“The bottom line is that Putin doesn’t yet have a good enough reason to agree to end the war.
What will change his mind? The carrots Trump has been offering must be replaced with sticks — effective and consistent policies designed to make the cost of waging war higher than the cost of peace.”
“If an African government wants strong relations with Washington, including future development assistance, it must pay up in other ways — ranging from giving access to minerals to accepting deportees, Trump backers told me.”
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“Trump and his team are fast-tracking efforts to achieve a goal that other U.S. presidents, including his four immediate Democratic and Republican predecessors, articulated to varying degrees — to shift the nature of the U.S. relationship with Africa. Each saw some progress, but none was willing to slash aid so deeply and suddenly.
The overwhelming sense among African officials is that they need to pony up what they can to effectively buy Trump’s love — the transactionalism for which he’s well known.
The Democratic Republic of Congo is offering access to critical minerals in exchange for U.S. help battling rebel forces; Massad Boulos, the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, was named recently to a role looking into such potential deals in the DRC and other African countries. And Somalia has offered the U.S. operational control over certain ports.
Angola will likely keep U.S. backing for the Lobito Corridor, a rail project that can help the U.S. access minerals. Togo, which is touting its track record in quietly mediating some African conflicts, could also see continued U.S. support, according to a former U.S. official familiar with African diplomatic circles. (A Togo official did not respond to questions about the mediation pitch.)
Some African nations will have an easier time staying on the U.S. radar simply because of their political sway on the continent (hey there, Kenya and Ethiopia), importance to energy markets (Nigeria) or other one-off reasons. Some are more financially and politically able to absorb the shock of losing U.S. aid than others. But some will have little to offer for Washington’s benefit, and they may choose to side with U.S. adversaries on the global stage — whether at the United Nations or in a war.
At least one, South Africa, is likely to be in the cold for a long time under Trump. The president’s team is infuriated by South Africa’s foreign policy choices, especially its diplomatic attacks on Israel, and accuses South Africa’s government of persecuting white Afrikaners. Trump has recently kicked out South Africa’s ambassador in Washington and set up a refugee program for white Afrikaners. South African officials insist Trump is misrepresenting them, especially on the Afrikaner issue.”
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“Africans are already dying because of the U.S. aid cuts, and there’s been an outcry, mainly among Democrats, over the scaling down of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief — aka PEPFAR, the George W. Bush-era health initiative that has funded HIV/AIDS treatments on the African continent.
Still, people in Trump’s orbit are not moved by such anecdotes or data, seeing them as parts of tired arguments that have prevented a needed, radical change in U.S. ties with Africa. One person pointed out that the “E” in PEPFAR stands for “emergency.” Yet the program is now more than two decades old.”
“sanctions have never made the clerical regime abandon its nuclear ambitions. During Trump’s first term, his “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign did real damage to Iran’s economy. Iran didn’t, however, concede its atomic assets.”
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” Obama’s more friendly outreach only made progress after Washington made a key concession — Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. The Americans also made a second key concession: allowing Iran to retain a substantial nuclear infrastructure, which could ramp back up at any time. Ali Salehi, the MIT-educated nuclear engineer who was probably the mastermind behind Iran’s dual-use import network, loved the Obama agreement because it would guarantee the Islamic Republic a more advanced, better-financed atomic program that it could grow in the open. It was Obama’s permissive terms much more than the promised financial relief that induced the theocracy to sign the 2015 accord.”
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” Along the way, the clerical regime might agree to dilute its stock of 60 percent-enriched uranium, which is near weapons-grade, or even cap enrichment at a lower level. It would be a flashy concession that won’t fundamentally affect the complexion or the trajectory of Tehran’s nuclear program. The mullahs know that what matters most are protecting its new generation of centrifuges. With much greater efficiency and speed, these machines can enrich uranium to bomb-grade and can be housed in small facilities that are harder to detect.”
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“Even a stringent inspection regime, unless supported by a well-placed human-intelligence network, would find locating these centrifuges an excruciatingly difficult task.”
