“China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, detests Lai as a “separatist”. Lai and his government reject Beijing’s sovereignty claims, saying only Taiwan’s people can decide their future.
On Thursday at his keynote national day speech, Lai said the People’s Republic of China had no right to represent Taiwan, but that the island was willing to work with Beijing to combat challenges like climate change, striking both a firm and conciliatory tone, drawing anger from China.
The Saturday announcement from China’s commerce ministry could portend tariffs or other forms of economic pressure against the island in the near future.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, which on Thursday said that Lai’s speech promoted “separatist ideas” and incited confrontation, responded to the announcement by saying the fundamental reason behind the trade dispute was the “DPP authorities’ stubborn adherence to the stance of ‘Taiwan independence'”.
“The political basis makes it difficult for cross-Strait trade disputes to be resolved through negotiation,” it added.
In May, China reinstated tariffs on 134 items it imports from Taiwan, after Beijing’s finance ministry said it would suspend concessions on the items under a trade deal because Taiwan had not reciprocated.
The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and Taiwan was initially signed in 2010 and Taiwanese officials had previously told Reuters that China was likely to pressure Lai by ending some of the preferential trading terms within it.”
The U.S. needs to pull together its different resources in different domains to successfully compete against China, including not just militarily, but taking an active diplomatic and economic role in Asia.
“China has published baselines for a contested shoal in the South China Sea it had seized from the Philippines, a move that’s likely to increase tensions over overlapping territorial claims.
The Foreign Ministry on Sunday posted online geographic coordinates for the baselines around Scarborough Shoal. A nation’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone are typically defined as the distance from the baselines.
Both China and the Philippines claim Scarborough Shoal and other outcroppings in the South China Sea. China seized the shoal, which lies west of the main Philippine island of Luzon, in 2012 and has since restricted access to Filipino fishermen there. A 2016 ruling by an international arbitration court found that most Chinese claims in the South China Sea were invalid but Beijing refuses to abide by it.
Ships from China and the Philippines have collided several times as part of increased confrontations, and the Chinese coast guard has blasted Philippine vessels with water cannons.
China’s move came two days after Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed two laws demarcating the government’s claims in the disputed waters.”
“Northeast Asia undoubtedly benefited from capitalism (private profit-driven production), and
from access to the world market. To this extent the mainstream is correct. But five qualifications
have to be made.
First, for the first several decades the Northeast economies relied not so much on ‘the world
market’ as on ‘empire preference’ to the US market—and to US technologies, US capital, US
military and civilian aid, and US public procurement—thanks to their role in the US’s geopolitical
strategy to contain communism and show the world that ‘capitalism’ was superior to ‘communism’.
Second, the US’s threat perception, its commitment to getting front-line allies economically strong
enough to be a credible defence against communism, and its intense involvement in national
economic policy-making and institution building, kept the national elites relatively unified and not
at each other’s throats. So on the spectrum of ‘weak state/special interest state/common interest
state’ these were special interest states moving towards—with a lot of American help in the first
decades— common interest states.
Third, steered by a developmental mindset, the developmental state was organized differently than
the model neoliberal state. The latter has no strong centre of coordination (because markets played
by private capitalists, not states, are the resource coordinating institution), and has arms-length
relations between the various ministries and between ministries and business. The developmental
state has one or a few powerful centres of coordination and market leadership, a limited role for
the legislature in matters of economic, financial, and security policy, and well-developed
mechanisms of consultation and coordination with private capitalists, in the spirit of ‘embedded
autonomy’.
Fourth, these governments made intensive use of policies and institutions frowned upon in the
neoliberal playbook—such as managed trade, sectoral industrial policy (‘making, not picking,
willing winners’), targeted concessional credit, and capital controls. These instruments were
intended to buffer (not insulate) producers in selected sectors from international competitive
pressure and volatility—so profit-raising protection and subsidies came with performance
conditions, which were enforced. The whole complex would have scored poorly by Washington
Consensus criteria. For example, Taiwan’s financial system was and remains the despair of visiting
western economists. That being said, there is no knock-out evidence on the effects of these
‘government interventions’. The causality is too difficult to disentangle rigorously.
Fifth, from early on they undertook to develop domestic technological capacity, such as
engineering faculties at universities and public laboratories, to aggressively seek out western
technologies and domesticate them for deploying in national firms, and much later to undertake
world-standard innovation and attract back a high proportion of overseas graduate students—this,
rather than rely, as in much of Latin America, on incoming western multinational companies.
