrote Chief Justice John Roberts, referring to plaintiff Geraldine Tyler, who had fallen $2,300 behind on her property taxes. The total came to $15,000 after penalties, interest, and fees. After the sale, the government kept what was left over—$25,000. The Court said that was illegal.
Instead of complying with a straightforward interpretation of the law, Michigan has attempted to dance around it, passing a byzantine debt collection statute that sends homeowners on a wild goose chase should they want their equity back.”
“Start with that $30 toaster made overseas. Now, slap a 10 percent tariff on it, so that consumers must pay $33 to buy it. That means the Treasury Department collects $3 in new revenue, but it also means that domestic toaster-makers can sell their wares for $32 and undercut the imported models.
If tariffs cause consumers to switch to those domestic-made toasters, Cass acknowledges that consumers are out two bucks. This is what economists call a “deadweight loss” and it’s one of the major reasons why tariffs harm the economy.
Cass, the head of American Compass and a prominent proponent of the conservative moment’s shift toward central planning, wants to focus on the benefits of those higher prices. “The share of the $32 purchase price that would once have gone to a Chinese factory and its workers now goes to an American firm and its workers instead,” he argues. “It pays American taxes and supports American families in American communities.”
All of that for just $2 more. Wow, what a great deal!
Unfortunately, Cass is wrong about the math and wrong about the underlying economics.
Tariffs can, of course, be used to make foreign-produced goods (like toasters) more expensive. That doesn’t mean that manufacturing firms will radically redesign their supply chains to produce more toasters in the United States. And if they did do that, those new toasters wouldn’t cost a mere $2 more than the ones available at Home Depot now. Cass is making several wild logical leaps here, and offers no evidence to substantiate this claim of a hypothetical $32 American-made toaster.
How much would that toaster actually cost? More than $250.
That’s the figure offered by Ed Gresser, the former assistant U.S. Trade representative who is currently the director of trade and global markets for the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI). Unlike Cass, Gresser understands how tariffs and trade work.
More importantly, he also shows his work. Because there are no kitchen appliance manufacturers making toasters in the United States right now, he examined the prices of toasters made in other wealthy, western countries like Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. At the lowest end, those toasters cost the equivalent of $250, and some would be significantly pricier.
“In sum, ‘developed’ high-income countries do make home toasters. But they are profitable at prices about ten times those you’d find in mainstream U.S. retail outlets.,” writes Gresser. “So to achieve Vance’s apparent goal, mainstream toaster prices would probably have to rise to Neiman Marcus levels, say $300 each.””
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“there would be far more toaster-buying consumers than toaster-making workers—and the consumers would be far worse off. Indeed, the workers would be worse off too, since they become consumers as soon as they clock out for the day.
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“Now, imagine what would happen if you told them that the price of jeans would have to increase tenfold, as would be the case with toasters. I suspect that Cass—and Sen. J.D. Vance (R–Ohio), who is making a version of this same argument on the campaign trail—is relying on faulty math and bad economics because he’s aware that the real numbers would be unpalatable to just about everyone.”