“The direct cost of President Donald Trump’s trade war will be borne by American consumers and businesses—of that, there should no longer be much debate.
But trade wars also come with indirect costs and unforeseen consequences. Some of those show up on balance sheets in the form of lower profits, losses in the stock market, or stagnating wages. Some are best counted under the Christmas tree, where higher prices might mean fewer toys (as the president now admits) and other goodies that make life a little more joyful, as tariffs squeeze wallets and reduce discretionary income.
Others are trickier to sum up, but that doesn’t mean they don’t exist.
“The administration’s trade policy sends a message to the world: America is an unreliable ally that sees you only as a source of wealth; and if you don’t have wealth, you’ll pay for it,””
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“”The United States’ role as a linchpin of this system has enhanced its position as the pre-eminent global power,” writes Murray. “Yet the new administration’s curious tariff policy threatens all of this, for no discernible benefit.””
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“American soft power rides on the back of the global trading system. American investment and purchasing power help build factories and lift people out of extreme poverty. For the countries that benefit from all that, American interests are first and foremost. Take away the benefits of trade, and the rest fades too, warns Murray.
Higher tariffs and reduced global trade “kills US soft power with these nations and leaves a geopolitical vacuum into which US rivals like China will expand,” he writes. “High tariff rates on south east Asian countries, for example, will exacerbate the drift of those countries towards the Chinese sphere of influence that has been happening in the wake of trade uncertainty since the first Trump administration.””
“Sanctions are a complicated bureaucratic knot to untangle. Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, warned on X that “people in [Trump’s] own administration are trying to stop it or slow it down severely.” And a Syrian government minister tells Reason that a U.S. delegation has come with a set of “requests” for Syria to fulfill.
The Caesar Civilian Protection Act, passed after Assad had fought a civil war against rebels to a standstill, punishes foreign investment in reconstructing areas under the Syrian government’s control. There is also a general U.S. trade embargo on Syria passed by executive order. And Sharaa himself is a designated terrorist because of his past fighting for Al Qaeda, which he later violently turned against.”
“A one-two punch from the United States risks shattering the already fragile trade war truce between Washington and Beijing, with Chinese tech companies and students both dealt shock blows by the Trump administration”
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“The first hit came in a Financial Times report on Wednesday that said moves by US President Donald Trump had effectively cut off some American companies from selling software used to design semiconductors to China.”
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“But it was the second blow from the White House that landed right in the living rooms of Chinese families, with US State Secretary Marco Rubio saying the US will “aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students” – especially those in critical fields or with connections to the Chinese Communist Party.”
‘Already in 1993/1994, [Russia] had begun to make threatening language and gestures toward its neighbors. In 1994 the president of Estonia made a speech about how happy Estonia was to be a member of Europe and about the reemergence of a threat from Russia. He was already hearing language from Russia threatening Estonia sovereignty and whether Estonia was really an independent country. At this speech, the deputy mayor of Saint Petersburg, Vladimir Putin, walked out. The language of threat from Russia began in the 90s. In 2005 there was a large cyber attack on Estonia. This is why these countries wanted to join NATO, because they felt a reasonable direct threat from Russia.’
NATO is not a direct threat to Russia’s homeland, and it is only a threat to Russia’s interests if Russia has the intention of dominating its neighbors. Russia’s interest in Ukraine is not primarily defensive, but imperial.
There was almost no U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe until Russia stole Crimea with military force.
The global south’s response to Russia’s invasion has been disappointing because it is not just a European issue. The invasion violates the global norm that you don’t change borders by force.