Militarily opening the Strait of Hormuz will be incredibly hard. Iran only has to get through once, the US needs to stop every weapon. It will require the great risk of putting a lot of forces close to Iran.
Iran was prepared for the US to dominate with “overwhelming” airpower. Iran saw the US take out Saddam’s centralized command with airpower and decided to focus on missiles, drones, and decentralization. Taking out the snake’s head is less effective when there are many snakes with their own weapons, each able to lash out. Iran knew it couldn’t go toe to toe with the US in the skies, so scattered and hid their weapons. Iran knows that the US would not like a long war, so they planned for a long war where a determined Iran can outlast a US that grows weary with the costs of war.
The mission of keeping the Strait of Hormuz safe from Iranian attacks on civilian ships is a burdensome and dangerous mission. The US needs to focus on protecting its carriers until the Iranian threat is further diminished.
“High-end missile interceptors can run into the millions of dollars per shot.
Many of the drones they are designed to defeat are far cheaper and produced in large numbers — creating what defense officials have described as a growing “math problem” in modern warfare. The U.S. can end up firing expensive missiles at relatively inexpensive drones, a dynamic that becomes harder to sustain if attacks come in waves.
That imbalance is accelerating a push inside the Pentagon to expand a layered counter-drone strategy — combining short-range interceptors, electronic warfare tools and emerging technologies such as high-energy lasers.
For U.S. forces in the region, larger drone waves increase the odds that defenses are stretched, and that even one drone could reach a base or ship.
This marks the first sustained confrontation in which U.S. forces are facing large-scale, state-backed drone waves as a central feature of the battlefield — forcing commanders to adapt in real time and draw on lessons learned from Ukraine, where mass-produced Shahed drones reshaped air defense strategy.”
“The first six days of war in Iran cost U.S. taxpayers at least $11.3 billion in munitions alone, according to Pentagon estimates reviewed by lawmakers, and experts say the ongoing cost could increase exponentially. That total does not include the cost of operating and maintaining the military force engaged in the war or battle damage sustained from Iran’s attacks.
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While initial cost estimates of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were around $50 to $60 billion, they ended up costing a combined $8 trillion, according to analysis by Costs of War.”
Iran’s military is split up into regional commands that each have the resources to fight independently if they lose contact with leaders or the rest of the country.
Producing Iran’s shahed drone requires many advanced components. Logistic supply lines need to remain open for Iran to continue producing many of those. Not only can the US and Israel bomb the factorites themselves, but it can also disrupt these supply lines.
W Bush focusing on fighting insurgencies while China was rising, led to the US not having the military industrial base and stockpiles of certain munitions. If the US uses too many munitions fighting Iran, it will be greatly weakened for a fight against China. This also weakens US deterrence against China.
However, if Iran is in too much chaos to pump oil, or if it is friendly enough with the US that in the event of a China-US war it would not sell oil to China, that would be a huge advantage in starving China of oil in the event of a war.