“the four most prominent politicians in the country (sorry, Tim Walz) agree: U.S. Steel, a private company, should not be allowed to conduct a transaction with another private company unless the federal government agrees.
This is absurd—particularly because the deal is obviously in the best interest of U.S. Steel.
“We’ll admit that the competition for the dumbest economic policy is fierce these days—with prices controls on food, a 10% across-the-board tariff, and national rent control on the table,” opined The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board this week. “But opposition to the Nippon deal deserves careful consideration for this distinct dishonor given the deal’s manifest benefits and nonexistent harm.”
Indeed, Nippon’s plan to buy U.S. Steel gives the legacy steelmaker something that Trump’s tariffs and Biden’s blather about blue-collar jobs never could: A chance to actually become more competitive in the global marketplace. Among other things, Nippon has promised to invest $2.7 billion in revamping U.S. Steel’s plants.”
“Despite international sanctions meant to cripple Russia’s war machine, Russia has maintained an edge over Ukraine when it comes to artillery production and rate of fire.
Over a dozen analysts from the Royal United Services Institute wrote in a new report that Russia’s artillery advantage “is the single greatest determinant of the distribution of casualties and equipment loss, the balance of military initiative, the calculus of what is operationally possible, and thus the political perception of the trajectory of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”
Russian artillery is estimated to be responsible for more than 70 percent of Ukraine’s combat casualties.
The analysts at RUSI said that the West needs to disrupt the industries that are keeping Russia’s deadly and destructive howitzers firing before it’s too late for Ukraine.
Russia’s defense industry is growing through new facilities, supply imports, and mass recruitment, the analysts said. They said that, without interruption, Moscow will be better poised to strengthen its position in Ukraine within the next few years.
The report explained that “Russia is self-sufficient in many of its needs, especially in raw materials like iron ore, and may have enough machine tools and stored howitzers from the Soviet era to support its war in Ukraine.”
However, the analysts said, “the longer the war continues, the more Russia’s dependencies on foreign suppliers will become a weakness.”
…
“These vulnerabilities include placing sanctions on the supply of essential materials to Russia, preemptive purchasing of raw materials on the open market to prevent them from falling into the hands of hostile nations, or putting diplomatic pressure on countries to examine their domestic companies that are exporting goods to Russia.
One example the RUSI report gave was targeting chrome ore imports for barrel production. Another involved hindering the flow of machining equipment into Russia.
The analysts said that Ukraine’s Western partners should immediately prioritize disrupting Russia’s artillery supply chain because doing so for prolonged periods will make it more difficult for Moscow to maintain its howitzers and artillery ammunition.
This is critical for Ukraine. The analysts warned that “left on its current trajectory, Russian fire superiority will increase year-on-year and become less vulnerable to external disruption through pressure on the supply chain.”
The task potentially becomes even more urgent for the West as Russia continues to increase its security ties with China, Iran, and North Korea. The US has publicly expressed concern over Moscow’s deepening military relationships with its rivals and foes over the past few years.
Ukraine has managed to reduce Russia’s long-held artillery advantage and is increasingly taking steps to degrade its stockpiles of shells by using long-range drones to attack ammunition depots inside Russia, but more is needed to break Russia’s edge.”
“Unfortunately, the poll also suggests that Americans—just like their elected officials—may be a bit confused on the subject.
Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated being “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” “about rising prices of things you buy because of trade tariffs.” But a majority would also support imposing tariffs on certain products, under certain conditions, if they felt it would help American businesses. For example, 62 percent said they would support “adding a tariff to blue jeans sold in the US that are manufactured in other countries to boost production and jobs in the American blue jean industry”—though, notably, 66 percent would oppose a tariff if it raised the price of a pair of jeans by $10.
Further, when asked, “From what you’ve read and heard, who primarily is responsible for paying for the cost of a U.S. tariff,” only 47 percent answered that it was American consumers. The next highest answer was “Not sure” at 20 percent, followed by 15 percent who said the U.S. government pays, 12 percent who said foreign companies pay, and 5 percent who said foreign governments pay the tariffs.
Despite Trump’s claims that exporting countries pay tariffs, it is indeed consumers who pay in the form of higher prices. On the campaign trail in 2019, Biden claimed—accurately—that “Trump doesn’t get the basics. He thinks his tariffs are being paid by China. Any freshman econ student could tell you that the American people are paying his tariffs.” And yet as recently as last month, Biden was proposing 25 percent tariffs on imports from Mexico that use Chinese steel.
While not entirely consistent on the subject, the survey suggests that Americans largely recognize the positive effects of international free trade. It’s a shame, then, that our politicians don’t.”
“During former President Donald Trump’s term in office, he promised that higher tariffs on American imports would reduce the country’s large trade deficit.
At the time, many economists disputed that notion. Tariffs might marginally reduce the import side of the trade ledger, but they also reduce economic output (and therefore exports), so the net effect on the trade deficit was likely to be minuscule, they warned.
No matter. In 2017, the White House’s official Trade Policy Agenda highlighted how America’s manufacturing trade deficit had grown from $317 billion in 2000 to $648 billion in 2016. That was evidence, the document claimed, that greater levels of trade had triggered “a period of slowed GDP growth, weak employment growth, and sharp net loss of manufacturing employment in the United States.”
You know what happened next. Tariffs were raised. Then more tariffs were added. President Joe Biden took over and left Trump’s higher tariffs in place. American businesses and consumers paid the cost of those higher taxes. The average tariff rate on imports to the United States has climbed from 1.5 percent to over 3 percent, and annual tariff revenue has nearly tripled.
So what happened to the trade deficit? It didn’t fall.
In 2017, the last full year before Trump’s tariffs were imposed, America’s overall trade deficit was $517 billion. By 2023, it had grown to $785 billion, according to new Census Bureau data.
The story is the same when you look at the manufacturing trade deficit, the narrower category that the Trump administration had highlighted in that 2017 report. It climbed to over $1 trillion by 2021, nearly 60 percent higher than the 2016 figure that was cited by the White House as evidence that free trade was a failure.
Rather than reducing the manufacturing trade deficit, the higher tariffs likely led to its sharp increase, writes Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. Trade Representative. “Manufacturers import goods so as to turn them into other goods, and are big tariff payers,” writes Gresser in a post for the Progressive Policy Institute, where he now works as vice president for trade policy. “So the tariffs raised the costs of industries like automobiles, machinery, and toolmaking; they faced a bit more challenges competing against imports and succeeding as exporters; and the overall goods/services deficit grew more concentrated in manufacturing.””
“”I don’t think we’re going to see a deal like we saw in the first term,” Robert O’Brien, Trump’s fourth and final national security advisor, told Chalfant. “I think people were generally happy with [the previous deal], but as it turned out, the Chinese didn’t honor it.””