“the U.S. is heavily reliant on Canadian crude oil to make liquid fuels and other petroleum products. Most U.S. refineries were built in the 1970s to accommodate heavy oil from the Middle East and Canada. This was well before the American shale boom, which brought lighter-grade oil to the market. In 2023, nearly 60 percent of crude imports came from Canada and July 2024 saw a record 4.3 million barrels of oil per day imported from the country.
“Canada is by far our largest supplier, and we build refineries specifically to refine heavier Canadian crude,” explains Nick Loris, the executive vice president of policy at C3 Solutions, a free market energy think tank. “Depending on the tariff rate and how long they’re in place, gas prices could rise anywhere from 10-30 cents per gallon, with the Midwest and the Rocky Mountain Region getting hit the hardest,” Loris tells Reason.”
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“tariffs could also harm American nuclear power. Despite generating the most nuclear energy in the world, the U.S. relies on other nations for uranium to fuel its fleet. Canada is the largest supplier of raw uranium (27 percent of imports in 2022), followed by Kazakhstan (25 percent) and Russia (12 percent), the latter of which the U.S. depends on for roughly a quarter of its uranium enrichment needs.
With last year’s passage of a bill to ban imports of Russian uranium signed into law, Canada is primed to play an increasingly important role in America’s uranium supply. Tariffs would threaten this and could increase fuel costs for American nuclear power producers”
“Alaska is an energy behemoth with massive reserves of oil, natural gas, and petroleum. It also, oddly, faces a looming natural gas shortage—not good for a state where half of electricity production depends on the stuff. The problem is that most natural gas deposits are far from population centers and pipelines to transport the gas don’t yet exist and may never be built. So, to get gas to Alaskans, you need to transport it by ship. But federal law requires that only U.S.-flagged liquid natural gas (LNG) carriers be used, and there aren’t any.”
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“A century ago, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (better known as the Jones Act) to prop up the country’s shipping industry. The law “among other things, requires shipping between U.S. ports be conducted by US-flag ships,” according to Cornell Law Schools’s Legal Information Institute. The ships must also be built here. So, to move natural gas from one part of Alaska to another, you need American LNG carriers. And here we find another shortage.
“LNG carriers have not been built in the United States since before 1980, and no LNG carriers are currently registered under the U.S. flag,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office found in 2015. And while there’s lots of demand for more LNG carriers for the export market, not just for Alaska, “U.S. carriers would cost about two to three times as much as similar carriers built in Korean shipyards and would be more expensive to operate.”
U.S. Customs and Border Protection did make an exception to let foreign LNG carriers transport U.S. natural gas to Puerto Rico earlier this year, but only because the gas was first piped to Mexico before being loaded onto ships. Isolated Alaska doesn’t have that option.”
“Ukraine has said it will not extend the transit agreement with Russian state-owned Gazprom in order to deprive Russia of profits that Kyiv says help to finance the war against it.
Moscow’s suspension of gas for Austria, the main receiver of gas via Ukraine, means Russia will now only supply significant gas volumes to Hungary and Slovakia, in Hungary’s case via a pipeline running mostly through Turkey. In contrast, Russia met 40% of the European Union’s gas needs before Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.”
In a series of panels about promoting North American gas, oil, and uranium energy in ways that will boost the economy and make North America strong and independent vis-a-vis world challenges, people are worried about the effects of Trump’s proposed tariffs which will hurt both countries’ economies and make energy more costly.
“Noah acknowledges, in passing, one particular provision of the existing nuclear regulatory framework on the United States that’s very important: radiation is held to the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) standard, which makes it essentially impossible for nuclear to be cost-competitive.
Suppose I had a design for a cost-effective nuclear reactor, and I said I should be allowed to build it, because electricity is good and air pollution is bad. The regulator is going to look at it and say, “Well, that reactor seems awfully cheap to build, why not add a bunch more features to make the radiation levels even lower?” And then I will say, “That would be hideously expensive in a way that is net bad for public health, because it leads to more burning of fossil fuels and worse air pollution.” But the regulator comes back and says, “We’re not using a cost-benefit framework, we’re using ALARA.” And I say, “That doesn’t make sense, coal ash is radioactive — you are creating more radiation by raising my costs.” And the regulator says, “I don’t regulate coal plants, I regulate you — ALARA!”
As Jason Crawford writes, “any technology, any operational improvement, anything that reduces costs, simply gives the regulator more room and more excuse to push for more stringent safety requirements, until the cost once again rises to make nuclear just a bit more expensive than everything else. Actually, it‘s worse than that: it essentially says that if nuclear becomes cheap, then the regulators have not done their job.”
This is a deeply dysfunctional regulatory paradigm, and it reflects the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s origins in 1974 legislation that was explicitly motivated by a belief that the old Atomic Energy Commission was too friendly to the industry.
