“China banned the export of gallium, germanium, antimony, and industrial diamonds to the U.S., in response to U.S. trade and investment restrictions on Chinese technology companies. Though tit-for-tat tariffs occasionally lead to bilateral trade agreements, protectionism is more frequently a response in kind. China’s rare materials ban is the latest such response in the ongoing U.S.–China semiconductor trade war.”
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“The technological trade war reduces the productive and military capacity of both countries, not just China. Technonationalism harms American and Chinese consumers, hinders economic growth, reduces cross-cultural cooperation, and makes aggression more attractive.”
“a one percentage point increase in imports from China caused a 1.9 percent decline in U.S. consumer prices, saving a representative American household roughly $1,500 a year”
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“prices are not just about prices. When consumers have more purchasing power, they use it to buy goods and services in other, more high-productive sectors. Higher tariffs would lead to lost jobs, and inputs would become more expensive for American producers.
Some research suggests that competition from international trade can lead to better wages in new roles for U.S. workers. A 2017 paper by the economist Ildikó Magyari estimates that the American companies most exposed to Chinese imports expanded employment 2 percent more per year than other companies did. Some of these were manufacturing jobs—with higher wages, because they are in the stages of production where workers add more value—and some were complementary service jobs, in such areas as engineering, design, research and development, and marketing.
Apple offers a fascinating example. Trump has often complained that China is the biggest beneficiary of the iPhone, just because the devices are often assembled there. But when researchers Kenneth L. Kraemer, Greg Linden, and Jason Dedrick disassembled an iPhone 7 in 2018, they found that almost all of its value was captured by Western producers of parts, including hundreds of thousands of American researchers, designers, programmers, salespeople, marketers, retailers, and warehouse workers. China just got 1.3 percent of the price paid for an iPhone, and that offshoring made it possible to move U.S. labor to the more value-added parts of the supply chain.”
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“more than a million American jobs depend directly on exports to Chinese consumers. About 0.5 percent of the U.S. work force would lose their jobs if the U.S. lost access to its third-largest goods exporting market.”
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“more opportunities would be lost in the future, since protectionism reduces competition and innovation. If the United States shuts its doors to the best manufacturers of, say, electric cars, that may save some jobs in the short term, but it will turn the U.S. into a fenced-off auto show for more expensive and less efficient vehicles. American consumers will have to pay much more, and foreign consumers will be much less interested.”
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“A United States bent on decoupling from China risks pushing many more innovators and entrepreneurs to the Far East. On paper there are good reasons to stop the export of sensitive technologies to geopolitical rivals, but what good does it do to fence in a geopolitical rival if cutting-edge producers feel the need to join that rival behind the fence?
One German producer of lasers and chip toolmakers, Trumpf, has faced increased obstacles and costly delays after the U.S. government pushed Germany to restrict its exports to China. In response, Trumpf moved some of its 3D-laser-cutting production to China.”
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“This comes from a company in one of America’s closest allies, a country dependent on America’s security guarantees. Imagine how countries diplomatically closer to China will react if forced to choose between Beijing and Washington.”
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“When economies slow, governments have a harder time keeping the populace satisfied. That often leads them to crack down on dissent. China is now doing the bare minimum to fit into the global order, and it has an awful human rights and civil liberties record at home. There is a great risk that a declining, more isolated, and less interdependent China could be much worse on both fronts.”
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“If a rising power can see a future in which it prospers and is allowed to take its place in the established world order—or become so dominant that it can easily replace that order—it makes sense to hide its strengths and bide its time, as Deng Xiaoping encouraged the Chinese to do. But delay is defeat if further rapid growth seems impossible: if it suffers demographic decline, or if geopolitical rivals decide to starve it of resources or markets. Then the country must either accept that it will never realize its grand ambitions, or lash out.”
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“Xi knows an invasion of Taiwan would result in an economic war with the West that would cause China tremendous pain. But what if China had already been deprived of those lucrative markets and had already lost access to investments and technologies it needs?”
