“If Trump’s goal here is to strike deals that will lower foreign barriers to American exports and deliver better trading conditions for American manufacturers (who rely on imports), then hiking tariffs on South Korea makes startlingly little sense.”
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“the new tariffs seem to violate an existing trade deal between the U.S. and South Korea. That deal, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, was signed in 2007 by President George W. Bush and implemented in 2012. Under the terms of the deal, about 95 percent of the goods traded between the two countries are imported tariff-free. Among other things, that deal put an end to high South Korean tariffs on American cars and light trucks, which has boosted American exports and U.S. auto manufacturing jobs.
On the whole, the deal has been good for both countries. Bilateral trade between the U.S. and South Korea expanded nearly 70 percent in the first 10 years that the deal was in place. As the Heritage Foundation noted in 2022, the deal was particularly good for American farmers (who saw exports to South Korea hit record highs) and for foreign investment in American industries (South Korean investment in the U.S. nearly tripled during the deal’s first decade in force).”
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“Trump himself signed a renegotiated version of that same trade deal in 2018. The so-called KORUS 2.0 rolled back some of the free trade provisions in the original deal—most notably, it limited exports of Korean steel to the U.S. and postponed a planned elimination of the U.S. tariff on imported light trucks.
Still, it was mostly “a minor tweak” to the previous deal, as the Cato Institute termed it at the time.
Trump called the reworked deal “fair and reciprocal” and said it was “a historic milestone in trade.”
Now, less than seven years later, he’s effectively torn up that deal. Or he’s pretending that it never existed (or he forgot about it).
So, here’s the question: What is the White House hoping to accomplish with this latest maneuver?
If the goal is to lower tariffs across the board, then KORUS already did that. If the goal is to increase American exports to foreign countries by getting them to lower their trade barriers, then KORUS has already done that too. If the goal is to allow Trump to renegotiate the supposedly flawed trade deals from previous generations of American leaders, then KORUS 2.0 did that.
And, of course, if the goal is to strike more deals with more countries—as the White House keeps claiming—then this seems to be a step in the wrong direction. What other leader will be willing to negotiate seriously with this administration, knowing full well that it does not respect the deals it reaches?”
“Asked whether the U.S. would be flexible with any countries about on the July 9 deadline, Trump said, “Not really.”
“They’ll start to pay on Aug. 1,” he added. “The money will start to come into the United States on Aug. 1, OK, in pretty much all cases.”
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Tariffs are paid by importers — which can pass on part or all of the costs to consumers — and not necessarily by entities in the goods’ country of origin.”
“That unwillingness to significantly budge on his array of tariffs has bogged down trade negotiations and hindered the administration from crafting substantial trade deals. As the U.S. has set out to negotiate deals with more than 60 trading partners, world leaders have grown increasingly frustrated with what they say are unbalanced demands from the U.S.
Other trading partners, including the European Union, have bristled at the terms of the UK framework and said they would not agree to a similar deal. That arrangement left a 10 percent so-called baseline tariff in place, while laying out a path to slash sector-specific tariffs.
The bloc isn’t alone, and Trump’s numerous demands and “do-it-or-else” approach have made it challenging for countries to corral the domestic political support they’ll need in order to sell any deal at home.”
“Trump’s all-sticks-and-no-carrot approach to trade talks is making it difficult for even friendly foreign governments to reach an agreement they fear could be political suicide back home — no matter how much the White House threatens their economies.”
“China on Friday signaled it would approve the export of rare earth minerals to the US, hours after White House officials said the two sides had reached a deal, in what would be a major breakthrough following weeks of negotiations over US access to the key materials.”
“Foreign manufacturers will have to lower their prices to accommodate tariff rates, Miran believes. If they don’t, then U.S. importers will turn to factories in other markets rather than absorbing the cost of tariffs themselves.
“We can move our demand across borders, but a factory can’t get up and move across borders,” he said.
You might say, his theory is that the customer is always right.
This line of thinking, a theme of his work since before he joined the administration, is an important way Miran’s reasoning diverges from that of most of his fellow economists. Critics point to examples — such as Trump’s tariffs on washing machines in his first term — where consumers seemed to be the ones who paid the price.
The question of who will bear the cost burden of import taxes is an important puzzle piece for gaming out how much inflation will rise and how much growth will slow. It is a particularly critical dilemma for the Federal Reserve, which is trying to decide when to ease off the decelerating economy.”
