“”I DOUBT NATO WOULD BE THERE FOR US IF WE REALLY NEEDED THEM,” Trump blasted on Truth Social, while insisting the U.S. would still defend alliance members. “We will always be there for NATO, even if they won’t be there for us.”
Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s collective defense clause, an attack on one member of the alliance is considered an attack on all. The provision has been formally invoked only once — in response to al-Qaida’s 9/11 terror attack against the U.S.”
“I think we’re in a situation where we have not gotten regime change. The same group, minus only Maduro, is still in power, and it’s not at all clear just how much intimidating force that we’ve really got.
There are pressure points. I think they’re in trouble on oil exports and so on. But what are China and Russia and Iran and Cuba going to do in the face of that, just sit back and watch it happen? So, I’m not at all sure what day-after planning there was, because I’m not sure we’re finished with the day yet.
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Trump talked about getting the oil, and I think there would have been a legitimate argument that U.S. oil companies kind of get first dibs to come in — not that we would take it, but that we would get some preference in terms of the ability to present proposals — and we should, at a minimum, get some of that production and maybe a lot of it.
But that’s not how Trump looks at it. He just wants to take control of it, and that’s how he’s going to pay for the military force and sort of everything else he’s been promising.
I just think that’s the kind of limited vision he has. He focuses on what he thinks he understands, the tangible economic asset.
The idea that American oil companies are just lining up to go invest in Venezuela is just flatly wrong, and the idea that somehow there will be a quick transformation of the incredibly dilapidated Venezuelan oil infrastructure that’s going to suddenly turn the production back online is fantasy, too.
It’s going to take tens of billions of dollars over a sustained period of time before they get this thing back up and running the way it used to be.
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I think we do have full authority under international law to go after Maduro because what we would consider the legitimate government today is the opposition, with Maduro having stolen both the 2018 and 2024 presidential elections.
When you basically go back to dealing with the old regime and undercut the legitimate government, you’re giving Russia and China the precedent that they don’t have.
There’s nobody in Ukraine calling for Russian intervention, and the government of Taiwan certainly isn’t calling for Chinese intervention.
So the Venezuelan case as it stands now is quite different from those, but that’s not the way Trump’s behaving, and it’s the mistakes he’s making today that lend greater credence to a Russian or a Chinese effort to say, well, we’re just doing what the U.S. did in Venezuela.
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what if they decide they’re not going to do what we want six months from now? Where are we going to be at that point? And I don’t think Trump has addressed that.”
“Internet tracking group NetBlocks reported a loss of internet connectivity in Caracas that occurred around the same time as power cuts in the country. Venezuela’s electric energy ministry said Monday that power cuts in some areas of the country were due to U.S. attacks.
Chinese-made radar systems and Russian-made air defense systems were also reportedly disrupted during the strikes, hampering the Venezuelan government’s ability to effectively respond.
In a statement, a Space Command spokesperson declined to comment on details of its operations, but noted that “space-based capabilities such as Positioning, Navigation and Timing and satellite communications are foundational to all modern military activities,” and that “U.S. Space Command possesses the means and willingness to employ combat-credible capabilities that deter and counter our opponents.”
These efforts point to a more aggressive use of U.S. military technology and cyber expertise in foreign operations — a shift that the administration has repeatedly touted since Trump’s first term. In 2018, a classified national security policy memorandum was signed, expanding the Pentagon’s authorities to conduct offensive cyber strikes. This policy was later refined under the Biden administration.
Joshua Steinman, who served as senior director for cyber on the National Security Council under the first Trump administration, said that the Venezuela strikes demonstrate that the U.S. “is finally in a place where we can use cyber as a tool of national power.””
“Industry analysts have warned that even in the best of circumstances, it would take tens of billions of dollars and more than a decade to completely rebuild Venezuela’s oil fields. Oil executives have told POLITICO that it would be a tough battle to convince their shareholders to make such an investment when other oil fields around the globe offer easier returns.”
Venezuela is a direct security threat to the United States because they cooperate militarily with countries like Iran who considered giving missiles to Venezuela that can hit the US.
Because the Maduro regime is still in charge in Venezuela, it seems likely that these military ties will continue, even if they take a temporary pause.
Venezuela isn’t simply ruled by a dictator or a military junta, but by criminals who are in criminal enterprises to get rich. That makes it harder to negotiate away the rulers because the government is actually run by criminals who want to maintain their criminal enterprises.
Venezuela is a more homogenous country than Iraq, and it has a history of democracy before the authoritarian socialists took over.
Making a profit of Venezuelan’s oil will be difficult. Venezuela is in deep debt; those debtors will demand the first cut on any profits. Efficiently exploiting Venezuela’s oil will require tons of investment in both oil drilling and the infrastructure of the country.Trump doesn’t think like a businessman, but a Marxist. He sees resources and wants to steal it for his whims. The US is a wealthy country who can trade for what it needs; it doesn’t need to use force to take resources in another country.
Trump appeared to have meen riffing when he said that the US would run Venezuela. There appears to be no plan for the US to run Venezuela.
The US has never perfectly followed international law, but it did generally follow and enforce norms against overthrowing a leader or regime without assuming responsibility for the consequences. In Venezuela, Trump kidnapped the country’s leader and then took little to no responsibility to nation-build, just demanding oil from the new leader if she doesn’t want to meet a similar fate.
The Trump administration sometimes appeal to spheres of influence, saying they shouldn’t have to ignore a threat in this hemisphere. This is dangerous because it justifies other great powers doing the same thing and makes it harder for the US to rally a coalition against such actions because the US looks hypocritical. If the US can change Venezuela’s leader at will, why can’t China do it to South Korea?
“The fraud, while egregious, does not justify revoking legal protections for Somali immigrants: While the lion’s share of this monumental theft was likely perpetrated by people of Somali descent, the vast majority of this community had nothing to do it.”
“Of the roughly 281,000 people arrested by ICE from January 20 through December 9, fewer than 10,000 individuals are classified as “the worst of the worst” by the DHS, according to analysis done by the Cato Institute’s Director of Immigration Studies, David Bier. Of those classified, “a majority (56 percent) of the list has not been charged or convicted of a violent crime,” according to Bier, “and nearly a quarter…had nothing but a vice, immigration (e.g., illegal entry), or non-DUI traffic charge.” Thousands of faces and names have been placed on the DHS’ list for minor offenses, like drug possession charges.
The DHS database tracks closely with previous findings by Bier. After analyzing data on immigration arrests between October 1, 2024, and June 14, 2025, Bier found that 65 percent of people arrested by ICE had no criminal convictions, and 93 percent had no violent convictions. Even more recently, data on individuals booked into ICE custody since October 1 showed an increase in the number of detainees with no criminal convictions—73 percent—and even fewer people with violent convictions—only 5 percent. (Note that Bier’s analysis estimated an even higher percentage of violent criminals in ICE custody than the new DHS database.)
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It’s clear the DHS is using a relatively small number of immigrants who have committed violent crimes to justify a slew of rights violations, including excessive force, due process violations, and overcrowded, inhumane conditions in detention facilities as a means to achieve one of the Trump administration’s chief goals: deporting 1 million people by the end of the year. Given this reality, Noem’s suggestion that the current methods of immigration enforcement are done in the name of following the law rings hollow.”