“Any new tariffs imposed by the incoming Trump administration will function the same way as every other tariff: It will drain wealth from American consumers and businesses to enrich the U.S. Treasury. That’s what tax increases do, even when they are proposed by a Republican president and cheered by a crowd of Republican lawmakers, donors, and administration officials.
Indeed, study after study after study has found that the tariffs Trump levied during his first tenure were paid nearly entirely by American consumers and businesses.”
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“The big change Trump is proposing this time around is the creation of a new “External Revenue Service” that will collect tariff revenue. The exact contours of that new agency are still unclear, but it is probably best thought of as a public relations maneuver rather than a meaningful policy change. After all, there’s already a governmental entity that handles tariff collection—that’s the “customs” in U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Changing the name won’t change anything about the transactions that occur.”
“Trump told reporters Monday night that he’s thinking of imposing tariffs of up to 25 percent on Mexican and Canadian goods. The Peterson Institute for International Economics recently published a study finding that such tariffs “would slow growth and accelerate inflation in all three countries.”
Though the details of Trump’s tariffs remain uncertain, he promised in his inauguration speech to establish an “External Revenue Service [ERS] to collect all tariffs, duties, and revenues,…massive amounts of money” from foreign sources. The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to establish the ERS on Monday night by the America First Trade Policy order. Howard Lutnick, Trump’s pick to run the Commerce Department, said that “the External Revenue Service will put up tariffs, or walls that protect you.” They will do just the opposite.
As Reason’s Eric Boehm explains, “The tariffs Trump levied during his first tenure were paid nearly entirely by American consumers and businesses.” Trump has to choose: Complement his deregulatory agenda with free trade policies that decrease the price of consumer goods, manufacturing, and production, or hinder them with protectionism that benefits select industries at the expense of the American people. Let’s hope the president chooses the former.”
“On the campaign trail, Trump pledged to put a tariff of between 10 percent and 20 percent on all imports to the United States, along with a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and a 25 percent import surcharge on Canadian and Mexican wares — at least, until our neighbors choke off the flow of all migrants and drugs across America’s northern and southern borders.
This protectionist agenda is far more radical than anything Trump attempted during his first term. It threatens to hamper American tech companies by increasing the cost of semiconductors, depress stock valuations by reducing economic growth and fueling a global trade war, and disrupt the US auto industry, whose supply chains were built around the presumption of duty-free trade with Mexico.
Thus, American investors, executives, and entrepreneurs watched Trump’s first day in office with bated breath: Would his inaugural address and initial executive orders prioritize corporate America’s financial interest in relatively free global exchange — or his own ideological fixation on trade deficits?
Trump’s Day 1 actions did not fully clarify his priorities on this front. In his inaugural speech, the president reiterated his broad commitment to protectionism. Meanwhile, his administration prepared to launch federal investigations into America’s trade deficit in general, as well as the trade practices of China, Mexico, and Canada in particular.
Nevertheless, Trump did not actually establish any new tariffs on his first day in office, as his administration’s arch-protectionists had hoped that he would.
Investors interpreted Trump’s caution as a sign that he would be heeding his advisers’ push for a more limited and incremental tariff policy; stocks rose Monday while the US dollar fell (stiff tariffs would increase the value of America’s currency).
Wall Street’s relief may be premature. Trump appears as ideologically perturbed by America’s trade deficit as ever.”
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“Imposing even a 10 percent tariff on all imported goods would not only harm various business interests, but would also likely increase costs for consumers. Thus, such a duty would harm both Trump’s donors and voters.
If Trump’s first term is any guide, his universal tariff would not even redound to the benefit of American manufacturers, who would be vulnerable to higher costs and retaliatory tariffs from foreign nations. Generally speaking, presidents seek to avoid enacting policies that harm the bulk of their coalition, to the benefit of a narrow band of ideologues. And this is what implementing Trump’s grandest visions for trade policy would likely entail.
Second, the imposition of a universal tariff would roil stock markets. During Trump’s first term in office, he monitored the markets’ performance obsessively, tweeting about it incessantly and suggesting that stock values were a barometer of sound policy, warning in 2018, “If Democrats take over Congress, the stock market will plummet.”
