“President Donald Trump moved forward Saturday with his plans for tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, ending a guessing game about how aggressively he would move to penalize America’s three largest trading partners.
The tariffs — as Trump has promised since after his election win — will be 25% duties on Canada and Mexico and 10% on China over issues of fentanyl and illegal migration.”
…
“tariffs on crucial energy imports from Canada will be lower, with 10% duties on those products. The carveout was an acknowledgment of US and Canadian energy interdependence.
Trump said the drug and migration issues constituted a national emergency and moved forward on the duties using authority in the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).”
…
“”Tariffs are simply taxes,” wrote Sen. Rand Paul, who is a vocal Trump advocate on other fronts. “Taxing trade will mean less trade and higher prices.”
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce added its own blistering statement that called Trump’s move “profoundly disturbing” and added that it “will have immediate and direct consequences on Canadian and American livelihoods.””
“a one percentage point increase in imports from China caused a 1.9 percent decline in U.S. consumer prices, saving a representative American household roughly $1,500 a year”
…
“prices are not just about prices. When consumers have more purchasing power, they use it to buy goods and services in other, more high-productive sectors. Higher tariffs would lead to lost jobs, and inputs would become more expensive for American producers.
Some research suggests that competition from international trade can lead to better wages in new roles for U.S. workers. A 2017 paper by the economist Ildikó Magyari estimates that the American companies most exposed to Chinese imports expanded employment 2 percent more per year than other companies did. Some of these were manufacturing jobs—with higher wages, because they are in the stages of production where workers add more value—and some were complementary service jobs, in such areas as engineering, design, research and development, and marketing.
Apple offers a fascinating example. Trump has often complained that China is the biggest beneficiary of the iPhone, just because the devices are often assembled there. But when researchers Kenneth L. Kraemer, Greg Linden, and Jason Dedrick disassembled an iPhone 7 in 2018, they found that almost all of its value was captured by Western producers of parts, including hundreds of thousands of American researchers, designers, programmers, salespeople, marketers, retailers, and warehouse workers. China just got 1.3 percent of the price paid for an iPhone, and that offshoring made it possible to move U.S. labor to the more value-added parts of the supply chain.”
…
“more than a million American jobs depend directly on exports to Chinese consumers. About 0.5 percent of the U.S. work force would lose their jobs if the U.S. lost access to its third-largest goods exporting market.”
…
“more opportunities would be lost in the future, since protectionism reduces competition and innovation. If the United States shuts its doors to the best manufacturers of, say, electric cars, that may save some jobs in the short term, but it will turn the U.S. into a fenced-off auto show for more expensive and less efficient vehicles. American consumers will have to pay much more, and foreign consumers will be much less interested.”
…
“A United States bent on decoupling from China risks pushing many more innovators and entrepreneurs to the Far East. On paper there are good reasons to stop the export of sensitive technologies to geopolitical rivals, but what good does it do to fence in a geopolitical rival if cutting-edge producers feel the need to join that rival behind the fence?
One German producer of lasers and chip toolmakers, Trumpf, has faced increased obstacles and costly delays after the U.S. government pushed Germany to restrict its exports to China. In response, Trumpf moved some of its 3D-laser-cutting production to China.”
…
“This comes from a company in one of America’s closest allies, a country dependent on America’s security guarantees. Imagine how countries diplomatically closer to China will react if forced to choose between Beijing and Washington.”
…
“When economies slow, governments have a harder time keeping the populace satisfied. That often leads them to crack down on dissent. China is now doing the bare minimum to fit into the global order, and it has an awful human rights and civil liberties record at home. There is a great risk that a declining, more isolated, and less interdependent China could be much worse on both fronts.”
…
“If a rising power can see a future in which it prospers and is allowed to take its place in the established world order—or become so dominant that it can easily replace that order—it makes sense to hide its strengths and bide its time, as Deng Xiaoping encouraged the Chinese to do. But delay is defeat if further rapid growth seems impossible: if it suffers demographic decline, or if geopolitical rivals decide to starve it of resources or markets. Then the country must either accept that it will never realize its grand ambitions, or lash out.”
…
“Xi knows an invasion of Taiwan would result in an economic war with the West that would cause China tremendous pain. But what if China had already been deprived of those lucrative markets and had already lost access to investments and technologies it needs?”
“Any new tariffs imposed by the incoming Trump administration will function the same way as every other tariff: It will drain wealth from American consumers and businesses to enrich the U.S. Treasury. That’s what tax increases do, even when they are proposed by a Republican president and cheered by a crowd of Republican lawmakers, donors, and administration officials.
Indeed, study after study after study has found that the tariffs Trump levied during his first tenure were paid nearly entirely by American consumers and businesses.”
