“As members of federal law enforcement, ICE officers have the authority to stop, detain and arrest people they believe to be in the country illegally. They need a warrant to arrest someone inside a private home or business. In public spaces, they can make arrests without a warrant, but they must have cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is violating immigration laws.
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“By the letter of the law, ICE only has the authority to detain, arrest or deport people who are believed to be in the country illegally.
In practice, however, there are many accounts of American citizens being caught up in the administration’s raids. The news site ProPublica identified upward of 170 incidents where citizens were held by immigration authorities, including some who were detained even after showing a legal government ID.
ICE can detain citizens if they allegedly commit a crime, such as interfering with an immigration operation or assaulting officers. ProPublica’s list includes 130 people who were held for alleged infractions, though those cases “often wilted under scrutiny” and very few resulted in convictions.
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ICE reported that it had conducted 622,000 deportations since the start of Trump’s second term on Jan. 20, 2025. While that’s well short of the goal of 1 million annual deportations the administration had set for itself, it’s still enough to shatter the previous annual record of 316,000 set during Barack Obama’s presidency.”
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/article/can-ice-agents-detain-us-citizens-what-powers-do-they-have-to-arrest-people-your-most-common-questions-answered-194725171.html
“Cártel de los Soles “is actually a slang term, invented by the Venezuelan media in the 1990s, for officials who are corrupted by drug money.” As Savage explained in November, citing “a range of specialists in Latin American criminal and narcotics issues,” Cártel de los Soles “is not a literal organization” but rather “a figure of speech in Venezuela.”
In 2020, in other words, the Justice Department made a pretty embarrassing mistake, which it has sought to rectify in the revised indictment. Yet the Treasury Department and the State Department are still listing Cártel de los Soles, which federal prosecutors now say refers to “a patronage system” created by a bunch of corrupt government officials, as an FTO, which under federal law means “a foreign organization” that “engages in terrorist activity” threatening “the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.””
“here’s the most important thing about free trade that Trump fails to grasp: It is voluntary and consensual.
Rolling into Greenland with guns blazing—or making enough threats that Denmark eventually hands the island over to avoid that possibility—is the exact opposite of that. Trump’s centralized, nationalistic view of the world has no room for individuals or their consent. What do the people of Greenland want? What do the people of Denmark want? Heck, most Americans are not very keen on the idea of their government seizing Greenland. It’s not quite accurate to say that no one wants this—some very powerful people unfortunately do—but this would be something that the U.S. government would be doing against the will of most of the individuals involved in the transaction. That should matter—a lot.
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it is encouraging to see that the Trump administration is putting together an offer that will reportedly be presented directly to the semiautonomous government of Greenland. The Economist reports that the deal includes giving Greenland the same status as the Marshall Islands and some other small Pacific islands.
The people of Greenland have the right to vote on their own future. If Trump’s deal is accepted, then Denmark (and others) should stand aside. But it certainly seems like that deal would have had a better chance of being accepted without all the bellicosity that has gone along with it.
Again, one of the glorious things about free trade is that no one points a gun (or the whole U.S. military’s terrifying arsenal) at you to make a deal happen. Individuals buy and sell things when and how it makes sense for them to do it. Yes, it is impossible to apply that logic to every aspect of international geopolitics, but presidents ought to nudge the world toward more trade and less war whenever possible. Trump is doing the opposite.”
It’s not clear how long Venezuela will remain stable. There is a careful political balance to maintain stability. It’s also not clear how long the powers in Venezuela will put up with the US domineering over them. The US can destroy shit, but the Venezuelans can release chaos within Venezuela. Gangs in Venezuela are very powerful. The Venezuelan military doesn’t fully control the country.
Oil companies don’t want to invest in a country that requires huge investment and may not be stable, so their investment will likely need to be subsidized by the taxpayer.
The US is in its weakest position compared to China. The US’s global trade war makes it less able to threaten China with a coalition of countries working together to counter it economically, and the US’s trade war with China revealed America’s severe weaknesses, which is why the US keeps backing down when the bilateral trade war reaches extremes. China was starting to understand and respond to a more coalitional strategy when that got blown up with a change of president.
The uncertainty of Trump’s tariffs have hurt small businesses and people who buy from them. If people can’t be sure how much something will cost, sometimes they just hold off on that economic activity.
A lot of internet posts and comments about the ICE shooting are bots or foreign trolls trying to weaken America by riling up its people. Social media companies make money when these bots, trolls, and foreign adversaries are successful.
“I think we’re in a situation where we have not gotten regime change. The same group, minus only Maduro, is still in power, and it’s not at all clear just how much intimidating force that we’ve really got.
There are pressure points. I think they’re in trouble on oil exports and so on. But what are China and Russia and Iran and Cuba going to do in the face of that, just sit back and watch it happen? So, I’m not at all sure what day-after planning there was, because I’m not sure we’re finished with the day yet.
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Trump talked about getting the oil, and I think there would have been a legitimate argument that U.S. oil companies kind of get first dibs to come in — not that we would take it, but that we would get some preference in terms of the ability to present proposals — and we should, at a minimum, get some of that production and maybe a lot of it.
But that’s not how Trump looks at it. He just wants to take control of it, and that’s how he’s going to pay for the military force and sort of everything else he’s been promising.
I just think that’s the kind of limited vision he has. He focuses on what he thinks he understands, the tangible economic asset.
The idea that American oil companies are just lining up to go invest in Venezuela is just flatly wrong, and the idea that somehow there will be a quick transformation of the incredibly dilapidated Venezuelan oil infrastructure that’s going to suddenly turn the production back online is fantasy, too.
It’s going to take tens of billions of dollars over a sustained period of time before they get this thing back up and running the way it used to be.
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I think we do have full authority under international law to go after Maduro because what we would consider the legitimate government today is the opposition, with Maduro having stolen both the 2018 and 2024 presidential elections.
When you basically go back to dealing with the old regime and undercut the legitimate government, you’re giving Russia and China the precedent that they don’t have.
There’s nobody in Ukraine calling for Russian intervention, and the government of Taiwan certainly isn’t calling for Chinese intervention.
So the Venezuelan case as it stands now is quite different from those, but that’s not the way Trump’s behaving, and it’s the mistakes he’s making today that lend greater credence to a Russian or a Chinese effort to say, well, we’re just doing what the U.S. did in Venezuela.
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what if they decide they’re not going to do what we want six months from now? Where are we going to be at that point? And I don’t think Trump has addressed that.”
“Industry analysts have warned that even in the best of circumstances, it would take tens of billions of dollars and more than a decade to completely rebuild Venezuela’s oil fields. Oil executives have told POLITICO that it would be a tough battle to convince their shareholders to make such an investment when other oil fields around the globe offer easier returns.”