Finally, Trump has recently shown some sensitivity to the interests of his newfound friends in tech, even when those interests conflict with the tenets of rightwing nationalism. Over the holidays, Elon Musk feuded with their co-partisans over the desirability of high-skill immigration and the H-1B visa, which help American tech companies to hire foreign talent. Trump ultimately expressed support for Musk’s position.”
“Donald Trump will soon become the second president to serve non-consecutive terms. Naturally, this invites comparison between Trump and the first president to serve non-consecutive terms, Grover Cleveland. In one crucial respect that juxtaposition is both instructive and cruelly ironic.”
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“When tariffs are too high, Cleveland argued, it means that corrupt politicians and businessmen are able to exploit consumers, often imposing severe hardships through price increases. Just as bad, it means that the government is failing to treat all citizens as equal before the law, instead picking winners and losers in the aforementioned “communism of pelf.”
This was the situation that existed in America during and after the Civil War, when politicians imposed weighty tariffs under the pretext of supporting the nation’s burgeoning business community. While American consumers initially accepted the additional taxation as a wartime necessity, the high rates persisted even after the nascent military-industrial complex had been wound down.
The problem was both simple and intractable: There were thousands of manufacturing, industrial, agricultural, and other business interests that profited from high tariffs. Each special interest group disregarded the national welfare to protect themselves, and as a result, the government accumulated massive surpluses—$113 million in 1886–1887 alone.
Despite this growing crisis, initially, Cleveland did not prioritize tariff reform. For the first two-and-a-half years after taking office in 1885, Cleveland concentrated on rooting out government corruption, which had reached such a nadir that in 1873 Mark Twain dubbed the post-Civil War era as a “Gilded Age.” To the extent that Cleveland’s anti-corruption agenda involved vetoing legislation he deemed financially wasteful, he indirectly picked off some of the rotten fruits that grew from the protectionist tree. However, it was not until 1887 that he shifted his attention to a need for sweeping tariff reform. When he did, he transformed the presidency and America in the process.”
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“Cleveland’s tariff reform proposals passed the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives but failed in the Republican-controlled Senate. Even worse, despite winning the popular vote, Cleveland lost the 1888 election to Republican nominee Benjamin Harrison amid Electoral College disputes in the key states of New York and Indiana. (Unlike Trump, Cleveland accepted his defeat with grace and peacefully ended his term in 1889.) The Republicans took office and passed a high tariff law (framed by future president William McKinley, then an Ohio congressman). The McKinley tariffs raised the average duty on imports by almost 50 percent, and as Dartmouth University economist Douglas Irwin demonstrated in 1998, these tariffs did little to stimulate the economy even as they imposed considerable suffering on low-income Americans.
This is why, just like Trump, Cleveland was able to comfortably get elected to a non-consecutive term by promising to lower prices. The key difference is that, unlike Trump, Cleveland proposed an intelligent solution to the problem—lowering tariffs, not raising them.
Unfortunately for both Cleveland and the Americans of his time, he would not live to see his vision for tariff reform realized. America plunged into an economic depression shortly after he took office in 1893, compelling Cleveland to confront a number of unrelated crises before he could get to tariff reform. By the time a tariff bill did reach his desk in 1894, special interest groups in both parties had diluted it almost to meaninglessness.”
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“Tariff reform along the lines Cleveland advocated would not become the law of the land until the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913, which was promoted with far more political effectiveness by Woodrow Wilson, the first Democratic president to serve after Cleveland’s administration. By then, Cleveland had been dead for five years.”
“If stopping the flow of illegal drugs is as straightforward as Trump implies, one might wonder, why didn’t he do that during his first term? “I’m going to create borders,” he promised during his 2016 campaign. “No drugs are coming in. We’re gonna build a wall. You know what I’m talking about. You have confidence in me. Believe me, I will solve the problem.”
Trump did not, in fact, solve the problem. According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the annual number of drug-related deaths in the United States rose by 44 percent between 2016 and Trump’s last year in office.
