“Were Trump to implement Musk’s vision while simultaneously honoring his promise to avoid cutting entitlements and the GOP’s commitment to avoiding defense spending cuts, then he would need to slash all other government programs by 80 percent. That would involve gutting all social services for low-income Americans, food inspections, air safety, health insurance subsidies, and infrastructure investments, among countless other things.
This would abruptly and massively reduce demand in the US economy, potentially triggering a recession.
There is little reason to expect such severe and haphazard spending cuts to benefit the economy in the long term. After all, government investments in education and infrastructure often increase the economy’s growth potential — slashing funding for such programs could impair America’s economic performance in the coming decades.”
“Kamala Harris lost the presidential election and Democrats lost control of the Senate.
But when you zoom in on the details of that result, there’s a striking pattern: Democratic Senate candidates are outperforming Harris. Or, put another way, Republican Senate candidates are doing worse than Trump.
In recent years, the outcome of a state’s US Senate race has increasingly matched the outcome of its simultaneous presidential race. Ticket-splitting has decreased in our era of polarization and partisanship. The vast majority of people voting for a presidential candidate also vote for their party’s Senate candidate.
But not everyone does that. And there’s still some variation in how much better or worse Senate candidates do compared to the top of the ticket. Looking at that variation can provide clues about what sorts of candidates overperform (even if they don’t actually win).”
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“Some might argue for racism or sexism explaining Harris’s struggles, but I’d note that several of the Democratic candidates who overperformed Harris were nonwhite or female. Others might argue that she was a uniquely flawed candidate or campaigner, but President Joe Biden was on track to do much worse if he’d stayed in the race.
My suspicion is that Harris’s electoral struggles were more about Biden’s unpopularity and her association with his administration than any newfound love of the American public for the Republican Party generally.”
…
“Call them the “I don’t like Republicans much, but the economy was better under Trump” voters. Biden lost them, and Harris failed to get them back.”
“Wray’s decision undermined decades of hard work — by Congress, presidents, the Justice Department and the FBI itself — to move it out of a partisan, political framework. The FBI’s highest guiding principle is supposed to be the rule of law — and federal law is clear: The FBI director serves a 10-year-term, a length meant to isolate the role from political winds. Similarly, in federal law, there is a mechanism for removing an FBI director who errs — they can be fired, but only for cause. The role is not meant to be like the CIA director, attorney general or Defense secretary and turn over at noon on Jan. 20 for a new administration; it is, in fact, explicitly designed to NOT do so. Ronald Reagan spent almost all of his presidency with Jimmy Carter’s FBI director; George W. Bush inherited Bill Clinton’s FBI director; Barack Obama, in turn, inherited Bush’s, and Joe Biden will have spent his entire presidency with Wray, Trump’s choice to head the bureau.
Those safeguards and traditions exist because the FBI, in the wrong hands, is incredibly dangerous to American democracy.
The FBI is the most powerful, best resourced, and far-reaching law enforcement agency, not just in the United States, but anywhere in the world. Nothing compares to the sweeping breadth of its investigative powers; the intelligence and information it collects, wittingly and unwittingly, on all manner of Americans, powerful and not, guilty and innocent alike; and the resources and technologies it can bring to bear against anyone in its investigative sights. Even its routine investigations can paralyze and bankrupt businesses, upend lives, careers and families, and destroy reputations — and even do so when it doesn’t bring federal charges at the end. Under J. Edgar Hoover’s half-century reign, he deployed those resources to ruin the lives of civil rights activists and antiwar protesters, harass literary figures such as James Baldwin, blackmail gay people and persecute anyone he didn’t feel was sufficiently patriotic. We’ve spent a half-century as a nation trying to make sure that never happens again — and now Trump is explicitly saying he wants to restart that darkest chapter of the FBI’s history.”
…
“let’s be clear about what’s happening here: The only reason Trump wants to change FBI directors is he doesn’t think he can boss, bend and break Wray to his will sufficiently, that Wray would not be personally loyal to him in the way that he has wanted his FBI directors to be — and which, institutionally, they’re explicitly not supposed to be. Every single part of that is a dire warning sign about what’s to come under Trump II and what he and Patel intend to do with the bureau.
Wray had an opportunity to make that a fight — to force Trump to bear the political cost of firing him on invented pretexts, to force the president to be the one who destroyed that guardrail rather than Wray himself. And, instead of upholding that oath to the Constitution, the rule of law and duty to protect the bureau from outside influence, Wray just … capitulated.”
“Pete Hegseth, President-elect Donald Trump’s pick for secretary of defense, has repeatedly criticized policies allowing gay people to serve openly in the US military, calling them part of a “Marxist” agenda to prioritize social justice over combat readiness.”
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“Hegseth in his book does not reference any specific examples of incidents to support his argument that gay individuals openly serving has been detrimental to the military.”
“Trump can’t influence the Federal Reserve much — for right now.
When it comes to interest rates, which are basically how much it costs to borrow money, Trump can complain they are too high (or too low) like any other American, but the Fed’s leaders are the only government officials with the power to adjust those rates. The Fed has lowered interest rates this year as inflation has declined, but it kept rates fairly high for the last few years, in part to fight pandemic-era inflation. Even with the lower rates, however, many Americans are still finding it too expensive to borrow money so they can make big purchases like a home.
Forcing or pressuring the Fed to lower interest rates won’t necessarily fix high borrowing costs for Americans; the interest rates set by the Fed are actually short-term costs that banks pay to each other to borrow money. The Fed’s decisions influence the cost of borrowing, but there are a lot of other factors that go into consumer credit.”
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“Trump might try to meddle in the Fed’s affairs is by trying to fire Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. Trump appointed Powell, but was highly critical of Powell’s decision-making during his first term, and reportedly looked into whether he could fire the Fed chair.