In 2019, Congress passed the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, which, among other things, “requires the NRC to develop new processes for licensing nuclear reactors, including staged licensing of advanced nuclear reactors.” The hope of NEIMA’s proponents was to change 45 years of the NRC fundamentally being an agency that says “no” to stuff and make them into an agency that would create a regulatory pathway under which new kinds of nuclear reactors could be licensed and built. And after several years, the NRC did get around to writing the new rules for SMRs, but they came up with an even longer and more cumbersome regulatory process.
Earlier this summer, the ADVANCE Act reiterated Congress’s determination for the NRC to change.
But the NRC staff, to the best of my knowledge, fundamentally does not believe that America’s elected officials genuinely want them to make it faster and cheaper to build nuclear reactors. And one reason they don’t believe it is that even though the Biden administration says lots of pro-nuclear stuff, has plenty of pro-nuclear appointees, signed the ADVANCE Act, and has done a lot to help with SMRs in terms of financing, they still coughed-up an NRC nominee who basically supports the status quo. You need a team of political appointees at the agency who are willing to both drive change and also personally take the heat when change makes people mad. You can’t “just use nuclear, bro.” You need to put people in place to actually drive specific policy change in a way that will let the industry grow and work.
And of course, even if you did that, it might not work.”
“The U.S. government has limited influence over those global prices, which are shaped by market and geopolitical factors. Gas prices dropped during the early months of the pandemic, for example, because millions of people stayed home and dramatically reduced their gas consumption. But as the Bureau of Labor Statistics documented, prices surged as society reopened and the economy started to rebound.
While energy prices have consistently been higher under Biden than they were during Trump’s first term, they have dropped from their heights in 2022, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent global prices soaring. As the Agriculture Department noted in February, fuel and oil costs saw significant declines in 2023 and are expected to decline again in 2024, thanks to drops in global energy prices. U.S. oil prices in the past few days have dropped to their lowest level in two years as OPEC+ says it will increase its own oil production later this year and fuel demand in China looks weaker.
And it’s not clear green-lighting more domestic drilling would have much impact on energy costs. For one thing, the U.S. is already producing record amounts of oil and gas, not to mention renewable energy like solar, wind and hydropower. The Biden administration has also approved more permits to drill for oil on federal land than many of its predecessors, even as it moves to restrict how much federal land is available for drilling.
Several economists also told POLITICO that while energy costs are a factor in every part of the food supply chain, they’re just one of many inputs companies consider when setting prices.”
“European industry — and Germany first and foremost — was battered by the surge in energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The bloc rode out the immediate emergency better than expected, finding alternatives to Russian gas, for example, through imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas.
But the hope that European industry would swiftly recover has faded, even as the eurozone economy in the aggregate returns to growth.
Eurostat’s industrial production index for the eurozone remains below its 2021 level, and is trending lower. And policymakers are starting to realize that the turnaround they had expected is not materializing.”
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“The numbers underline the challenge of maintaining Europe’s competitiveness — and relevance — as China and the U.S. race to reshape the global economy within the context of an increasingly acute geopolitical rivalry.”
“Whether LNG is better for the climate than other options is a topic of intense debate. If it replaces coal, then in general, yes. Since it’s made mostly of methane, it burns more cleanly than coal, producing roughly half of the greenhouse gas emissions. But it’s still a fossil fuel that contributes to warming, and every new gas terminal, transport tanker, and power plant implies these emissions will continue for decades more.
By one estimate, US LNG shipments to China reduced the intensity of greenhouse gas emissions — the amount of greenhouse gases released per unit of energy — by as much as 57 percent. Other analyses have also found that countries that import LNG produce power with lower emissions than with local coal. Another advantage is that gas produces fewer air polluting substances like particulates, so turning away from coal has immediate health benefits. And having more cheap gas on the global market could undermine the case for new coal power plants in some countries, if they can secure a reliable gas supplier.
But some environmental activists say this paints too optimistic a picture. For gas importers like the United Kingdom, LNG has a greenhouse gas footprint four times larger than gas extracted locally. Methane is itself a heat-trapping gas, about 30 times more potent than carbon dioxide, so small leaks from gas infrastructure — as little as 0.2 percent — can quickly overwhelm any environmental advantages. The added steps of chilling and shipping gas create even more opportunities for LNG to escape, and the industry has done a poor job of tracking its fugitive emissions. In addition, some LNG exports will simply fill in existing gas needs, as they do in parts of Europe, so the climate impact overall is at best a wash, though likely worse than more locally produced gas. At the same time, renewable energy is already the cheapest source of electricity in many parts of the world, and climate activists argue that gas no longer serves as a bridge to a low-carbon world.”