…
“The big change Trump is proposing this time around is the creation of a new “External Revenue Service” that will collect tariff revenue. The exact contours of that new agency are still unclear, but it is probably best thought of as a public relations maneuver rather than a meaningful policy change. After all, there’s already a governmental entity that handles tariff collection—that’s the “customs” in U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Changing the name won’t change anything about the transactions that occur.”
“On the campaign trail, Trump pledged to put a tariff of between 10 percent and 20 percent on all imports to the United States, along with a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and a 25 percent import surcharge on Canadian and Mexican wares — at least, until our neighbors choke off the flow of all migrants and drugs across America’s northern and southern borders.
This protectionist agenda is far more radical than anything Trump attempted during his first term. It threatens to hamper American tech companies by increasing the cost of semiconductors, depress stock valuations by reducing economic growth and fueling a global trade war, and disrupt the US auto industry, whose supply chains were built around the presumption of duty-free trade with Mexico.
Thus, American investors, executives, and entrepreneurs watched Trump’s first day in office with bated breath: Would his inaugural address and initial executive orders prioritize corporate America’s financial interest in relatively free global exchange — or his own ideological fixation on trade deficits?
Trump’s Day 1 actions did not fully clarify his priorities on this front. In his inaugural speech, the president reiterated his broad commitment to protectionism. Meanwhile, his administration prepared to launch federal investigations into America’s trade deficit in general, as well as the trade practices of China, Mexico, and Canada in particular.
Nevertheless, Trump did not actually establish any new tariffs on his first day in office, as his administration’s arch-protectionists had hoped that he would.
Investors interpreted Trump’s caution as a sign that he would be heeding his advisers’ push for a more limited and incremental tariff policy; stocks rose Monday while the US dollar fell (stiff tariffs would increase the value of America’s currency).
Wall Street’s relief may be premature. Trump appears as ideologically perturbed by America’s trade deficit as ever.”
…
“Imposing even a 10 percent tariff on all imported goods would not only harm various business interests, but would also likely increase costs for consumers. Thus, such a duty would harm both Trump’s donors and voters.
If Trump’s first term is any guide, his universal tariff would not even redound to the benefit of American manufacturers, who would be vulnerable to higher costs and retaliatory tariffs from foreign nations. Generally speaking, presidents seek to avoid enacting policies that harm the bulk of their coalition, to the benefit of a narrow band of ideologues. And this is what implementing Trump’s grandest visions for trade policy would likely entail.
Second, the imposition of a universal tariff would roil stock markets. During Trump’s first term in office, he monitored the markets’ performance obsessively, tweeting about it incessantly and suggesting that stock values were a barometer of sound policy, warning in 2018, “If Democrats take over Congress, the stock market will plummet.”
Finally, Trump has recently shown some sensitivity to the interests of his newfound friends in tech, even when those interests conflict with the tenets of rightwing nationalism. Over the holidays, Elon Musk feuded with their co-partisans over the desirability of high-skill immigration and the H-1B visa, which help American tech companies to hire foreign talent. Trump ultimately expressed support for Musk’s position.”
“This is not only unfair but uniquely so. The United States is the only developed nation that taxes based on citizenship rather than residency. We are in terrible company. As the Cato Institute’s Adam Michel writes, “Eritrea’s brutal dictatorship is the only other country to come close, imposing a 2 percent levy on all expatriates.””
“If you want to create a black market in a perfectly legal product, just make regulations and taxes so onerous that many people prefer to buy from illegal vendors to escape being hassled and mugged by the powers that be. As a new study reveals, that’s certainly the case with cigarettes, which remain available for sale across the United States but with much of the trade continuing to involve smokes smuggled from one jurisdiction to another. Since busybody politicians refuse to learn from the ongoing trade, this is a tempting business opportunity for risk-tolerant entrepreneurs as well as low-tax jurisdictions.”
…
“”As tax rates increase, consumers and suppliers search for ways around these costs. In cigarette markets, consumers tend to shop across borders where the tax rates are lower and dealers develop black and gray markets to sell illegally to consumers, paying little or no tax at all.””
…
“At $3.51 per pack, Massachusetts isn’t even the most heavily taxed state when it comes to cigarettes, nor does it have the largest black market in tobacco products. That honor belongs to New York, which last year raised its tax rate to $5.35 per pack (New York City adds another $1.50).
“New York has the highest inbound smuggling activity, with an estimated 54.3 percent of cigarettes consumed in the state deriving from smuggled sources in 2022,” note Hoffer and Macumber-Rosin. “New York is followed by California (46.7 percent), New Mexico (41.2 percent), Massachusetts (39.7 percent), and Washington (36.8 percent).”
