“When Trump urged the Justice Department to investigate his baseless allegations of election fraud, Roberts says, he was exercising his “conclusive and preclusive” authority. The executive branch has “‘exclusive authority and absolute discretion’ to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute,” he writes, “including with respect to allegations of election crime.”
The indictment also alleges that Trump “attempted to enlist” Vice President Mike Pence to “use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” Trump wanted Pence to reject electoral votes for Joe Biden from several battleground states and send them back to state legislatures to consider whether he actually won them. When the president and the vice president “discuss their official responsibilities,” Roberts says, “they engage in official conduct.” The government therefore has to overcome a presumption of immunity, which means the district court must consider whether prosecuting Trump based on these conversations would impermissibly intrude on executive authority.
Other allegations involve Trump’s interactions with state officials and private parties. Trump tried to persuade state officials that the election results had been tainted by systematic fraud, and his campaign enlisted “alternate” electors whom he wanted state legislators to recognize instead of the Biden slates.
Those actions, Trump maintained, were “official” because he was trying to ensure the integrity of a federal election. To the contrary, Special Counsel Jack Smith argued, Trump was trying to undermine the integrity of the election, and he did so in service of his interests as a political candidate, not as part of his presidential duties. According to the Supreme Court, the district court therefore must determine, as an initial matter, “whether Trump’s conduct in this area qualifies as official or unofficial.”
Finally, the indictment cites Trump’s behavior on January 6, 2021, the day his supporters, inspired by his phony grievance, invaded the U.S. Capitol, interrupting the congressional tally of electoral votes. Trump’s conduct that day consisted mainly of his speech at the pre-riot “Stop the Steal” rally and various tweets. Roberts notes that the president has “extraordinary power to speak to his fellow citizens and on their behalf.” Generally speaking, his public communications therefore “are likely to fall comfortably within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities.” Whether Trump’s communications counted as official acts, Roberts says, depends on the “content and context of each,” requiring “factbound analysis” by the district court.”
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“The majority says Trump cannot be prosecuted for urging the Justice Department to embrace his stolen-election fantasy because such conversations fell within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority to enforce federal law. But the president is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which suggests that orders to the military, whether they involve assassination or a coup, likewise trigger absolute immunity. The president has plenary authority to issue pardons, which suggests impeachment might be the only remedy if he takes a bribe in exchange for granting one.
That remedy, as Roberts notes in rejecting Trump’s interpretation of the Impeachment Judgments Clause, could be foreclosed by timing or a lack of political will. If a president abuses his powers toward the end of his term (as happened in this case), resigns immediately afterward, or conceals his crimes well enough that they do not come to light until after he has left office, impeachment will not be a viable option, and his prosecution could be blocked by “absolute” or “presumptive” immunity, leaving no way to hold him accountable.
Roberts glides over such possibilities, focusing instead on the threat to presidential authority that allowing prosecution for “official acts” could pose. One of the charges against Trump, for example, alleges that he defrauded the United States, which is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison under 18 USC 371. Section 371, Roberts notes, “is a broadly worded criminal statute” that can cover “any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.” Since “virtually every President is criticized for insufficiently enforcing some aspect of federal law,” he says, “an enterprising prosecutor in a new administration may assert that a previous President violated that broad statute.”
Without immunity, such prosecutions of former presidents “could quickly become routine,” Roberts worries. “The enfeebling of the Presidency and our Government that would result from such a cycle of factional strife is exactly what the Framers intended to avoid. Ignoring those risks, the dissents are instead content to leave the preservation of our system of separated powers up to the good faith of prosecutors.””
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“Barrett disagrees with the majority’s holding that “the Constitution limits the introduction of protected conduct as evidence in a criminal prosecution of a President, beyond the limits afforded by executive privilege.” In a bribery case, for example, the official act that a president allegedly performed in exchange for money would be clearly relevant in establishing his guilt. “Excluding from trial any mention of the official act connected to the bribe would hamstring the prosecution,” Barrett writes. “To make sense of charges alleging a quid pro quo, the jury must be allowed to hear about both the quid and the quo, even if the quo, standing alone, could not be a basis for the President’s criminal liability.”