“First, the Constitution gives Congress the authority to tax and impose tariffs. Congress has delegated that authority to the executive branch in a handful of trade laws passed over the course of the last century, but the president’s power in this area is a function of the particular language contained in those statutes. (The likely reason that Trump invoked IEEPA is that, unlike the more commonly invoked trade laws, IEEPA does not require administrative investigations or consultations with Congress.)
Second, the relevant provision of the IEEPA contains a bunch of words, but none of those words is “tariffs” or “taxes.”
Indeed, no president before Trump has ever used the IEEPA to impose tariffs. The law has typically been deployed to impose economic sanctions, such as prohibitions on transactions with designated foreign governments or businesses.
In theory, these facts should resonate with the Republican appointees on the court, who typically hold themselves out as committed textualists, eager to adhere only to the words on the page.
Third, even if the IEEPA granted the president the authority to impose tariffs, there are no actual “emergencies” here that would support them (though we will return to this notion).
The law authorizes the president to act when there is “an unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,” and the Trump administration has claimed that there are several different emergencies. They include the opioid crisis and illegal immigration, which Trump has invoked to support tariffs against Canada, Mexico and China. To support other global tariffs, Trump has claimed that the country’s “trade deficits” constitute the emergency.
At least as a factual matter, credible independent analysts have generally rejected these claims. Take the country’s trade deficits. “They’re not actually harmful any more than it’s somehow harmful if I have a trade deficit with my local supermarket,” Somin said. “I buy a lot of things from them, but they virtually never buy anything from me.”
Fourth, as the California complaint correctly notes, IEEPA was passed as part of an effort in the 1970s to limit the president’s emergency economic powers. Congress did not intend to expand the president’s powers or to give him carte blanche to overhaul the global trading system.
That fact may not move the Republican appointees on the Supreme Court if the issue gets to them — they generally oppose the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation — but it is likely to prove relevant to the three Democratic appointees.”
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” The Supreme Court might also side with the Trump administration given that the court is generally deferential to the president’s handling of foreign policy and his assessment of what constitutes a national emergency. We may not have had any national emergencies before Trump returned to office, but ironically, his tariffs may themselves have caused a global emergency — one that could give the justices reason to pause before coming in against the president in a way that could now severely constrain his powers on the global stage and diminish his international diplomatic standing.”
“The New York Times reported that Hegseth shared sensitive information about military operations in Yemen in a private chat on the Signal app that included his wife, brother and personal lawyer — the second reported instance of the secretary sharing operational plans in an unclassified chat. The revelations have reignited the so-called Signalgate scandal and deepened scrutiny over Hegseth’s judgment and leadership.”
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“Ullyot — once a vocal supporter of the Defense secretary — accused Hegseth’s team of spreading unverified claims about three top officials who were fired last week, falsely accusing them of leaking sensitive information to media outlets.”
“in his second term he appears to be in the business of exerting American power abroad, from Greenland to Gaza. But no modern empire has ever successfully projected power globally without a competent and motivated bureaucracy. The late Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington wrote that the more complex a society becomes, the more it needs institutions to run it. And this is especially true of an empire, which the United States has been in functional terms since 1945. Americans may, like the elder Bush, be uncomfortable with the word empire, but our successes, challenges and even disasters have been akin to those of all the great empires of history. The Trump administration’s war on its own imagined “deep state” is essentially a war against the very institutions needed to organize society at home and especially, defend it from its enemies abroad.
American power abroad is expressed not only through presidential decisions, but through the power of institutions, notably the State Department and the Defense Department. American diplomats deal with crises in dozens upon dozens of countries in the world on a daily basis that you never read about: they include small countries and large, troubled, and complex states like Pakistan, Nigeria and Colombia. The finest linguists and political secretaries are needed in overseas embassies to manage such challenges. Weaken the bureaucracy at this crucial level — at the same time you are discouraging new generations of young people from going into public service — and you weaken American power itself. This might take time to be noticed, but its effect will be real and insidious.”
