“Russia’s changing attack tactics are forcing Ukraine to adapt by making shorter defense lines and building low-rise strongpoints less visible to drones swarming the skies.
But the revamp is undermined by a chaotic approach to fortifying front lines, with very different approaches being used depending on local commanders. Tougher defense positions are also made much less effective by Ukraine’s chronic shortage of combat troops.
The change in fortification strategy is being driven by Russia dropping large formation attacks supported by armored vehicles in favor of much smaller units backed by drones, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said last week.
Ukraine is responding by building fortifications for ever smaller units — from battalions of about 500 troops to companies of about 100, and now for platoons of 20 to 50 soldiers.
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Previously, strong points used extensive trench networks from 2 to 5 kilometers in length. The new system uses smaller strongpoints with trench networks 60 to 70 meters long and equipped with mandatory anti-drone cover. “These are harder to detect and are effective in carrying out tasks of defense, deterrence, and delivering firepower, including against FPV drones,” Umerov said.
Behind that frontline defense, Ukraine is continuing to build two additional lines that include concrete tetrahedrons, also called dragon’s teeth, to hold off armored vehicles, minefields, foxholes, wooden and concrete trenches, anti-drone covers and nets.
“Fortification is not just about concrete and trenches — it is an adaptive engineering system that takes the enemy’s tactics into account and always serves one purpose: protecting our warriors. We monitor the process daily and reinforce the areas where it’s needed most,” Umerov said.
Earlier, fortifications were often built in open terrain to block Russian attacks using large numbers of armored vehicles. Now, they are built around forest belts, which have better camouflage.”
“The attack on the ship comes as Iranian-backed militias in Iraq are also suspected of numerous drone and missile attacks over the past two weeks.
An attack on a vessel in the Red Sea was reported on Sunday, which was the first attack there in months.
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The US launched airstrikes on the Houthis in mid-March. The airstrikes ended in April with some kind of a deal, and the Houthis appeared to stop attacks on ships.”
“The term “axis,” however, suggests that all four powers have a unified view of what they want the global order to look like and have a grand plan to get there. It sounds mischievous and conspiratorial, and it’s most certainly inaccurate. What’s occurring is less a strong, cohesive grouping bounded by ideology and long-term considerations and more a collection of bilateral relationships whose interests sometimes converge — until they don’t.”
“The Pentagon has halted shipments of some air defense missiles and other precision munitions to Ukraine due to worries that U.S. weapons stockpiles have fallen too low.
The decision was driven by the Pentagon’s policy chief, Elbridge Colby, and was made after a review of Pentagon munitions stockpiles, leading to concerns that the total number of artillery rounds, air defense missiles and precision munitions was sinking, according to three people familiar with the issue.”
The Constitution clearly puts the power of deciding to go to war in the hands of the Congress. The attack on Iran was a clear act of war. It was not authorized by Congress. The attack on Iran was unconstitutional.
“Under the War Powers Act of 1973, the law that governs presidential authority to order military strikes, there are three lawful ways for a commander-in-chief to order the bombing of another country. None of them appears to cover the strikes carried out on Saturday.
Here is the relevant section of the law (emphasis added): “The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”
The first two options provided by the law are clearly not involved here, as Congress did not declare war against Iran and did not pass an authorization for the use of military force (as was done to allow the invasion of Iraq in 2002).
The third circumstance also does not apply to Trump’s attack on Iran, which was not carried out in response to an attack on American troops and did not respond to a crisis threatening American soil.”
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“The War Powers Act should not be treated as a series of suggestions that can be discarded when they seem inconvenient. Indeed, limits on executive power are most essential at the moments when they are inconvenient—otherwise, they are meaningless. Trump’s attack on Iran was not just an assault on a suspected nuclear weapons program; it was yet another blow against the separation of powers and the fundamental structure of the American constitutional system.”