In response, Roberts says “the prosecutor may point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act” and may submit “evidence of what the President allegedly demanded, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept in return for being influenced in the performance of the act.” But the prosecutor may not offer “testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself.””
“Both sides in the case agreed that a former president can be prosecuted for “unofficial acts,” a point that Chief Justice John Roberts affirmed in his majority opinion. But Roberts added that a former president is “absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.”
It is not clear exactly which conduct falls into that “exclusive sphere,” although Roberts said conversations in which Trump urged the Justice Department to investigate his bogus claims of systematic election fraud clearly did. Adding to the uncertainty, the majority said even “official acts” outside “the core” of a president’s duties merit “at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution,” which the government can overcome only if it “can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no ‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.'”
The strictness of that test, combined with the lack of clarity about which acts are “official,” suggests that the distinction between “absolute” and “presumptive” immunity is apt to dissolve in practice. And even if it proves meaningful, the Court said absolute immunity might ultimately be required for all conduct “within the outer perimeter” of a president’s “official responsibility.”
Under the majority’s reasoning, Justice Sonia Sotomayor warned in a dissent joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, a president “will be insulated from criminal prosecution” when he “uses his official powers in any way.” That shield, Sotomayor said, would extend to a president who “orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival,” who “organizes a military coup to hold onto power,” who “takes a bribe in exchange for a pardon,” or who insists that the Justice Department use fabricated evidence in a criminal case.
Instead of explaining why immunity would not apply in such situations, Roberts faulted Sotomayor for “fear mongering on the basis of extreme hypotheticals.” He dismissed the threat posed by lawless presidents because he was focused on the supposed need to protect “an energetic executive” from the threat of criminal liability.
As Sotomayor noted, however, presidents have been operating under that threat for a long time. “Every sitting President,” she wrote, “has so far believed himself under the threat of criminal liability after his term in office and nevertheless boldly fulfilled the duties of his office.”
Former President Richard Nixon, who did not suffer from a notable lack of executive energy, evidently shared that long-standing assumption. After he resigned amid the Watergate scandal, Nixon accepted a pardon from his successor, Gerald Ford, that covered any federal offenses he may have committed as president.
According to the proposed articles of impeachment, those offenses included many acts that would count as “official” in Roberts’ book, such as “false or misleading public statements,” misuse of the CIA and the IRS, and interference with an FBI investigation. If Nixon was immune from prosecution for those acts, his pardon is a bit of a puzzle.
As that episode illustrates, we need not conjure “extreme hypotheticals” to understand the danger of a president who feels unbound by the law. In the real world, the risk of presidential paralysis pales beside the risk of presidential impunity.”
“there is certain information the U.S. relies on receiving from its European partners — and if Trump were to hold back intelligence, they, too, would likely retaliate, one recently retired senior U.S. official said.”
“Donald Trump went on national TV last week and proposed bombing Mexico.
Asked by Fox News’s Jesse Watters if he’d consider strikes against drug cartels operating in the country, Trump said yes — and framed his answer as a threat against the Mexican government. “Mexico’s gonna have to straighten it out really fast, or the answer is absolutely,” the former president said.
This is not a one-off answer to a stray question. Trump suggested firing missiles at Mexico during his presidency, asked advisers for a “battle plan” against the cartels last year, and recently proposed sending special operators to assassinate drug kingpins. The idea of war in Mexico is popular among the Republican elite; a Trump-aligned think tank even drew up a broad-strokes plan for how such a war might work.
There is every reason to take Trump’s proposal seriously. Presidents tend to at least try to deliver on campaign promises, and they have nearly unlimited war-making power nowadays. As unthinkable as it may sound, there is a reasonable chance the United States will be at war on its southern border in the coming years if Donald Trump returns to office.”