The cigarette-tax study authors add that because their tax rates drive people to purchase their smokes from illicit dealers, high-tax states suffered a revenue hit in 2022 of more than $5 billion. Since 2007, they’ve lost out on more than $79 billion.”
“Donald Trump will soon become the second president to serve non-consecutive terms. Naturally, this invites comparison between Trump and the first president to serve non-consecutive terms, Grover Cleveland. In one crucial respect that juxtaposition is both instructive and cruelly ironic.”
…
“When tariffs are too high, Cleveland argued, it means that corrupt politicians and businessmen are able to exploit consumers, often imposing severe hardships through price increases. Just as bad, it means that the government is failing to treat all citizens as equal before the law, instead picking winners and losers in the aforementioned “communism of pelf.”
This was the situation that existed in America during and after the Civil War, when politicians imposed weighty tariffs under the pretext of supporting the nation’s burgeoning business community. While American consumers initially accepted the additional taxation as a wartime necessity, the high rates persisted even after the nascent military-industrial complex had been wound down.
The problem was both simple and intractable: There were thousands of manufacturing, industrial, agricultural, and other business interests that profited from high tariffs. Each special interest group disregarded the national welfare to protect themselves, and as a result, the government accumulated massive surpluses—$113 million in 1886–1887 alone.
Despite this growing crisis, initially, Cleveland did not prioritize tariff reform. For the first two-and-a-half years after taking office in 1885, Cleveland concentrated on rooting out government corruption, which had reached such a nadir that in 1873 Mark Twain dubbed the post-Civil War era as a “Gilded Age.” To the extent that Cleveland’s anti-corruption agenda involved vetoing legislation he deemed financially wasteful, he indirectly picked off some of the rotten fruits that grew from the protectionist tree. However, it was not until 1887 that he shifted his attention to a need for sweeping tariff reform. When he did, he transformed the presidency and America in the process.”
…
“Cleveland’s tariff reform proposals passed the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives but failed in the Republican-controlled Senate. Even worse, despite winning the popular vote, Cleveland lost the 1888 election to Republican nominee Benjamin Harrison amid Electoral College disputes in the key states of New York and Indiana. (Unlike Trump, Cleveland accepted his defeat with grace and peacefully ended his term in 1889.) The Republicans took office and passed a high tariff law (framed by future president William McKinley, then an Ohio congressman). The McKinley tariffs raised the average duty on imports by almost 50 percent, and as Dartmouth University economist Douglas Irwin demonstrated in 1998, these tariffs did little to stimulate the economy even as they imposed considerable suffering on low-income Americans.
This is why, just like Trump, Cleveland was able to comfortably get elected to a non-consecutive term by promising to lower prices. The key difference is that, unlike Trump, Cleveland proposed an intelligent solution to the problem—lowering tariffs, not raising them.
Unfortunately for both Cleveland and the Americans of his time, he would not live to see his vision for tariff reform realized. America plunged into an economic depression shortly after he took office in 1893, compelling Cleveland to confront a number of unrelated crises before he could get to tariff reform. By the time a tariff bill did reach his desk in 1894, special interest groups in both parties had diluted it almost to meaninglessness.”
…
“Tariff reform along the lines Cleveland advocated would not become the law of the land until the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913, which was promoted with far more political effectiveness by Woodrow Wilson, the first Democratic president to serve after Cleveland’s administration. By then, Cleveland had been dead for five years.”
“Trump’s position on tariffs begins with his longstanding misconceptions about international trade, which he erroneously views as a zero-sum game with rules that are rigged against the United States. “We’re subsidizing Canada to the tune [of] over $100 billion a year,” he told Kristen Welker on Meet the Press. “We’re subsidizing Mexico for almost $300 billion.”
Trump was referring to U.S. trade deficits with those countries, which are about half as big as he claimed. Those gaps between exports and imports are not subsidies; they reflect goods that Americans voluntarily purchase, which means they get something of value in exchange for their money.
As Trump sees it, however, trade deficits are inherently bad, and he aims to eliminate them by imposing tariffs. Although that is feasible only if tariffs raise the cost of imports, making them less competitive with domestically produced alternatives, Trump contradicts that logic by insisting that tariffs do not raise prices.
“Americans are not paying for the Tariffs” on Chinese goods, Trump averred in 2019. “They are being paid for compliments of China.”
Trump, the self-described “Tariff Man,” clearly does not understand how tariffs work. They are taxes collected from importers, not from the exporting country.
In theory, exporters could respond by cutting prices, or importers could swallow the additional cost. But study after study has found that the cost of tariffs is paid mainly by American buyers of intermediate goods and finished products.”
“Extending the individual income tax portions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) is supposed to be a good thing, right? After all, who doesn’t love lower taxes? However, data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that, without accompanying spending cuts, these tax cuts are going to cost the government.
