The reason so many Trump prosecutions are failing to get indictments is because he is charging people with weak evidence and for political reasons.
“Grand juries have emerged as a major stumbling block for Trump’s drive to use the criminal courts to exact retribution on his perceived political foes.
Federal grand juries operate in near-total secrecy and decide whether prosecutors can bring a criminal indictment in the first place. Unlike trial juries, they don’t need to be unanimous; rather, a majority of their 16 to 23 members must agree to return an indictment. And their only job is to determine if the Justice Department has brought a plausible case — a relatively low standard which led to the cliche that prosecutors could get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich.
But in the Trump era, grand juries are no longer a rubber stamp. Instead, they’ve become a headache for prosecutors trying to advance controversial Trump policies like mass deportations and militarizing law enforcement. Dozens of recent cases in Washington, D.C., have been met with so-called “no bills” — the shorthand for a grand jury declining to return a bill of indictment. And grand juries in other jurisdictions have turned down high-profile cases that Trump has prioritized.
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The administration also seems to be losing because it’s pushing for indictments in cases with weak evidence, and due to the unpopularity in some parts of the country of tough tactics against protesters and of policies like Trump’s crackdown on undocumented immigrants. and
U.S. District Judge Sparkle Sooknanan recently marveled at the “apparent prosecutorial machinations” at work, emphasizing the “unprecedented” actions prosecutors have taken to bring cases — even when grand juries have rebuffed them.
“Most troubling, prosecutors have rushed to charge cases before properly investigating them,” the Washington-based Biden appointee lamented.
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The Constitution’s requirement that a grand jury approve serious criminal cases was adopted as a safeguard against executive power and political prosecutions. The move stemmed from what many revolutionaries regarded as political trials instituted by British authorities.”
“Trump may have pardoned Cole last year as part of the sweeping clemency that he gave to Jan. 6 offenders on his first day back in office.
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Trump’s proclamation commuted the sentences of 14 individuals and also granted “a full, complete and unconditional pardon to all other individuals convicted of offenses related to events that occurred at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” This immediately covered roughly 1,500 people, including hundreds of defendants who were charged with assaulting or resisting law enforcement officers.
Lawyers for Cole did not respond to a question about whether they intend to argue that Cole is entitled to a pardon if convicted. But there are several legal and factual points that are worth zeroing in on if they pursue that strategy.
For starters, it does not matter whether Trump specifically intended to pardon the person who planted the pipe bombs. Under the law, it is the text of the pardon that matters — not the subjective intention of the president or the DOJ’s interpretation of it.
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Cheerleaders of the sweeping Jan. 6 pardon did not bat an eye when Trump knowingly freed people like Stewart Rhodes and Enrique Tarrio — leaders of the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys, respectively, who were convicted at trial of a seditious conspiracy to prevent the transfer of power to Joe Biden. And they have remained silent as some of the people that Trump pardoned have gone on to commit more alleged crimes — a predictable development given the empirical evidence on recidivism rates among convicted felons. Some of these crimes have been explicitly political in nature, including threatening to kill House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries.
For all that’s happened in the last year, Trump’s Jan. 6 pardon remains one of his most stunning acts since he returned to office.”
“As senators woke up Saturday with questions on President Donald Trump’s audacious decision to order the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, one of their old colleagues was ready with answers.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio worked the phones in the wee hours of the morning and, in the days since, has played an outsize role in not only formulating the administration’s strategy in Venezuela but explaining it to skeptical lawmakers wary of a protracted military commitment.
That outreach has been to his former Republican colleagues as well as Democrats, including those who see him as a rare Trump official with whom they can maintain a trusted and respectful relationship amid profound policy disputes.
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“Marco has been evangelical on Latin America for a long time, for a long time — I mean, he’s, you know, a pretty classic neocon who believes that America will generally be greeted as liberators,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), another former Foreign Relations colleague. “I didn’t vote for him because I thought he was going to suddenly agree with me on the importance of military restraint overseas.”
Added Kaine, “At the end of the day, he’s going to do what Trump tells him to do.””