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“This is part of a bigger pattern. If you actually look at Trump’s policy agenda, he’s called for some wild stuff: policies so extreme that, had they been proposed prior to 2016, would have defined the entire course of the campaign. Today, a few get some coverage, but mostly feel like sideshows — with policy as a category taking a backseat to personality and polling.
Recently, the lack of policy focus is partly due to a remarkably chaotic stretch of American political life. One candidate, the incumbent president, bungled his debate performance so badly that his party replaced him with his vice president. The other almost got killed on national television by a would-be assassin.
But even in more normal times this is a general problem with the media: Policy is technical and boring, while horse-race reporting is exciting and easier for audiences to grasp.
Elements of Trump’s persona also make policy reporting a lot tougher. The combination of habitual lying, flip-flopping, and personal disinterest in detail can make it tough to know what’s an actual proposal and what’s something he said just for the hell of it.”
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“Before I started writing this story, I asked my colleagues at Vox what stood out as Trump’s signature policy proposals in this election — the equivalent of “Build the Wall” in 2016. We came up with two big answers: Trump’s proposal for a general 10 percent tariff and his plan for “the largest deportation in American history.”
Each of these policies is genuinely extreme.
A 10 percent blanket tariff isn’t just putting a tax on specific imports to protect a particular industry, or to retaliate against a country like China engaging in unfair trade practices. It’s a blanket attempt to make all imports from every country, including from neighbors like Canada and allies like the European Union, 10 percent more expensive.
This is a radical shift from the way that trade policy typically works in the United States — one with huge and predictably negative implications for US consumers and the economy.
The tariffs mean that people will either buy American-made goods that cost more than their current foreign competitors, or they will keep buying foreign-made goods at a 10 percent markup. That’s inflation basically by definition: an odd proposal for a candidate running against inflation as his central issue.
The center-right Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs would shave nearly 1 percent off of US GDP growth annually, costing roughly 684,000 jobs. This estimate did not take into account retaliation from other countries, who almost certainly would impose their own tariffs on American goods in response. A second estimate, from the centrist Peterson Institute, finds that every group of Americans — from the poorest to the wealthiest — would see drops in their annual income.
Neither of these estimates takes into account the all-but-certain retaliation from the affected countries, especially China (who Trump wants to hit with a special 60 percent across-the-board tariff).”
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“No one is exactly sure how many people are going to be targeted for deportations: Trump never sets a specific target, but often implies he’s going to deport every undocumented immigrant in the United States (there are currently around 11 million). A group of four NBC reporters tried to figure out how deporting so many people was supposed to work, and ended up concluding that it was such a break with the way immigration enforcement typically works that it was near-impossible to grasp the scope of the effort.
Typically, police don’t go out looking for undocumented migrants currently residing in the United States. They find them by accident, during a traffic stop or criminal arrest, and then discover that they are undocumented and notify ICE to begin deportation. Targeted enforcement raids happen, but they’re comparatively rare and make up only a fraction of annual deportations.
For Trump’s “mass deportation” policy to work, he would need to devote extraordinary resources — state, federal, and local — to finding and apprehending undocumented immigrants. Once found, they still pose a massive logistical challenge: current law does not allow ICE to deport longstanding US residents without a hearing (or the migrant’s consent), posing a huge burden on the legal system. The government would also need to figure out the travel logistics for deportation, including negotiating with home countries that might not be very happy to receive large numbers of functional refugees.
During all of this, the US government would need to house millions of people — which ICE currently lacks the capacity to do. Hence the now-infamous Trump proposals for keeping detained immigrants in camps: there’s literally nowhere else to put them while they await deportation.
All of this is not only a human rights disaster, but an economic and law enforcement one. The cost of devoting police and judicial resources to this task, in terms of trade-offs with addressing actual crime, would be significant. So too would be the financial cost of building immigrant camps and providing them with food and medical care.
