“The White House says it has the upper hand in its trade war with China. Its actions suggest otherwise.
Top administration officials spent the weekend trying to defend a carve-out of consumer electronics from the astronomical 145 percent tariffs it levied on China last week. The carve-out was neither an exemption nor a policy rollback, the White House argued, because those electronics are still subject to a separate 20 percent tariff on China and some electronic components could face sector-specific tariffs in the future.
But to some White House allies, the exceptions are indicative of the relatively weak position the administration is in as it wages a trade war with China, which has spent years making preparations for an escalation with the U.S. on trade. The carve-outs also reveal the conundrum facing the administration: The U.S. is imposing new tariffs on Chinese goods in an attempt to move manufacturing back to the U.S., but those tariffs are particularly painful for U.S. manufacturers because they are currently so dependent on Chinese parts.
So far, the U.S. has demonstrated that it is more willing to bend than China is in this burgeoning fight.
“Xi Jinping will not back down,” said one former Trump administration official, who like others in this story was granted anonymity to share their candid assessment of the U.S.-China relationship, adding that “the CCP will lose confidence in him” if he does, using the acronym for the ruling Chinese Communist Party.”
“the sanctions failed in one crucial way. The fact that Moscow was blindsided by them suggests it grossly underestimated the severity of the penalties it would face. Although the U.S. and its allies had developed an extensive menu of possible sanctions before the invasion, they never reached consensus on how far they were willing to go. They left Putin to divine the meaning of “the most severe sanctions that have ever been imposed,” and Putin—as he so often did—read Western ambiguity as weakness.
If Biden and other world leaders had committed ahead of time to the actions they would eventually take, they might have had a much better chance of staving off Putin’s invasion. Deterrence can’t work if your adversary underestimates your ability or willingness to act. Putin never saw the sanctions coming—and that was precisely the problem.”
“Slovakia has a population of just 5.4 million, yet it is one of Europe’s leading car manufacturers, heavily reliant on auto production and exports to the U.S. Home to five major car manufacturers and more than 350 local suppliers, Slovakia is not only the second-largest E.U. exporter of vehicles to the U.S., but also the biggest car producer per capita in the world.
Slovakia manufactures and exports higher-end SUVs from brands like Audi, Volkswagen, Porsche, Range Rover, and—starting in 2026—Volvo. With SUVs accounting for 46 percent of total annual auto sales in the U.S., the tariffs are likely to hurt models that are especially popular among American consumers.
According to the National Bank of Slovakia, the Slovak economy “would decrease cumulatively by nearly 3 percent” due to the new tariffs, and “would also mean the loss of 20,000 jobs.” The bank projects that Slovakia’s economy will “suffer the most in 2026, when its growth would barely stay above zero” and that by 2027, the automotive tariffs alone could reduce gross domestic product by 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points. The bank’s governor referred to the prospects of a 25 percent car tariff impact as a “small Armageddon.””