As drug warriors have been discovering since Congress banned nonmedical use of opiates and cocaine in 1914, prohibition creates a strong financial incentive to evade any obstacles that the government manages to erect between suppliers and consumers. That problem is compounded in the case of fentanyl, which is cheap to produce and highly potent, making it possible to smuggle large numbers of doses in small packages.”
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“Mexican drug cartels “move illicit fentanyl into the United States, primarily across the southwestern border, often in passenger vehicles,” the CRS reports. “The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security asserts that 90% of [seized] fentanyl is interdicted at ports of entry, often in vehicles driven by U.S. citizens. A primary challenge for both
Mexican and U.S. officials charged with stopping the fentanyl flow is that [the cartels] can meet U.S. demand with a relatively small amount.”
Finding those small amounts among the hundreds of thousands of cars and trucks that cross into the United States from Canada and Mexico each day is a daunting task.”
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” Even if the U.S. “managed to stop 100 percent of direct [fentanyl] sales to the US, enterprising dealers [would] simply sell into nations such as the UK, repackage the product, and then resell it into the US,” economist Roger Bate noted in a 2018 American Enterprise Institute report. “Intercepting all packages from the UK and other EU nations to the US will not be possible.” And “whether or not drugs are available to the general public via the mail,” Bate added, “drug dealers have domestic production and overland and sea routes and other courier services that deliver the product to the US.””
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“after Trump had four years to deliver on his promise that “no drugs” would be “coming in” during his administration. Yet he now claims that Mexican and Canadian officials could accomplish what he manifestly failed to do if only they tried harder.”
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“Even if severe legal penalties were enough to deter all Chinese suppliers of fentanyl precursors, that would not be the end of the story. As The New York Times recently noted, Mexican cartels already have a backup plan: They are recruiting “chemistry students studying at Mexican universities” so they can “synthesize the chemical compounds, known as precursors, that are essential to making fentanyl, freeing them from having to import those raw materials from China.””
https://reason.com/2024/12/11/trumps-plan-to-fight-illegal-drugs-with-punitive-tariffs-makes-no-sense/
“American consumers and businesses bore roughly 93 percent of the cost of Trump’s tariffs, according to one analysis by Moody’s. The U.S. Trade Commission concluded in 2023 that American companies and consumers “bore nearly the full cost” of the tariffs Trump levied on steel, aluminum, and many goods imported from China.”
“House Agriculture Chair G.T. Thompson (R-Pa.) said Saturday that he will oppose any spending measure that leaves out the billions in extra aid farm state Republicans were seeking for farmers still reeling from Donald Trump’s 2018 trade war, inflation, a delayed five-year farm bill reauthorization and a raft of other economic pressures. Republicans in agriculture-heavy states and some Democrats have warned about a crippling economic crisis hitting rural America, which overwhelmingly supported Trump in the last election.”
“”The China tariffs are, in my view, a significant piece of leverage—and a trade negotiator never walks away from leverage,” U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said at that time. The Biden administration, she added, was seeking to turn that “leverage into a strategic program that will strengthen American competitiveness and defend our interests in a global economy in which China will continue to play.”
More than two years later, and nearly four years after Biden took office, what has that supposed leverage accomplished? Tai provided the answer to that question this week during an interview with Bloomberg.
“We really haven’t seen the [People’s Republic of China] make any changes to its fundamental systemic structural policies that would make sense for us to provide any relaxation,” Tai told reporter Eric Martin for his Supply Lines newsletter.
In fact, Tai noted that there aren’t any ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and China right now—but don’t worry, she’s still insistent that the tariffs are useful for…something. “At the moment we are not negotiating anything with the PRC on trade,” she told Martin, “but one day we may be back at the table, in which case these tariffs will be useful as leverage, right?”
In summary, Tai’s position seems to be that American businesses and families must continue bearing the cost of the Trump-Biden tariffs even though those tariffs have plainly failed to achieve their primary policy goal (changing China’s behavior) because there’s a chance that someday, somehow, that might make a difference.”