Removing so many people from the workforce would also be inflationary, far outweighing any (questionable) increase in wages for native-born workers. One estimate suggests that, all told, mass deportations would cost the American economy $4.7 trillion over a 10-year period.
The point, in short, is that Trump is proposing sweeping changes to the way the US economy and legal system operates — ones with consequences for every American — and we’re barely even talking about what they would mean.”
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“there’s a difference between Trump’s random utterances, or what he might do about some obscure policy issue, and his consistent instincts on the issues central to his political identity — like trade and the southern border. And there, he could not be clearer: across-the-board tariff, mass deportation, and waging war on the drug cartels.
Even if we set aside everything else we know (or think we know) about what Trump would do, these three items alone would have the potential to transform life in America as we know it. It’s time to start covering Trump like he means what he says.”
“During former President Donald Trump’s term in office, he promised that higher tariffs on American imports would reduce the country’s large trade deficit.
At the time, many economists disputed that notion. Tariffs might marginally reduce the import side of the trade ledger, but they also reduce economic output (and therefore exports), so the net effect on the trade deficit was likely to be minuscule, they warned.
No matter. In 2017, the White House’s official Trade Policy Agenda highlighted how America’s manufacturing trade deficit had grown from $317 billion in 2000 to $648 billion in 2016. That was evidence, the document claimed, that greater levels of trade had triggered “a period of slowed GDP growth, weak employment growth, and sharp net loss of manufacturing employment in the United States.”
You know what happened next. Tariffs were raised. Then more tariffs were added. President Joe Biden took over and left Trump’s higher tariffs in place. American businesses and consumers paid the cost of those higher taxes. The average tariff rate on imports to the United States has climbed from 1.5 percent to over 3 percent, and annual tariff revenue has nearly tripled.
So what happened to the trade deficit? It didn’t fall.
In 2017, the last full year before Trump’s tariffs were imposed, America’s overall trade deficit was $517 billion. By 2023, it had grown to $785 billion, according to new Census Bureau data.
The story is the same when you look at the manufacturing trade deficit, the narrower category that the Trump administration had highlighted in that 2017 report. It climbed to over $1 trillion by 2021, nearly 60 percent higher than the 2016 figure that was cited by the White House as evidence that free trade was a failure.
Rather than reducing the manufacturing trade deficit, the higher tariffs likely led to its sharp increase, writes Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. Trade Representative. “Manufacturers import goods so as to turn them into other goods, and are big tariff payers,” writes Gresser in a post for the Progressive Policy Institute, where he now works as vice president for trade policy. “So the tariffs raised the costs of industries like automobiles, machinery, and toolmaking; they faced a bit more challenges competing against imports and succeeding as exporters; and the overall goods/services deficit grew more concentrated in manufacturing.””
“”I don’t think we’re going to see a deal like we saw in the first term,” Robert O’Brien, Trump’s fourth and final national security advisor, told Chalfant. “I think people were generally happy with [the previous deal], but as it turned out, the Chinese didn’t honor it.””
“Former President Donald Trump helped negotiate the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, ending America’s longest foreign war. But now he believes that the United States should have kept its largest base in Afghanistan to help in a future conflict against China.
During this week’s Republican National Convention, speaker after speaker has tried to transform “America First” from a slogan against overseas entanglements into a cry for more aggressive military force. And the gambit seems to have succeeded. A day after Trump’s running mate, Sen. J.D. Vance (R–Ohio), condemned the war in Afghanistan as a failure, Trump himself called for using Afghanistan as a springboard to future conflicts.”
Ultimately, society and democracy cannot survive if we throw out civility. Destiny is right that people believe outrageous things and support immoral leaders and policies. But that’s politics, baby. It always has been and always will be. People are fools who believe stupid shit and support stupid shit. If we throw our hands up and shit all over everyone because of that, we won’t save the country, we’ll just cover everything in shit.