“According to the study, reservations today are 46 percent less likely to host wind farms and 110 percent less likely to host solar projects compared to neighboring non-reservation lands. Although the lands provided to Native Americans have historically been less agriculturally productive, those lands are now seen as perfectly conditioned for solar and wind energy, according to research from the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability.
Federal policy, however, continues to pigeonhole Native Americans into farming because of how difficult it can be to use the land for anything else. Since the Dawes Act of 1887, which broke up communal land into parcels among Natives in an attempt to assimilate them into American society, and its subsequent reversal through the Wheeler-Howard Act, Native land policy has been overwhelmingly bureaucratized.
Despite its reversal, the Dawes Act has had long-lasting consequences. Inheritance rules imposed by the law spurred a phenomenon called fractionation, in which parcels of land had to be divided up between all heirs after the owners passed away. As a result, some parcels have hundreds of owners, increasing the cost of development exponentially as the number of owners who needed to be contacted for approval ballooned.
A green light from the Bureau of Indian Affairs is also required for most energy projects on Native lands. “Typically, you have to work with different agencies, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs,” said Sarah Johnston, one of the study’s co-authors, “which, anecdotally, can be quite slow in terms of getting the necessary approvals.” Additionally, ownership records from the Bureau are often incomplete, making cases involving fractionated land even more fraught.
Were reservation lands to host more energy facilities, this would help lower the rate of unelectrified tribal communities. In just Navajo Nation homes, the largest federally recognized tribe in the United States, 21 percent lack electricity.
Altogether, removing regulatory barriers would give Native American tribes the ability to move past the raw deals they’ve gotten throughout history, allowing them to generate electricity, wealth, and prosperity for their communities.”
“”Criminal laws have grown so exuberantly and come to cover so much previously innocent conduct that almost anyone can be arrested for something,” Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch observed in 2019. Gorsuch elaborates on that theme in his new book Over Ruled, showing how the proliferation of criminal penalties has given prosecutors enormous power to ruin people’s lives, resulting in the nearly complete replacement of jury trials with plea bargains.
“Some scholars peg the number of federal statutory crimes at more than 5,000,” Gorsuch and co-author Janie Nitze note, while “estimates suggest that at least 300,000 federal agency regulations carry criminal sanctions.” The fact that neither number is known with precision, they suggest, speaks volumes about the “unpredictable traps for the unwary” set by the government’s ever-expanding rules.
To illustrate “the human toll” of “too much law,” the book tells the story of Florida fisherman John Yates, whose grueling legal odyssey began with the charge that he had discarded undersized red grouper. That alleged act supposedly violated a law aimed at deterring the destruction of potentially incriminating financial records. Gorsuch also recalls the pretrial suicide of 26-year-old computer programmer Aaron Swartz, whom prosecutors threatened with “decades in prison and millions in fines” for downloading a bunch of articles from an online academic library without permission.
Over Ruled emphasizes how overmatched ordinary people are in disputes with bureaucrats empowered to write the rules under which they operate. Those nemeses include officials charged with dispensing government benefits, deciding whether immigrants can remain in the country, and enforcing the frequently arbitrary and petty restrictions inspired by COVID-19. Gorsuch also decries draconian prison sentences and mass incarceration, again illustrating how his supposedly right-wing instincts frequently overlap with progressive concerns. His compassion for people confronted by bewildering, absurdly punitive legal codes defies ideological stereotypes.”
“Northeast Asia undoubtedly benefited from capitalism (private profit-driven production), and
from access to the world market. To this extent the mainstream is correct. But five qualifications
have to be made.
First, for the first several decades the Northeast economies relied not so much on ‘the world
market’ as on ‘empire preference’ to the US market—and to US technologies, US capital, US
military and civilian aid, and US public procurement—thanks to their role in the US’s geopolitical
strategy to contain communism and show the world that ‘capitalism’ was superior to ‘communism’.
Second, the US’s threat perception, its commitment to getting front-line allies economically strong
enough to be a credible defence against communism, and its intense involvement in national
economic policy-making and institution building, kept the national elites relatively unified and not
at each other’s throats. So on the spectrum of ‘weak state/special interest state/common interest
state’ these were special interest states moving towards—with a lot of American help in the first
decades— common interest states.
Third, steered by a developmental mindset, the developmental state was organized differently than
the model neoliberal state. The latter has no strong centre of coordination (because markets played
by private capitalists, not states, are the resource coordinating institution), and has arms-length
relations between the various ministries and between ministries and business. The developmental
state has one or a few powerful centres of coordination and market leadership, a limited role for
the legislature in matters of economic, financial, and security policy, and well-developed
mechanisms of consultation and coordination with private capitalists, in the spirit of ‘embedded
autonomy’.
Fourth, these governments made intensive use of policies and institutions frowned upon in the
neoliberal playbook—such as managed trade, sectoral industrial policy (‘making, not picking,
willing winners’), targeted concessional credit, and capital controls. These instruments were
intended to buffer (not insulate) producers in selected sectors from international competitive
pressure and volatility—so profit-raising protection and subsidies came with performance
conditions, which were enforced. The whole complex would have scored poorly by Washington
Consensus criteria. For example, Taiwan’s financial system was and remains the despair of visiting
western economists. That being said, there is no knock-out evidence on the effects of these
‘government interventions’. The causality is too difficult to disentangle rigorously.
Fifth, from early on they undertook to develop domestic technological capacity, such as
engineering faculties at universities and public laboratories, to aggressively seek out western
technologies and domesticate them for deploying in national firms, and much later to undertake
world-standard innovation and attract back a high proportion of overseas graduate students—this,
rather than rely, as in much of Latin America, on incoming western multinational companies.
Singapore, as noted, did rely on western multinationals—which were left in no doubt as to who
called the shots”
There is an alliance of authoritarian countries that include Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela. They don’t have ideology in common, but they want to maintain authoritarian power over their people. China’s reach doesn’t stay in Asia; they support the autocracy in Venezuela. Russia and Iran also support Venezuela’s dictatorship.
Iran, Russia, and China have illegitimate systems and their government’s fear that their own people will want a system more like America’s. They can never live in full harmony with the United States because the U.S. represents an internal threat to their regimes even when the U.S. does nothing other than stand as another possibility for their people. Therefore, they try to undermine the U.S. and democracy in general in whatever way they can.
“There’s a slight of hand when people declare the United States is a Christian nation. The nation was clearly founded on enlightenment principles that included freedom of religion and separation of church and state. These principles were put into the Constitution, and we know their meaning because we have the writings of the founders. At the same time, the country was a mostly Christian populace whose culture evolved from a Europe that had been Christian for many hundreds of years. Of course much of the ethos of such a society is going to be infused with Christian ideas, which themselves had been infused with Jewish, Roman, and Greek ideas. The country was and is majority Christian; in this sense it was a Christian nation. The country is and has always been heavily influenced by Christian culture, so also in that sense it is a Christian nation. But, at the nation’s founding, the founders explicitly created a government that was not supposed to implement Christianity upon its people, so in that sense it is not a Christian nation. As the country’s religious diversity grows, it becomes less of a Christian nation unless it can maintain some underlying Christian culture that goes beyond religious belief.”