“The Problem: The base pay for tipped workers in Washington, D.C., is a fraction of the minimum wage, making their income heavily reliant on unpredictable gratuities.
The Solution: Initiative 82, which phases in a higher base wage for tipped workers until it meets D.C.’s full minimum wage in 2027 ($17.95).
Sounds like a great idea, with the best of intentions. What could possibly go wrong?
Turns out, money has to come from somewhere. New labor costs led many restaurants to raise prices, drop staff, cut hours, or close up shop entirely. Many establishments began charging “Initiative 82 fees,” which customers found difficult to swallow, especially when Maryland and Virginia are just minutes away. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the average tipped wage worker in D.C. saw their income drop by over $1,800 in the two years since the initiative went into effect.”
“Liquor and wine will likely get more expensive next year in Pennsylvania—and residents will have no choice but to pay the higher prices, thanks to the state’s monopoly on alcohol sales.
The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) voted earlier this month to impose a new “bailment fee,” which it says is necessary to cover rising warehouse costs and improve its distribution system. The $1 fee will be charged on all packages that move through the state’s warehouses, and will take effect at the start of 2026.
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In other states, those producers would have more options when a wholesaler or retailer—the PLCB fulfills both functions—decides to impose a new fee or otherwise raise prices. Some wineries or distilleries might choose to pay the extra per-package fee and build the cost into their pricing. Others might look for different distributors to carry their product, or other distributors might try to undercut whichever one was raising fees in the first place.
In Pennsylvania, like in other states that maintain a monopoly on alcohol sales, those options do not exist. If you want to sell or buy alcohol in the Keystone State, you’ll simply have to accept whatever prices and fees the PLCB chooses to charge.”
“The case against government grocery stores is straightforward. Government providers have no incentive to spend money wisely or respond to customers’ needs. Unlike private businesses, which must compete for customers by offering quality goods at reasonable prices, government entities get paid regardless of performance. Tax dollars flow into the system whether the shelves are stocked or empty, whether the service is stellar or abysmal.”
“Texas generates the most renewable energy in the nation. Three Republican bills being advanced by the state legislature could halt Texas’ green energy progress and give fossil fuels a leg up in the state’s energy market.
Senate Bill 388, which has passed the state Senate, would require at least 50 percent of power generation installed after January 1, 2026, to come from “dispatchable” energy sources, which include natural gas, nuclear power, and coal. This bill effectively subsidizes fossil fuel projects by requiring utility providers to purchase power generation credits from dispatchable energy sources.”
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“A report from Aurora Energy Research estimates that this bill would add $5.2 billion to Texas power prices over the next decade; residents could pay an extra $200 per year in energy costs.”
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“Using the “police power” of the state ignores what regulators and the market are saying: Texas needs every energy source to meet future demand. That includes renewables.”
“Because of the century-old Jones Act, U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico must use overpriced, outdated ships to import American LNG—while the Dominican Republic enjoys cheaper energy from the same source.”
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“Over 100 years ago, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, better known as the Jones Act, requiring all goods transported between U.S. ports to be carried on ships that are built in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens, crewed by Americans, and flagged under the United States. While support for the Jones Act was built on maintaining a strong U.S. maritime industry and protecting national security, it has failed to live up to these promises.
Due to absurdly strict requirements, the Jones Act increases the cost of shipping and ship manufacturing by limiting competition in domestic markets and even inspiring collusion. These inflated costs have historically made it impossible for Puerto Rico to import LNG from the United States. Unlike the mainland, Puerto Rico can’t import LNG via trucking or rail and must instead import LNG using Jones Act carriers (which, until recently, didn’t exist).”
“The current average credit card interest rate is 21 percent, but it didn’t get there overnight. In 2008, the average rate was 14 percent, at a time when the savings rate was much lower and consumers were overextended. In 2009, a Democratic supermajority in Congress passed the CARD Act, bringing a bevy of new regulations for credit card companies, such as requiring advance notice of any rate increases and limitations on fees for late payments.
Interest rates began rising immediately following the passage of the CARD Act and continued to rise as the risk-free rate—the Federal Reserve’s overnight lending rate, currently about 4.75 percent—fell to 0 percent throughout most of the 2010s. Objectively, credit card interest rates are high today, but they are arguably high as a direct result of legislation passed at the end of the 2000s. Capping credit card interest rates is simply an intervention to correct the results of previous interventions.”
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“There is a reason that credit cards carry a higher average interest rate than mortgages (7 percent) or car loans (8 percent). Mortgages and car loans are secured lending—the bank has collateral in the event of a default which increases recovery rates. Credit card borrowing is unsecured lending—lenders rely on nothing more than trust in the borrower. When losses occur, they are total and catastrophic. Credit card lending is inherently risky.
The vast majority of borrowers are unprofitable at a 10 percent interest rate. If credit card interest rates were capped at 10 percent, it wouldn’t just disrupt individual finances—it could destabilize the entire credit system. Major credit card lenders, such as Capital One Financial, would likely terminate the accounts of millions of their less creditworthy customers, which could mean anyone with a credit score of 780 or lower. To the extent possible, they might introduce new fees to make up for the loss of interest revenue, but the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is already taking a hard look at late fees, which can be large relative to small credit card balances.
Customers who lose access to credit would have to resort to cash or debit cards—and find that it is hard to function in modern society without a credit card. Even renting a car or getting a hotel room are activities that require a credit card.”
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“Interest rates are prices—the price of money—and all prices are signals. Capping credit card rates might sound like a win for consumers, but in practice, it’s a lesson in unintended consequences. Policymakers must tread carefully, weighing the broader economic impacts before introducing well-intentioned but potentially devastating reforms.”
“Faulkender was the assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department during the first Trump administration, and it was in that role that he oversaw the PPP, a stimulus program that ultimately distributed more than $800 billion.
That money was supposed to go to businesses that had been shuttered by the pandemic (or by various governmental edicts), and it was supposed to keep furloughed workers on the payroll until reopening. In fairness, at least some of the PPP’s budget was used for that purpose, but we now know that much—maybe even most—of the PPP funds ended up being wasted or stolen.
“Only 23 to 34 percent of the program’s funds went directly to workers who would have otherwise lost their jobs,” a National Bureau of Economic Research study found. Another study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis found that taxpayers paid roughly $4 for every $1 of wages and benefits to workers.
Some of the PPP’s funds likely ended up in the pockets of business owners rather than funding workers’ paychecks, a New York Times investigation concluded. A lot of it was simply stolen—so much, in fact, that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) says a full accounting of the losses “will never be known with certainty.””