Singapore, as noted, did rely on western multinationals—which were left in no doubt as to who
called the shots”
“For Washington, the question that really matters is Ishiba’s approach to the military relationship with America.
Here Ishiba has sounded more disruptive than either the Japanese or U.S. establishment would like. He approached one third rail by calling for the revision of the agreement on the deployment of U.S. forces here. He went for another in wanting to amend the constitutional provisions on Japanese pacifism. He has talked about an Asian version of NATO, which would take Japan from a security vassal of the U.S. to a peer, though still a close ally.
“He could be a problem for the U.S.,” says Gerry Curtis, the retired Columbia scholar of Japan who lives much of the year here. “He thinks the deal with the U.S. is outdated, has an occupation stink to it.” Ishiba is, as one of the preeminent Japan watchers in Washington Ken Weinstein texted me, “hardest for Americans to read of the major candidates.”
So what’s going on? A Japanese official who knows Ishiba offered the 60/40 theory over lunch the day after Ishiba’s victory. Every other similar status of forces agreement with the U.S., from Germany to South Korea to Italy, was revised in the last half century. Japan’s dates to 1960. Ishiba wants a deal to allow Japanese forces to base and train in the U.S. — in effect to become even more like a normal army than a self defense force. Abe took Japan down this road, and Kishida continued by boosting spending (Japan’s defense budget is the third-biggest in the world). But neither of Ishiba’s predecessors put the status agreement explicitly on the table the way Ishiba has. So 60 percent of Ishiba’s motivation is “to enhance deterrence and strengthen the alliance,” this official said. The other 40 percent? That’s about “restoring Japanese sovereignty,” and that’s the bit that makes Washington nervous.
Speaking after this victory, Ishiba said the time wasn’t right to raise any of these security questions. This will be a topic of discussion with the next U.S. president and shouldn’t even be mentioned before Election Day in November.
The other topic that will test bilateral relations is America’s more protectionist trade policies under both Trump and Biden administrations and the high cost to Japanese manufacturers of enforcing the U.S.-inspired restrictions on technology transfers to China. “Japan is hurting right now because of American policies,” says Koll.
The new Japanese prime minister is “a realist,” says Hiro Akita, the Japanese business daily Nikkei’s foreign affairs specialist, who knows him. Ishiba thinks that Japan has to adjust to a changing world, he says. The next prime minister is no Japanese Charles de Gaulle who’ll seek to push America back as the old French leader did there half a century ago, he adds.
But still, this at first undramatic leadership change in Tokyo does potentially bring chop to the waters of the Japanese-American relationship that have been especially placid of late.”
““If North Korea attempts to use nuclear weapons, it will face the resolute and overwhelming response of our military and the (South Korea)-U.S. alliance,” President Yoon Suk Yeol told thousands of troops gathered at a military airport near Seoul. “That day will be the end of the North Korean regime.”
“The North Korean regime must abandon the delusion that nuclear weapons will protect them,” Yoon said.
During the ceremony, the South Korean military displayed about 340 military equipment and weapons systems. Among them was its most powerful Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile, which observers say is capable of carrying about 8 tons of a conventional warhead that can penetrate deep into the earth and destroy underground bunkers in North Korea. It was the first time for South Korea to disclose that missile.
The U.S. flew a long-range B-1B bomber during the ceremony in an apparent demonstration of its security commitment to its Asian ally. South Korea also flew some of its most advanced fighter jets.
Since taking office in 2002, Yoon, a conservative, has put a stronger military alliance with the U.S. and an improved trilateral Seoul-Washington-Tokyo security cooperation at the center of his security polices to cope with North Korea’s advancing nuclear program. In recent years, North Korea has performed a provocative of missile tests and threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively in potential conflicts with South Korea and the United States.
Last month, concerns about North Korea’s bomb program further grew after it published photos of a secretive facility to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. It was North Korea’s first unveiling of a uranium-enrichment facility since it showed one at the country’s main Yongbyon nuclear complex to visiting American scholars in 2010.
South Korean officials say North Korea will likely try to further dial up tensions with provocative weapons tests ahead of the U.S. election to increase its leverage in future diplomacy with a new U.S. government. Experts say North Korea likely thinks an expanded nuclear arsenal would help it win bigger U.S. concessions like extensive sanctions relief.”