“With the Trump administration exerting control over Venezuela, Cuba has lost one of its principal economic patrons and oil suppliers. The island, already in economic dire straits, will face even deeper financial problems unless it finds another government willing to provide it with the oil it once received from Venezuela — the import of which until a week ago it exchanged for money and personnel. Cuba has dodged collapse for decades but Maduro’s capture poses perhaps the greatest threat to the regime since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
And a failed state could lead to an exodus of Cubans looking for refuge in the United States.”
“In addition to the 14 shootings involving ICE agents, 32 people died in ICE custody in 2025. That figure makes 2025 the deadliest year for the agency in more than 20 years and matches the previous record high set in 2004, as the administration moved to detain an unprecedented number of people.”
“Minnesota officials said Thursday that federal law enforcement are freezing out state investigators from the investigation into the deadly ICE-related shooting of a 37-year-old woman.”
“In dropping government recommendations Monday that children routinely receive shots for four diseases, Kennedy’s allies believe they are closer to realizing a top priority: a country in which people who claim vaccine injuries can more easily sue vaccinemakers for millions in civil court.
Manufacturers of those vaccines would no longer be shielded from liability, the plan’s proponents assert, and could be driven from the market amid an influx of lawsuits alleging injuries from their products. In that scenario, the anti-vaccine movement would have a high-profile opportunity to shape the public narrative about childhood shots in courts nationwide.
Kennedy and Health and Human Services Department officials announced that longstanding recommendations that children receive flu, meningitis, hepatitis A and rotavirus vaccines were downgraded to a category known as “shared clinical decisionmaking,” meaning patients are encouraged to confer with health care providers before getting the shots.
In all, the number of “routine” vaccine recommendations — which assume vaccination as the default — have now been cut by a third, from 18 to 11, since 2024.”
“”I DOUBT NATO WOULD BE THERE FOR US IF WE REALLY NEEDED THEM,” Trump blasted on Truth Social, while insisting the U.S. would still defend alliance members. “We will always be there for NATO, even if they won’t be there for us.”
Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s collective defense clause, an attack on one member of the alliance is considered an attack on all. The provision has been formally invoked only once — in response to al-Qaida’s 9/11 terror attack against the U.S.”
“I think we’re in a situation where we have not gotten regime change. The same group, minus only Maduro, is still in power, and it’s not at all clear just how much intimidating force that we’ve really got.
There are pressure points. I think they’re in trouble on oil exports and so on. But what are China and Russia and Iran and Cuba going to do in the face of that, just sit back and watch it happen? So, I’m not at all sure what day-after planning there was, because I’m not sure we’re finished with the day yet.
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Trump talked about getting the oil, and I think there would have been a legitimate argument that U.S. oil companies kind of get first dibs to come in — not that we would take it, but that we would get some preference in terms of the ability to present proposals — and we should, at a minimum, get some of that production and maybe a lot of it.
But that’s not how Trump looks at it. He just wants to take control of it, and that’s how he’s going to pay for the military force and sort of everything else he’s been promising.
I just think that’s the kind of limited vision he has. He focuses on what he thinks he understands, the tangible economic asset.
The idea that American oil companies are just lining up to go invest in Venezuela is just flatly wrong, and the idea that somehow there will be a quick transformation of the incredibly dilapidated Venezuelan oil infrastructure that’s going to suddenly turn the production back online is fantasy, too.
It’s going to take tens of billions of dollars over a sustained period of time before they get this thing back up and running the way it used to be.
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I think we do have full authority under international law to go after Maduro because what we would consider the legitimate government today is the opposition, with Maduro having stolen both the 2018 and 2024 presidential elections.
When you basically go back to dealing with the old regime and undercut the legitimate government, you’re giving Russia and China the precedent that they don’t have.
There’s nobody in Ukraine calling for Russian intervention, and the government of Taiwan certainly isn’t calling for Chinese intervention.
So the Venezuelan case as it stands now is quite different from those, but that’s not the way Trump’s behaving, and it’s the mistakes he’s making today that lend greater credence to a Russian or a Chinese effort to say, well, we’re just doing what the U.S. did in Venezuela.
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what if they decide they’re not going to do what we want six months from now? Where are we going to be at that point? And I don’t think Trump has addressed that.”