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“For this to work, foreign firms have to believe that, unless they capitulate, U.S. companies really will relocate their supply chains elsewhere, Miran told me. That’s one of the many tricky parts for proponents of Trump’s agenda — and Miran conceded as much.
“The truth is that for a lot of products, there’s not a credible alternative for a supply chain available instantaneously, right?” he said.
The recalibration, in other words, will take some time.
And that time could come at a price for the economy, as Trump’s shifting tariffs and fluid negotiations leave businesses hesitant to take action. If firms knew where tariffs would land, they could make investment decisions — on where to build factories, on what size workforce they need, on whether they need to change their business model. In the meantime, many executives are frozen in place, a paralysis that itself could take a bite out of growth.
Right now, manufacturers have been scaling back production as new orders dry up, and confidence in business conditions among CEOs collapsed during the second quarter at its fastest pace in roughly half a century.
Miran was straightforward about acknowledging that policy uncertainty is a challenge, repeatedly suggesting that there could be volatility — in growth, in prices — ahead.”
“Trump unilaterally imposed tariffs on much of the world. Yet the president has no such authority under Article II of the Constitution, which enumerates the limited powers of the executive branch. Instead, the authority “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” as well as the authority “to regulate Commerce with Foreign nations,” resides exclusively in Article I, which is where the limited powers of the legislative branch are detailed.
So, Trump’s trade war violates the constitutional separation of powers because Trump has unlawfully exercised power that the Constitution placed in the hands of Congress, not in the hands of the president.”
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“As a pretext for his trade war, Trump invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Yet “the statute is silent on tariffs, and for good reason. It was never meant, and has never been understood, to authorize the President to impose them.” That observation comes from a superb friend of the court brief filed by a cross-ideological group of legal scholars and former government officials in support of the legal challenge against Trump’s tariffs. Their brief thoroughly explains why Trump’s use of the IEEPA to fundamentally remake the American economy cannot be reconciled with any law passed by Congress. In short, Trump’s tariffs flunk the test imposed by the major questions doctrine.”
“By examining alternative studies and methodological adjustments, Winship contends that the negative effects of trade with China have been significantly exaggerated and that populist narratives blaming this trade for U.S. economic decline aren’t supported by rigorous evidence.
The originators of the China shock theory examined how Chinese imports affected certain U.S. locales compared with others—not with the entire country—based on initial industry composition and employment size. By these metrics, areas heavily exposed to Chinese imports showed disproportionately worse manufacturing job losses.
However, Winship points out that even if we accept these estimates, the findings suggest only relatively modest employment effects.
To put things in perspective, Winship gives the example of two hypothetical commuting zones with 200,000 working-age residents and 20,000 manufacturing workers. Data from the theory’s proponents indicate that moving from low (10th percentile) to high (90th percentile) exposure to Chinese imports would result in a loss of roughly 2,700 manufacturing jobs—just a 1.4-percentage-point drop in overall manufacturing employment.”
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“In addition, Winship flags multiple methodological issues. Once other economists revised the proponents’ methods, the estimated negative impact shrank dramatically. Various followup studies found the China shock effect on manufacturing employment to be 50 percent smaller than initially claimed.
Further research revealed that job losses in exposed areas were often offset or even outweighed by employment gains in other sectors. One detailed Census Bureau study even found that firms with greater Chinese import exposure increased manufacturing employment, reallocating jobs to more efficient domestic production lines enabled by cheaper imports.
Moreover, the steady decline in U.S. manufacturing employment began decades before China’s WTO entry. Between the late 1970s and 2000, factory employment had already decreased substantially, mostly because of technological advances and shifting consumer demand.
Notably, there was no sudden acceleration of this decline after China joined the WTO. The rate of manufacturing job losses remained consistent with earlier trends, undermining claims that Chinese trade uniquely devastated American manufacturing.
Furthermore, former manufacturing workers generally did not face permanent unemployment. In fact, unemployment rates among this group were lower in recent years compared to the late 1990s, before the peak of Chinese imports. Many workers transitioned successfully into other sectors, belying the notion of an enduring displacement crisis. It’s also worth noting that there are around half a million unfilled manufacturing jobs today.”
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” evidence from Trump’s first term showed that his tariffs often hurt American firms more than their foreign competitors. With broader and higher tariffs, we can only fear the worst.”