If the cuts continue, it’s possible that “the positive effects of lower taxes would be counteracted by the negative effects of higher debt,” according to a Tuesday report from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB).
“Despite claims that tax cuts pay for themselves,” the CRFB adds, “analyses from across the political spectrum have found that the economic effects of extending the expiring parts of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) would offset 1 to 14 percent of the revenue loss – falling well short of the 100 percent needed to pay for itself.”
While the tax cuts would create an economic boost in the short term, increasing gross domestic product (GDP) by around 0.3 percent in 2027 and 2028, the CRFB predicts that the cuts will actually lower projected GDP by 0.08 percent by 2034. Further, the CBO’s data shows that continuing TCJA tax cuts are likely to lead to increasing interest rates over the next decade.
While continuing the cuts “would produce about $90 billion of positive revenue feedback,” according to the CRFB, “those higher interest rates would add $150 billion to the debt, more than counteracting the revenue gains.””
“In an ideal world, everyone who qualifies for an aid program ought to receive its benefits. But the reality is that this is often not the case. Before the pandemic, for example, nearly one-fifth of Americans who qualified for food stamps didn’t receive them. In fact, millions of Americans who are eligible for existing social welfare programs don’t receive all of the benefits they are entitled to.”
…
“Means testing a given social program can have good intentions: Target spending toward the people who need it most. After all, if middle- or high-income people who can afford their groceries or rent get federal assistance in paying for those things, then wouldn’t there be less money to go around for the people who actually need it?
The answer isn’t so straightforward.”
…
“Implementing strict eligibility requirements can be extremely tedious and have unintended consequences.
For starters, let’s look at one of the main reasons lawmakers advocate for means testing: saving taxpayers’ money. But that’s not always what happens. “Though they’re usually framed as ways of curbing government spending, means-tested benefits are often more expensive to provide, on average, than universal benefits, simply because of the administrative support needed to vet and process applicants,” my colleague Li Zhou wrote in 2021.
More than that, means testing reduces how effective antipoverty programs can be because a lot of people miss out on benefits. As Zhou points out, figuring out who qualifies for welfare takes a lot of work, both from the government and potential recipients who have to fill out onerous applications. The paperwork can be daunting and can discourage people from applying. It can also result in errors or delays that would easily be avoided if a program is universal.
There’s also the fact that creating an income threshold creates incentives for people to avoid advancing in their careers or take a higher-paying job. One woman I interviewed a few years ago, for example, told me that after she started a job as a medical assistant and lost access to benefits like food stamps, it became harder to make ends meet for her and her daughter. When lawmakers aggressively means test programs, people like her are often left behind, making it harder to transition out of poverty.
As a result, means testing can seriously limit a welfare program’s potential. According to a report by the Urban Institute, for example, the United States can reduce poverty by more than 30 percent just by ensuring that everyone who is eligible for an existing program receives its benefits. One way to do that is for lawmakers to make more welfare programs universal instead of means-tested.”
…
“There sometimes is an aversion to universal programs because they’re viewed as unnecessarily expensive. But universal programs are often the better choice because of one very simple fact: They are generally much easier and less expensive to administer. Two examples of this are some of the most popular social programs in the country: Social Security and Medicare.
Universal programs might also create less division among taxpayers as to how their money ought to be spent. A lot of opposition to welfare programs comes from the fact that some people simply don’t want to pay for programs they don’t directly benefit from, so eliminating that as a factor can create more support for a given program.
In 2023, following a handful of other states, Minnesota implemented a universal school meal program where all students get free meals. This was in response to the problems that arise when means testing goes too far. Across the country, students in public school pay for their meals depending on their family’s income. But this system has stigmatized students who get a free meal. According to one study, 42 percent of eligible families reported that their kids are less likely to eat their school meal because of the stigma around it.
Minnesota’s program has proven popular so far: In September 2023, shortly after the program took off, the amount of school breakfasts and lunches served increased by 30 percent and 11 percent compared to the previous year, respectively.
While it might not be politically feasible — or, in some cases, necessary — to get rid of means testing for all public subsidies, free school meals also offer an example of what a compromise might look like at the national level. Though Congress hasn’t made school meals free to all, it passed a provision in 2010 that allows schools to provide free meals to all students in districts where at least 25 percent (originally 40 percent) are eligible. The program showed that providing free meals to all lowered food insecurity, even among poor students who already qualified for free meals, by removing stigma. (The community eligibility provision now serves nearly 20 million students.)
As for how universal programs can be paid for, the answer is, yes, imposing higher taxes. It might seem inefficient to give people a benefit if you’re going to essentially take it back from them in taxes, but what you actually end up with is a much more efficient program that is more easily administered and doesn’t leave anyone out.”