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“Trump wants to exert control worldwide, but his actions against the bureaucracy undermine that goal.”
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“The Arabists and the China experts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been some of the finest bureaucrats I have encountered. They are the ultimate early warning system: the Arabists warned against the 2003 Iraq War and the China experts about the political and economic dangers of a conflict over Taiwan. You want the very best people in these jobs. Empires at their best encourage cosmopolitanism, that is, a knowledge of other languages and cultures required for the maintenance of good diplomatic and security relations. Yet the Trump administration is essentially telling brilliant, linguistically adroit young people not to want a career in government. It is fine to trim bloated bureaucracies in order to save money and to improve efficiency. But it is another thing entirely to make life miserable for those who remain by requiring them to fill out weekly forms about their activities and so forth. In such a circumstance, the very people you need to be motivated won’t be, and will look elsewhere for careers.”
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“USAID, through its projects often run by non-governmental organizations, has been for decades doing much more than running humanitarian programs throughout the developing world. In fact, these programs don’t operate in the abstract: Because they are on-the-ground operations often in far-flung areas of a given country, they build vital human connections that are money in the bank for diplomats and military people to utilize, especially during crisis situations where local contacts are essential. An empire is about more than guns and money, it is also about the maintenance of relationships built up on official and non-official levels throughout the world by way of, among other things, humanitarian projects. Trump has been rightly concerned about the rise of Chinese power around the world, but has seemingly not realized that China is itself spreading its influence in large part through development projects. Dismantling our humanitarian projects in places like Africa and South America leaves a vast opening for the Chinese to fill with projects of their own. It will also hurt our intelligence gathering, as USAID staffers have had their own networks in the hinterlands of difficult countries.
The postwar American-led order has been administered through three non-economic pillars: NATO, USAID, and various treaty alliances in the Pacific. The Trump administration disdains the first, is trying to gut the second, and is making the third very nervous.”
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“The British Empire lasted as long as it did through the brilliance of its diplomats and intelligence agents. As I can attest through reporting in Africa and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s, British influence continued for decades afterwards, partly because the British embassy or high commission in each country was manned by equally brilliant people who could always be counted on to deliver a great briefing to a reporter. Nothing projects power like the quality of people in your vital institutions at home and at your embassies and other missions around the world.
The most long-lasting world powers and empires succeeded not by raw power but by various methods of persuasion: the more subtle the approach, the more longevity for the great power involved. And such persuasion involves a talented and well-functioning bureaucracy, exactly what Trump is seeking to destroy. Our bureaucratic elite is not like others around the world: its sense of seeing little differentiation between American self-interest and promoting human rights and democracy might be somewhat naïve and self-serving, but it is real and deeply felt. These bureaucrats know that without that sense of idealism, America’s foreign policy descends into a sterile, ruthless realpolitik: like China’s. And no empire or great power has lasted very long without a sense of mission. That’s why Trump’s policies toward the bureaucracy are in direct conflict with his goals abroad, even if he doesn’t know it.”
“During what was probably the low point of the 2024 presidential campaign, Vice President J.D. Vance falsely accused Haitian immigrants living in his home state of Ohio of kidnapping, killing, and eating pets. He then doubled down by challenging the legal status of those same immigrants.
“I’m still going to call them an illegal alien,” Vance said defiantly in late September, despite the fact that many Haitian immigrants in the U.S. have legal status under a federal policy called Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which is granted to migrants who cannot return safely to their home countries due to natural disasters or conflicts. At the time, Vance argued that TPS for Haitians was illegitimate because “Kamala Harris waves the wand illegally and says these people are now here legally.”
In reality, the TPS program for Haitians had been in place since the Obama administration, when it was implemented in response to a devastating earthquake. President Joe Biden extended TPS status for Haitians—legally, despite what Vance claimed—last year.
The Trump administration is now partially reversing that extension and retconning reality to match Vance’s politically motivated delusions.”