Powell has said he will serve through the rest of his term, which doesn’t end until 2026, but has declined to say whether he would stay on for a third term.
Legally, Trump cannot force Powell to resign or fire him. Members of the Fed’s Board of Governors, which Powell is part of as the Fed chair, can only be fired for wrongdoing or job performance reasons, not differences in policy. Trump could try to fire Powell claiming he’s performing his job poorly, but that decision would probably embroil the president-elect in a drawn-out legal battle”
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“Because the Federal Reserve was created by an act of Congress, it would take congressional action to make any changes to how it works. Congress has made some changes over the decades, but there’s no signal right now that most lawmakers are willing to challenge the independence of the institution.”
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“come May 2026, Trump will be able to have some congressionally authorized say in Fed policy. That’s when he’ll be required to appoint a Fed chair for a new four-year term, who’ll then have to undergo Senate confirmation. That may be Powell, or it could be someone more compliant with Trump’s idea of what the Fed should be.”
“Under a longstanding interpretation of the Constitution and federal law, children born in the US automatically become American citizens, even if their parents are undocumented. Trump, however, has promised that, “On day one of my new term in office, I will sign an executive order making clear to federal agencies that under the correct interpretation of the law, going forward, the children of illegal immigrants will not receive automatic US citizenship.”
Specifically, that executive order would mandate that at least one parent must be a US citizen or green card holder for their child to qualify for automatic citizenship. Federal agencies would be directed to deny passports, Social Security numbers, and public benefits to children with two undocumented parents.
The executive order would almost certainly be challenged in court. Though it’s impossible to say what the Supreme Court may ultimately decide, history and precedent isn’t on Trump’s side.”
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“The 14th Amendment states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”
Chemerinsky said that this has “always been understood to mean that all born in the United States (or naturalized as citizens) are United States citizens,” in addition to any individuals under US jurisdiction abroad, such as children born to US military personnel in foreign countries. The phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was intended to exclude only Native Americans born on tribal land as well as children of enemy occupiers and foreign diplomats.
The Supreme Court’s 1898 decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark “makes clear that those born in the United States are citizens,” Chemerinsky added. That case concerned a child born in California to Chinese immigrants who were lawful permanent residents of the US. At the time, no Chinese citizens were allowed to become naturalized US citizens under the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The court ruled that the child was a US citizen because he was born in the US, even though his parents were noncitizens.”
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“Right-wing immigration hawks have argued that the “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” clause ought to be interpreted differently to exclude children of unauthorized immigrants from the benefits of automatic citizenship. The clause, they argue, was meant to exclude anyone who had any loyalties to a foreign power, including citizens of other countries.”
“President-elect Donald Trump has repeatedly distanced himself from Project 2025, a 900-page opus of conservative policy recommendations published by the Heritage Foundation, a right-wing think tank. But he has nominated two of the document’s co-authors to Cabinet-level positions, and many others served in his first administration, which suggests the document may be a window into what the next four years could bring.”
“There’s only so much the administration can control, however. Although Trump can take notable steps to try to increase fossil fuel production, actual upticks in oil and gas extraction will depend heavily on the private sector and the economics of the industry.
Still, while Trump faces some constraints, he has significant policy levers he can pull to encourage production of fossil fuels. Wright, Burgum, and Zeldin have also signaled they’re prepared to execute on the president-elect’s vision, including changes to drilling on public lands and speedier permitting for oil and gas projects.
“President Trump and his energy team — Mr. Burgum, Mr. Wright, Mr. Zeldin — can go to considerable lengths to make expanded production attractive and relatively easy,” Barry Rabe, a University of Michigan environmental policy professor, told Vox.”
“According to the New York Times, Trump is planning to invoke the Insurrection Act to bring in the military to carry out mass deportations. The law is a key exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of the military to enforce federal law without the permission of Congress or the Constitution.
Only in rare instances have presidents invoked the Insurrection Act. President George H.W. Bush was the last one to do so amid the 1992 Los Angeles riots that broke out in response to the acquittal of police officers in the beating of Rodney King. President Dwight D. Eisenhower also notably used the Insurrection Act to facilitate the desegregation of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas.
The provision of the Insurrection Act most likely to apply in Trump’s case is one that allows the president to unilaterally activate the military domestically to enforce federal law whenever they determine that “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion… make it impracticable [to do so] by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”
Mirasola said Trump would have a “relatively easy time” making the case that cartels trafficking immigrants across the border constitute an “unlawful obstruction” to the enforcement of US immigration law. Trump has in some ways appeared to begin building his case for invoking the Insurrection Act through his rhetoric on the campaign trail this year by describing an “invasion of criminals” coming across the border.
But Mirasola said it would be harder for Trump to argue that it is impracticable to enforce immigration laws through the “ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” That’s because presidents have done so for decades, and border crossings are no longer unusually high: They have sharply declined this year and are down even from certain points in the first Trump administration.
However, the law gives the president “sole discretion, in most instances” to determine whether the criteria necessary to activate the military have been met, according to 2022 congressional testimony given by Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the liberty and national security program at the Brennan Center for Justice, and Joseph Nunn, the Center’s counsel in the national security program.
Goitein and Nunn also argued that the “vague and broad criteria for invoking the Act, combined with the lack of any provision for judicial or congressional review, render it ripe for abuse.” At that point, their concern was that Trump could have used the Insurrection Act to interfere with the certification of the 2020 election results. The use case is now different, but the potential for overreach is the same.
That is to say, while advocates may challenge Trump on whether the two key criteria for invoking the law have been met, the law gives presidents a wide berth — and the courts little power.
“For all practical purposes, courts have been cut out of the process,” Goitein and Nunn write.”