“Figures close to the Trump campaign like Tucker Carlson and Elon Musk have openly endorsed the view that Crimea is rightfully Russian.
Trump overturned decades of US policy and international consensus by recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which he has described as a snap decision made after a quick history lesson from his ambassador to Israel and his son-in-law Jared Kushner. He did the same for Morocco’s claims over the disputed region of Western Sahara, in return for Morocco recognizing Israel. (In fairness, the Biden administration hasn’t reversed either of these moves — once the taboo is broken, it’s hard to reestablish.)”
“During his first term, from 2017 to 2021, Trump withdrew the US from multiple international agreements, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), often called the Iran deal. That agreement, negotiated in 2015 under President Barack Obama, essentially eased US sanctions on Iran in exchange for curtailing its nuclear program and allowing greater international oversight of it.
“The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into,” Trump said when the agreement was terminated in 2018. Since then, Iran has built up its stockpile of enriched uranium and increased its missile supply, reportedly bringing the program much closer to developing nuclear capabilities — despite the Trump administration’s promise that Iran would never have them.
Trump also pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, which commits all signatories to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Other diplomatic casualties of the Trump administration include the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a Cold War-era pact between the US and Russia limiting the development of short- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons; the Open Skies Treaty, which allows signatories to conduct military reconnaissance flyovers; and two international migration agreements.
Trump also repeatedly critiqued NATO during his first term. He argued the other countries in the military alliance weren’t spending enough on defense (and they did begin to spend more), questioned whether the organization was still necessary, and in 2020 withdrew almost 10,000 troops stationed in Germany, a decision Vice President Kamala Harris’s foreign policy adviser Philip Gordon said seemed “designed to send a message about the limit of what Americans are prepared to spend to defend foreign borders and, more broadly, uphold world order.””
“Two days before the election, the Wall Street Journal reported that Western security services believed two incendiary devices seized on board planes in Europe over the summer were a test run for a Russian operation to start fires on US-bound planes. The devices detonated without injuries at logistics hubs in Germany and the UK, but the head of Poland’s intelligence agency said, “I’m not sure the political leaders of Russia are aware of the consequences if one of these packages exploded, causing a mass casualty event.” The Russian government has denied involvement.”
…
“Russian leaders reacted with open jubilation to Trump’s victory in 2016 but were largely disappointed with his administration, which, for all his kind words for Putin, also saw a raft of new sanctions against Moscow and the sale of anti-tank weapons to Ukraine.
Moscow is being much more cautious this time around. In a statement Wednesday responding to Trump’s victory, the Russian foreign ministry credited him with countering the “globalist” course of America’s current administration. It also added, “We have no illusions about the president-elect, who is well known in Russia … the US ruling political elite adheres to anti-Russia principles and the policy of ‘containing Moscow.’ This line does not depend on changes in America’s domestic political barometer.”
One of the risks of engaging in gray zone tactics is that you can’t always be sure how your opponent will react, and it’s difficult to know when a red line is finally crossed. Trump, for one, has prided himself on his unpredictability. Like everyone else after what happened on Tuesday, Putin is likely waiting to see what comes next.”
“When asked why Harris has not distinguished herself by opposing these measures, Lincicome notes that supporting tariffs is just part of the “conventional wisdom in Washington today” even if polls may not completely support this assertion. “The view among the political experts is that elections are won or lost in a few places with a few votes,” and those critical “voters like tariffs.”
Given the IMF’s projections, bipartisan support for tariffs could lead to increased costs and slower economic growth for Americans regardless of who wins in November. ”
…
“former President Donald Trump floated a specific 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods alongside a 10 percent across-the-board tariff, which he recently increased to 20 percent. “It’s just what he thinks galvanized an audience,” Scott Lincicome, vice president of general economics and Stiefel Trade Policy Center at the Cato Institute, tells Reason. “Let’s face it, none of this has any rigorous econometric modeling behind it, so it could be as simple as he thinks 20 percent sounds better.”
“Taking the candidates at their word, you would have to say that Trump’s tariffs would be orders of magnitude worse than what Kamala Harris might do, or say she will do,” Lincicome adds.”
“The US Navy has been battling the Houthis and some of Iran’s best weaponry in the Red Sea and changing some of the ways it fights to defeat them, America’s top naval officer said this week.
Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the chief of naval operations, said this week that the Navy is taking away many lessons from its almost yearlong fight against the Houthis, including the fact that drones are fundamentally changing warfare.
The Houthis, a Yemen-based rebel group that Iran has armed and supported for years, have used aerial and surface drones to attack key merchant shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and threaten US Navy ships since last fall. The militants have also fired anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles at vessels.
US warships and aircraft, in partnership with allies, have been intercepting these threats. Just last week, American forces engaged a number of Houthi drones and missiles.
“We’re continuing to learn,” Franchetti responded to questions at a Wednesday Defense Writers Group event. “And again, I’ll just go back to the changing tactics, techniques and procedures based on adversaries.”
“The Houthis are using the best Iranian technology, and we know that we need to be able to defeat that,” she added. “And again, our ships are doing an amazing job. And our aircraft.””
…
“In this fight, the Navy has fired well over $1.1 billion worth of munitions fighting the Houthis, a figure that covers hundreds of air-launched weapons and ship-fired missiles that have been used to take out rebel weaponry, both missiles and drones.
The increasing use of unmanned systems, such as aerial strike platforms and naval drones, has been seen in other conflicts, most notably the war in Ukraine.
Ukraine, for instance, has built up a formidable arsenal of domestically produced naval drones and has used these systems to target Russian warships and ports around the Black Sea. Even though Kyiv lacks a proper navy, it has demonstrated it can still cause problems through this asymmetrical style of warfare.
“I think Ukraine has shown us that you can innovate on the battlefield,” Franchetti said. “I want to innovate before the battlefield so we can stay ahead of any adversary any time.””
Iran, Russia, and China have illegitimate systems and their government’s fear that their own people will want a system more like America’s. They can never live in full harmony with the United States because the U.S. represents an internal threat to their regimes even when the U.S. does nothing other than stand as another possibility for their people. Therefore, they try to undermine the U.S. and democracy in general in whatever way they can.
“For Washington, the question that really matters is Ishiba’s approach to the military relationship with America.
Here Ishiba has sounded more disruptive than either the Japanese or U.S. establishment would like. He approached one third rail by calling for the revision of the agreement on the deployment of U.S. forces here. He went for another in wanting to amend the constitutional provisions on Japanese pacifism. He has talked about an Asian version of NATO, which would take Japan from a security vassal of the U.S. to a peer, though still a close ally.
“He could be a problem for the U.S.,” says Gerry Curtis, the retired Columbia scholar of Japan who lives much of the year here. “He thinks the deal with the U.S. is outdated, has an occupation stink to it.” Ishiba is, as one of the preeminent Japan watchers in Washington Ken Weinstein texted me, “hardest for Americans to read of the major candidates.”
So what’s going on? A Japanese official who knows Ishiba offered the 60/40 theory over lunch the day after Ishiba’s victory. Every other similar status of forces agreement with the U.S., from Germany to South Korea to Italy, was revised in the last half century. Japan’s dates to 1960. Ishiba wants a deal to allow Japanese forces to base and train in the U.S. — in effect to become even more like a normal army than a self defense force. Abe took Japan down this road, and Kishida continued by boosting spending (Japan’s defense budget is the third-biggest in the world). But neither of Ishiba’s predecessors put the status agreement explicitly on the table the way Ishiba has. So 60 percent of Ishiba’s motivation is “to enhance deterrence and strengthen the alliance,” this official said. The other 40 percent? That’s about “restoring Japanese sovereignty,” and that’s the bit that makes Washington nervous.
Speaking after this victory, Ishiba said the time wasn’t right to raise any of these security questions. This will be a topic of discussion with the next U.S. president and shouldn’t even be mentioned before Election Day in November.
The other topic that will test bilateral relations is America’s more protectionist trade policies under both Trump and Biden administrations and the high cost to Japanese manufacturers of enforcing the U.S.-inspired restrictions on technology transfers to China. “Japan is hurting right now because of American policies,” says Koll.
The new Japanese prime minister is “a realist,” says Hiro Akita, the Japanese business daily Nikkei’s foreign affairs specialist, who knows him. Ishiba thinks that Japan has to adjust to a changing world, he says. The next prime minister is no Japanese Charles de Gaulle who’ll seek to push America back as the old French leader did there half a century ago, he adds.
But still, this at first undramatic leadership change in Tokyo does potentially bring chop to the waters of the Japanese-American relationship that have been especially placid of late.”